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FEDERAL RULE 44.1 AND THE "FACT" 
APPROACH TO DETERMINING FOREIGN 
LAW: DEATH KNELL FOR A 
DIE-HARD DOCTRINE 
Arthur R. Miller• 
l. INTRODUCTION 
THE phenomenal expansion of international trade, communica-tion, and travel following World War II has been accompanied 
by a steady increment in the number of lawsuits with international 
aspects that have been commenced in American courts. Many of 
these cases have raised problems of serving process and other docu-
ments in a foreign country, procuring testimony and tangible evi-
dence abroad, proving foreign law or foreign official records, and 
enforcing judgments rendered beyond our shores. Unfortunately, 
in this country the wholly domestic lawsuit has been the traditional 
template for federal and state procedural systems and little attention 
has been paid to litigation requiring American courts and counsel 
to interact with their counterparts and officials in other lands. As a 
result, it frequently has been impossible to adjust existing domestic 
procedures to the needs of American litigants and the demands of 
foreign legal systems.1 
Responding to a call for reform by the American Bar Association 
and a strong presidential recommendation to the same effect, Con-
gress, in I 958, established the Commission and Advisory Committee 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B., Rochester, 1955; LL.B., Harvard, 
1958.-Ed. 
The author formerly was the Associate Director of the Columbia Law School 
Project on International Procedure and one of the draftsmen of the Uniform Inter-
state and International Procedure Act. Thus, it is necessary to intone the boilerplate 
caveat that the opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of any of the groups with which he was associated during 
the development of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 and the Uniform Act. 
A note of gratitude is extended to Professor John J. Cound of the University of 
Minnesota Law School for his comments on an earlier draft of this document. The 
extensive research assistance of Linda Silberman, a second-year student at the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School, and the valuable help of Prudence C. Beatty and 
Herman Kaufman, second- and third-year students at the University of Michigan 
Law School respectively, also must be acknowledged. 
I. The status of international judicial assistance in the United States as of 1961 is 
described in SMIT &: MILLER, INTERNATIONAL Co-OPERATION IN CIVIL LITIGATION-A 
REPORT ON PRAcrICES AND PROCEDURES PREVAILING IN THE UNITED STATES (Milan, 1961); 
Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1031 (1961). 
See also Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program 
for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953); Symposium: Pre-Trial and Trial Techniques in 
International Litigation, A.B.A. SEC. !NT'L &: COMP. L., PROCEEDINGS 34 (1959). 
[ 615] 
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on International Rules of Judicial Procedure,2 to which a distin-
guished group of judges, governmental officials, scholars, and prac-
titioners were appointed. Between 1958 and 1966, the Commission 
collaborated with the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States and the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and received the 
drafting and research assistance of the Columbia Law School Project 
on International Procedure. These labors have produced a complete 
revision of the federal schema for international judicial assistance 
and led to the adoption of the Uniform Interstate and International 
Procedure Act as a model for the states.3 
One important facet of the post-war proliferation of international 
litigation is a correlative increase in the number of lawsuits in which 
the law of a foreign country is germane, either because it governs 
the rights and liabilities of the parties under the relevant conflict-of-
laws principles or because it bears on a particular issue or issues in 
a case otherwise controlled by domestic law.4 Examination of the 
legislative and judicial treatment given the pleading, proof, and 
appellate review of foreign-law and a perusal of the decisions de-
lineating the consequences of failing to prove alien law, reveal an 
enormous disparity in approach to these matters and a tenacious 
retention of archaic dogma by American courts that is inconsistent 
2. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1743. 
3. These reforms are outlined in Commission on International Rules of Judicial 
Assistance, Fourth Annual Report, H.R. Doc. No. 88, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); 
Miller, International Co-operation in Litigation Between the United States and Switzer-
land: Unilateral Procedural Accommodation in a Test Tube, 49 MINN. L. REv. 
1069-73 (1965). Particular aspects of the recent changes are discussed in 1 BARRON &: 
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTlCE AND PROCEDURE § 184.1 (Wright ed. 1961 Supp. 1966); 2A 
id. § 693; 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 4.45 (2d ed. 1966); 4 id, ~~ 28.03-.08; 
Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (pts. 1-2) 
77 HARV. L. REv. 601, 635-37, 801, 811-14 (1964); Leflar, Act IOI-Uniform Interstate and 
International Procedure Act, 17 .ARK. L. REv. 118 (1963); Smit, International Litigation 
Under the United States Code, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 1015 (1965); Smit, Assistance Rendered 
by the United States in Proceedings Before International Tribunals, 62 COLUM, L. REv. 
1264 (1962); Smit, The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act Approved 
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws: A New Era Com-
mences, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 415 (1962); Comment, Judicial Notice and Deposition Prac-
tice in International Litigation, 1966 DuKE L.J. 512; Comment, Revitalization of the 
International Judicial Assistance Procedures of the United States: Service of Documents 
and Taking of Testimony, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1375 (1964). As of this writing, the Uniform 
Act has been enacted in three jurisdictions. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.2501-07 (Supp. 
1965); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1701.01-1706.04 (Supp. 1966); V.I. CooE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4901-
43 (Supp. 1965). The Judicial Council of Massachusetts has recommended the adoption 
of the Act, 41 Mass. Jud. Council (Pub. Doc. 144) 8-20 (1965), as has the Michigan 
Law Revision Commission, I M1cH, LAw REv. CoMM'N REP. (1967). 
4. The words "foreign law" or "alien law" are used in this article to refer to the 
law of a foreign country unless otherwise indicated. Because many state courts treated 
the pleading and proof of the law of sister states and foreign countries similarly until 
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with current trends in civil procedure. The cases also leave little 
doubt that the process of establishing foreign law often has proven 
to be tortuous and frustrating for both bench and bar. 
The objective of this article is to analyze Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 44.1, which was developed as part of the reforms of the 
last decade and became effective on July 1, 1966/1 and to assess its 
capacity to rationalize the process of determining foreign law in 
the federal courts. What follows is an excursion through the past 
doctrine and into the probable future treatment of foreign law in 
the federal courts, an exploration of the interrelationship between 
the new Rule and other phases of federal civil procedure, and an 
analysis of the prospect that the Rule's effectiveness may be partially 
emasculated by supervening policies inherent in our federal system. 
Although the primary focus of this article will be on foreign law in 
the federal courts, the substantial identity between Federal Rule 
44.1 and Article IV of the Uniform Interstate and International 
Procedure Act, coupled with the probability that states with a pro-
cedure patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will 
adopt Rule 44.1 in the near future,6 renders the following discussion 
relevant to state practice as well. 
II. THE PRECURSORS OF FEDERAL PRACTICE 
A. Common-Law Doctrines 
Anglo-American courts and commentators historically have char-
acterized a foreign-law issue as a question of fact to be pleaded and 
proved as a fact by the party whose cause of action or defense de-
pends upon alien law.7 Statements to this effect began to appear with 
recently, and because some states continue to do so, citations to state cases dealing 
with the determination of questions of sister-state law have been included when they 
seemed applicable to the foreign-country situation as well. 
5. The text of the Rule is as follows: 
A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country 
shall give notice in his pleadings or other reasonable written notice. The court, 
in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source, includ-
ing testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under Rule 43. 
The court's determination shall be treated as a ruling on a, question of law. 
The text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1, which also became effective on 
July 1, 1966, is identical except that the words "notice in his pleadings or other" in the 
first sentence of Rule 44.1 have been omitted from the criminal rule because there are 
no pleadings in criminal cases. 
6. Arizona adopted Rule 44.1 at the same time it became effective on the federal 
scene. See generally Frank, Arizona and the Federal Rules, 41 F.R.D. 79 (1966). 
7. See generally 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 621.2 (1935); 1 CHI'ITY, PLEADING 
•221 (1809); DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAws 1107-16 (7th ed. 1958); REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT 
OF LAws §§ 621-23 (1934); SOMMERICH &: BuscH, FOREIGN LAw-A GumE TO PLEADING 
AND PROOF 13-17 (1959); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 175 (3d ed. 1963); WESTLAKE, 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 413-14 (1859); 1 WHARTON, EVIDENCE §§ 300-16 (1877); 
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2573 (3d ed. 1940); 3 WOODDESON, LAws OF ENGLAND •309 (1794). 
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regularity in the eighteenth-century English cases8 and became so 
embedded in the literature by the following century that reiteration 
of the dogma· during the past one-hundred years has taken on a 
pavlovian quality. Despite its prevalence, the fact theory's genesis 
never has been isolated or its raison d'etre satisfactorily explained. 
Professor Beale suggested that its roots are to be found in the early 
English view that the only legal issue before a court was the domes-
tic law relevant to the case, which logically required all else to be 
characterized as fact.9 This explanation seems plausible inasmuch as 
English courts, in contrast to their continental counterparts, rou-
tinely declined to take jurisdiction over lawsuits having foreign 
incidents until well into the seventeenth century.10 This abstemious 
philosophy was a natural product of the high degree of jurispruden-
tial isolation afforded by the English Channel, the concept that trial 
by jury required trial per pais, which called for a jury whose mem-
bers were drawn from the vicinage where the facts occurred and 
theoretically had no cognizance of matters beyond their own locale, 
and the insistence that all causes fit within the existing, highly 
stylized forms of action.11 By the time "foreign" issues finally were 
granted entree to the inner sanctum of English justice, the long 
history of equating "law" with "English law" may well have so ob-
scured the difference between questions involving foreign events or 
transactions, which are traditionally factual matters, and issues con-
cerning the municipal law of another country that the courts simply 
classified all foreign elements in a case as questions of fact. 
Despite its uncertain origin and the highly unsettled character 
of the English practice of determining alien law during the American 
colonial and revolutionary periods, the fact theory of foreign law 
was embraced by the courts in this country without re-examina-
tion.12 American adherence to the common-law conception of 
8. See Male v. Roberts, 3 Esp. 163, 170 Eng. Rep. 574 (K.B. 1800); Mostyn v. 
Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774); Fremoult v. Dedire, I P. Wms. 
429, 24 Eng. Rep. 458 (Ch. 1718); Faubert v. De Cresseron, I Show. 194, I Eng. Rep. 
130 (H.L. 1698). These cases are discussed at text accompanying notes 235-40 infra. 
Current English practice is described in 15 HALSBURY's LAws OF ENGLAND ,I'1 597-603 
(3d ed. Simonds 1956). 
9. See 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 621.1 (1935). 
IO. See Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law, in 3 I.Aw: A 
CENTURY OF PROGRESS 342 (1937). 
11. Ibid. 
12. Note, Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 18 VAND. L. :&Ev. 1962, 1971-74 (1965). 
To the extent that the fact theory is discernible in England at all during the colonial 
period, it appears to have been designed primarily for situations involving the law 
of foreign countries. Yet, in this country it also has been applied to cases involving 
the law of sister states. The absurdity of perpetuating the common-law theory in the 
twentieth century is commented on in Hammond Motor Co. v. Warren, 113 Kan. 44, 
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foreign law cannot be rationalized in the same terms as have been 
offered for the English experience because foreign causes of action 
never have been viewed as anathema in this country and our jury 
institution never has been concerned with the jurors' testimonial 
qualifications or tied to notions of fact-venue; most probably our 
incorporation of the common-law view of foreign law simply repre-
sents blind obedience to entrenched attitudes. On the other hand, a 
concatenation of factors can be suggested for our perpetuation of the 
English view of foreign law: the enormous size of the United States; 
its ingestion during the nineteenth century of several large land 
masses having cultural and legal frameworks radically different from 
those found in the original Union-events that reinforced the 
tendency of state court judges to characterize the law of a sister state 
as foreign; the nation's relatively long isolation from other legal sys-
tems; the philosophy of state sovereignty, generated during the 
colonial and confederation periods and never completely eradicated; 
and an admixture of by-products of the polity's federal character.13 
On a more mundane but highly pragmatic level, until recently it 
has been difficult, and most librarians have been reluctant, to 
procure foreign-law materials in this country. Even today, extensive 
foreign-law libraries exist only in the important commercial and 
legal centers, so that foreign legal materials are not readily available 
in substantial areas of the nation.14 As recently as 1958, a federal dis-
trict judge in the Eastern District of New York remarked that despite 
his discretion to take judicial notice of foreign law under a New 
York statute, he did not have sufficient research facilities to justify 
departing from the traditional reliance on counsel for a comprehen-
sive presentation on the foreign-law issue.15 
The fact that this judge did not feel obliged to resort to one of 
the fine foreign-law collections a few miles from his courthouse 
suggests that access to foreign-law material was not the sole inhibi-
tion operating on him. It may betray an understandable feeling of 
inadequacy or insecurity with regard to issues of foreign law and an 
unwillingness to venture beyond the perimeter established by the 
proof presented by counsel, which, if widespread, also contributes to 
the continued vitality of the fact theory. Although we expect judges 
46, 213 Pac. 810, 8ll (1923), and in Hartwig, Congressional Enactment of Uniform 
Judidal Notice Act, 40 MICH. L. REv. 174, 176-78 (1941). See also 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 257!1 (3d ed. 1940). 
l!I. See Comment, Conflict of Laws-Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 30 MICH, L. 
REV. 747 (1932). 
14. See generally SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 31-41 (2d ed. 1959). 
15. Telesphore Couture v. Watkins, 162 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1958). 
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to be conversant with the law of their own, and perhaps related, 
jurisdictions, we cannot expect them to be familiar with the sub-
stance, let alone the nuances, of the jurisprudence of every state, 
territory, and country throughout the world. As Mr. Justice Holmes 
stated in Diaz v. Gonzalez,16 referring to the law of a civil-law juris-
diction: 
When we contemplate such a system from the outside it seems like 
a wall of stone, every part even with all the others, except so far as 
our own local education may lead us to see subordinations to which 
we are accustomed. But to one brought up within it, varying 
emphasis, tacit assumptions, unwritten practices, a thousand influ-
ences gained only from life, may give to the different parts wholly 
new values that logic and grammar never could have got from the 
books.17 
Even accepting the premise that issues of foreign law create 
difficulties of a different magnitude than those caused by issues of 
domestic law, what analytic or administrative advantage is served by 
cloaking this difference in the trappings of the conclusory law-fact 
dichotomy? It is submitted that there is none and that the fact 
characterization of foreign law is a misnomer. "Foreign law may be 
called a juridical fact with only one quality to differentiate it from 
domestic law, namely, that while judges are supposed to know the 
domestic law, they are not supposed to know the foreign law."18 
If the fact theory represented only a perversion of nomenclature, 
it would be of little consequence. Similarly, if a judicial pronounce-
ment that an issue of foreign law raises an issue of fact was simply 
a euphemism for the notion that counsel bear the responsibility for 
demonstrating the content of foreign law because judges cannot be 
expected to divine alien law on their own, the exercise in semantic 
alchemy could be tolerated. Unfortunately, however, the role of the 
fact theory has not been a passive one; the courts have become so 
entranced by the catechism that it has drastically affected the judicial 
treatment accorded foreign-law issues. 
One of the primary derivatives of the common-law characteriza-
tion of foreign law is that a party who relies on such law must plead 
it.19 The syllogistic basis for this proposition is self-evident. If foreign 
16. 261 U.S. 102 (1923). 
17. Id. at 106. See also Pittsburgh, C., C. &: St. L. Ry. v. Austin's Adm'r, 141 Ky. 
722, 728, 133 S.W. 780, 783 (1911), rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 143 Ky. 70, 
135 S.W. 413 (1911); Husserl, The Foreign Fact Element in Conflict of Laws, 26 VA. L. 
REV. 243 (1940). 
18, Wachtell, The Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts, 69 U.S.L. REv. 526, 
535 (1935). 
19. See, e.g., Hempstead v. Reed, 6 Conn. 480 (1827); Louisville, N.A. &: C. Ry. v. 
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law is a fact and facts must be pleaded, then foreign law must be 
pleaded. Several early decisions even insisted that pertinent foreign 
statutory material be pleaded in haec verba.20 Although a modicum 
of uncertainty on the point still exists, it probably is unnecessary to 
include a verbatim transcript of foreign statutes and court decisions 
when pleading in a jurisdiction in which the common-law rules re-
garding foreign law persist.21 Nonetheless, in these jurisdictions and 
in many that have adopted code pleading, a skillful statement is still 
required. Otherwise, a foreign-law statement might fall prey to a 
demurrer or to the code motion to dismiss for pleading evidence, 
when too much has been set forth, or for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion, when too little has been pleaded.22 In jurisdictions that take a 
permissive attitude toward the demands of code pleading formulae 
or that have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or some 
variant of the "notice" theory of pleading, the technical pitfalls of 
pleading foreign law have been ameliorated or entirely eliminated. 
At common law, proof of the written law of a sister state or 
foreign country generally required the introduction in evidence of 
a properly certified or exemplified copy or an official publication of 
the applicable law; 23 oral testimony concerning written law was un-
acceptable.24 This practice was believed required by the best-evidence 
Shires, 108 Ill. 617 (1884); Bean v. Briggs, 4 Iowa 464 (1857); Walker v. Maxwell, 1 
Mass. 104 (1804); Moe v. Shaffer, 150 Minn. ll4, 184 N.W. 785 (1921), 18 A.L.R. II94 
(1922); Gibson v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 225 Mo. 473, 125 S.W. 453 (1910); McKnight v. 
Oregon S.L.R.R., 33 Mont. 40, 82 Pac. 661 (1905); Sultan of Turkey v. Tiryakian, 213 
N.Y. 429, 108 N.E. 72 (1915); Peck v. Hibbard, 26 Vt. 698 (1854). See also Annot., 
Manner and Sufficiency of Pleading Foreign Law, 134 A.L.R. 570 (1941). 
20. See, e.g., Holmes v. Broughton, IO Wend. 75, 78 (N.Y. 1833). Statutory relief 
from stringent pleading requirements was afforded in some states at a comparatively 
early date. See N.Y. Laws 1848, ch. 312. 
21. See SOMMERICH 8: BUSCH, FOREIGN I.Aw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 13, 
32 (1959), and cases cited therein. But see Record Truck Linc, Inc. v. Harrison, 109 
~~~m~~~=~®~~~m~•m~ 
578 (1964) (dictum); McDonald v. Bankers Life Ass'n, 154 Mo. 618, 55 S.W. 999 (1900); 
Martin Bros. v. Nettleton, 138 Wash. 102, 244 Pac. 386 (1926); Lowry v. Moore, 16 
Wash. 476, 48 Pac. 238 (1897); McKenzie 8: Sarabia, The Pleading and Proof of Alien 
Law, 30 TuL. L. REv. 351, 361 (1956). See also Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138 
So. 414 (1931). 
22. Compare Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Brandt, 240 Ala. 260, 198 So. 595 (1940), 
and Argentine Airlines v. Aircraft Dynamics Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 272, 170 N.Y.S.2d 600 
(Sup. Ct. 1957), with Mcijer v. General Cigar Co., 73 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 
273 App. Div. 760, 75 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1947). 
23. See, e.g., Robinson v. Clifford, 20 Fed. Cas. 1001 (No. 11948) (C.C.D. Pa. 1807); 
Owen v. Boyle, 15 Me. 147 (1838). Proper authentication often was a condition on the 
copy's admissibility. 
24. See, e.g., Kenny v. Clarkson, I Johns. 385 (N.Y. 1806); Clegg v. Levy, 3 Camp. 
166, 170 Eng. Rep. 1343 (K.B. 1812); Millar v. Heinrick, 4 Camp. 155, 171 Eng. Rep. 
50 (C.P. 1815); Boehtlinck v. Schneider, 3 Esp. 58, 170 Eng. Rep. 537 (C.P. 1799). But 
cf. Ganer v. Lady Lanesborough, Peake 25, 170 Eng. Rep. 66 (K.B. 1790). 
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rule and deviation from it was permitted only when an authenticated 
copy of the foreign law could not be obtained.20 Unwritten laws, 
customs, and usages could be established by testimony of persons 
conversant with the relevant foreign law, custom, or usage, or, if 
available, by reports of proceedings before the out-of-state tribunals.26 
By the close of the nineteenth century, the technique of introducing 
a copy of an applicable statute or code provision and using expert 
testimony to establish its meaning had become common.21 Some 
courts, however, continued to hold oral testimony insufficient.28 
Another radiation of the common-law fact theory was the use of 
the rules of evidence to restrict the modes of proving foreign law.29 
On innumerable occasions, excessive amounts of time and money 
were expended by counsel to obtain copies of statutes and judicial 
decisions and to put expert testimony in a form that would satisfy 
the technical rules of admissibility. Moreover, much judicial energy 
was dissipated in refining the rules of evidence so that they could be 
applied to the proof of foreign law.30 The fact characterization of 
25. See Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 238 (1804); Charlotte v. Chou-
teau, 25 Mo. 465 (1857); Chanoine v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173 (N.Y. 1829); State v. Twitty, 
9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 441 (1823); Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts 158 (Pa. 1840); Dougherty 
v. Snyder, 15 Serg. 8: Rawle 84 (Pa. 1826). 
26. See, e.g., Kennett v. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181 (1863). The distinction between proof 
of written and unwritten foreign law is set out in Newsom v. Adams, 2 La. 153 (1831); 
Raynham v. Canton, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 293 (1825); People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349 
(1858); Phillips v. Gregg, supra note 25; Woodbridge v. Austin, 2 Tyler 364 (Vt. 1803); 
Millar v. Heinrick, 4 Camp. 155, 171 Eng. Rep. 50 (C.P. 1815). See generally Ennis v. 
Smith, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 400 (1852); STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 640-42 (1st ed. 1834). 
27. See The Sussex Peerage, 11 Cl. 8: Fin. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L 1844); 3 
BEALE, CONFLicr OF LAws § 621.5 (1935); STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 641-42 (1st ed. 
1834). See also Barkman v. Hopkins, 11 Ark. 157 (1850); Greasons v. Davis, 9 Iowa 
219 (1859); Wachtell, The Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts, 69 U.S.L. REv. 
526, 537-40, 580-85 (1935). Expert testimony on an issue of foreign law always has 
been subject to cross-examination. Moreover, the courts have exercised considerable 
discretion in determining the qualifications of expert witnesses and the extent to 
which their opinions, whether controverted or not, should be honored. See, e.g., Estate 
of Schluttig, 36 Cal. 2d 416, 224 P .2d 695 (1950); Barber v. International Co. of Mexico, 
73 Conn. 587, 599-600, 48 Atl. 758, 763-64 (1901); H. T. Cottam 8: Co. v. Comision 
Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 149 La. 1026, 90 So. 392 (1921); Hall v. Cos-
tello, 48 N.H. 176 (1868); Masocco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div. 181, 254 N.Y. Supp. 439 
(1931). See also GRAVESON, CoNFLicr OF LAws 399-401 (4th ed. 1960); Spaeth v. Kouns, 
95 Kan. 320, 148 Pac. 651 (1915); Central Consumers Co. v. Ralston, 202 Ky. 94, 259 
S.W. 67 (1923). An expert did not have to be a lawyer if he possessed other qualifi-
cations. See French v. Lowell, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 34 (1836) (dictum); Massucco v. 
Tomassi, 78 Vt. 188, 62 Atl. 57 (1905). See generally Sommerich &: Busch, The Expert 
Witness and the Proof of Foreign Law, 38 CoRNELL L.Q. 125, 147-53 (1953). 
28. See Robertson v. Staed, 135 Mo. 135, 36 S.W. 610 (1896); Russian Reinsurance 
Co. v. Stoddard, 211 App. Div. 132, 207 N.Y. Supp. 574 (1925), rev'd on other grounds, 
240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925). But see STARKIE, EVIDENCE •176. 
29. See 1 TAYLOR, EVIDENCE § 41 (3d ed. 1858). 
30. See, e.g., Nashua Sav. Bank v. Anglo-American Land, Mortgage 8: Agency Co., 
l6~ V,S, ~1 (1903); Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 546 (1882). 
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foreign law occasionally was carried to the extreme of leaving foreign-
law issues to the jury for determination, thereby increasing both the 
effort devoted to the presentation of evidence on such issues and the 
possibility of reversible error.31 Interjection of the jury caused con-
siderable uncertainty and confusion because it was not clear whether 
the jury's province was to determine the content of foreign law or 
merely to resolve conflicts in the testimony concerning its substance.32 
The absence of a sharp demarcation between the role of the trial 
judge and that of the jury probably reflected a desire to preserve the 
court's competence as an interpreter of legal materials while continu-
ing to utilize the jury's assumed expertise on matters of credibility.33 
The fact characterization also complicated the process of review-
ing trial-court findings on foreign-law issues. Many appellate courts 
went to the extreme of transmogrifying their attitudes toward re-
examining findings of fact and held that the trial court's resolution 
of a testimonial conflict regarding foreign law was conclusive unless 
against the clear weight of the evidence or not supported by any 
substantial evidence.34 If the relevant foreign statutes and judicial 
opinions were introduced at trial, however, some courts held that 
their construction and interpretation were subject to plenary re-
31. See Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. !H7 (1823); Ingraham v. Hart, 11 Ohio 255 
(1842). See also Keeffe, Landis 1k Shaad, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 
2 STAN. L. R.Ev. 664, 674 (1950). The ultimate extension of the fact theory probably is 
the thought that a mistake of foreign law is a mistake of fact. See WILLISTON, CON• 
TRAcrs § 1592 (rev. ed. 1937); cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 27 F.R.D. 
255 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East 469, 102 Eng. Rep. 448 (K.B. 1802). 
32. See Bock v. Lauman, 24 Pa. 435 (1855). Cases submitting foreign law to the 
jury in the latter context appear to have been more numerous. See Electric Welding 
Co. v. Prince, 200 Mass. 386, 86 N.E. 947 (1909); Harrison v. Atlantic C.L. Ry., 168 
N.C. 382, 84 S.E. 519 (1915); Hite v. Keene, 149 Wis. 207, 134 N.W. 383 (1912), modified 
on rehearing on other grounds, 149 Wis. 207, 135 N.W. 354 (1912); Hooper v. Moore, 
50 N.C. 136 (1857). See also Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and 
Proof, 45 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 23, 27 (1957); Annot., Determination of Question Relating to 
Foreign Law as One of Law or of Fact, 34 A.L.R. 1447 (1925). 
33. Most jurisdictions have now made foreign law an issue for the court by statute 
or judicial decision. See, e.g., Christiansen v. William Graver Tank Works, 223 Ill. 142, 
79 N.E. 97 (1906), 20 HARv. L. REv. 575 (1907); Current Legislation, Judicial Notice 
of the Law of Foreign States, 20 CoLUM. L. REv. 476 (1920); Comment, Conflict of 
Laws-Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 30 M1cH. L. R.Ev. 747, 748-49 (1932). The ques-
tion of jury trial is considered further at text accompanying notes 231-92 infra. 
34. See, e.g., Estate of Schluttig, 36 Cal. 2d 416, 224 P.2d 695 (1950); Hawi Mill 1k 
Plantation Co. v. Finn, 82 Cal. App. 255, 255 Pac. 543 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927); Wylie v. 
Cotter, 170 Mass. 356, 49 N.E. 746 (1898); Ames v. McCamber, 124 Mass. 85 (1878); 
Hansen v. Grand Trunk Ry., 78 N.H. 518, 102 Atl. 625 (1917): Banco Minero v. Ross 
8e Masterson, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711 (1915). See also Note, Proof of the Law of 
Foreign Countries: Appellate Review and Subsequent Litigation, 72 HAR.v. L. REv. 
318, 319-24 (1958). Most state decisions have not permitted an issue of foreign law 
to be raised on appeal for the first time. See, e.g., Emanuel v. Feierman, 202 Cal. App. 
2d 552, 20 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Donahue v. Dal, Inc., 314 Mass. 460, 
50 N.E.2d 207 (1943). 
624 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:613 
view.35 In general, a reviewing court's pronouncements on the 
content of a foreign country's law were not accorded precedential 
weight in subsequent cases in the same forum.36 
This sketchy panorama of the common-law treatment of foreign 
law suffices to demonstrate that the fact theory had ramifications far 
beyond the limits of the historical and administrative justifications 
offered for it. It is apparent that in an attempt to minimize the 
burden that issues of foreign law imposed on the trial judge and to 
maximize the assistance rendered by counsel, the common law con-
structed a procedural microcosm based on an equation between 
"foreign law" and "fact." Over the years, the resulting pastiche 
became so entangled in detail and so fertile a field for adversarial 
machinations that it actually exacerbated the difficulties inherent in 
proving foreign law. The original objective of the equation became 
mired in a morass of technicalities and ultimately was lost in the 
conclusory assertion of epithets that had the sole virtue of being 
harmonious with the fact characterization of foreign law. 
B. Modification of Common-Law Doctrines 
The initial legislative deviation from the common-law view of 
foreign law appears to have occurred in 1840 when Connecticut 
enacted a statute permitting "the reports of the judicial decisions of 
other states and countries ... [to] be judicially noticed ... as evi-
dence of the common law of such states or countries, and of the 
judicial construction of the statutes or other laws thereof."37 Since 
1848, Mississippi has provided that foreign law shall be noticed in 
the same way as if the question arose under local law.38 Following 
the publication in 1898 of Professor Thayer's Preliminary Treatise 
on Evidence, in which the author advocated a widened application 
of judicial notice,39 dissatisfaction with the common-law treatment 
of foreign law became more vociferous and a movement for "re-
35. See, e.g., Bank of China, Japan &: the Straits, Ltd. v. Morse, 168 N.Y. 458, 61 
N.E. 774 (1901); Tarbell v. Grand Trunk Ry., 96 Vt. 170, 118 At!. 484 (1922). But see 
Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N.H. 126, 155 At!. 47 (1931), which discusses the fact-law classi-
fication of foreign-law issues and recognizes that it is as much the duty of the judge 
to pass upon issues of foreign law as it is to pass upon issues of domestic law. 
36. See Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1034-35 
(1941); Note, Proof of the Law of Foreign Countries: Appellate Review and Subse-
quent Litigation, 72 HARV. L. REv. 318, 324-28 (1958). But see Nicholas E. Vernicos 
Shipping Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1965), in which the court relied 
heavily on a discussion.of Greek law in an earlier case. 
37. See Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 361, 370 (1847). The present version of 
the Connecticut statute is CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 52-163, -164 (1960). 
38. MISS. CoDE 1848, ch. 60, art. 10. The present text of the statute is found in 
Miss. CODE ANN. § 1761 (1956). See generally Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., 156 
Miss. 567, 126 So. 395 (1930). 
39. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 277-312 (1898). 
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form" developed. It bore fruit in Professor Thayer's own state in 
1926, when Massachusetts enacted a statute requiring that judicial 
notice be taken of the law of foreign countries.40 The following year 
the California courts were given power to take judicial notice of the 
law of sister states.41 
In 1936, the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act was 
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws and by the American Bar Association.42 The Uniform 
Act's judicial-notice provision applies only to the law of sister states 
and thus is a less drastic departure from common-law practice than 
was the Massachusetts statute of a decade earlier. Moreover, the act 
does not expressly apostatize the common-law pleading requirement 
but merely provides that "reasonable notice shall be given to the 
adverse parties either in the pleadings or otherwise.''43 The court is 
authorized to do independent research "as it may deem proper" and 
to call upon counsel for assistance in establishing the law.44 .How-
ever, section 4 of the act, which restricts the party's presentation to 
"admissible evidence," preserves some of the defects of the common-
law approach and appears to be inconsistent with the court's power 
to do independent research. Only section 5 deals directly with the 
law of foreign countries and it simply states that such law "shall be 
an issue for the court.'' The Commissioners' Notes make the 
section's objective abundantly clear: "we do want to make the 
foreign law determinable by the judge, not the jury, thus changing 
the absurd old common law.''45 The Uniform Act has been adopted 
in a majority of the States and the Virgin Islands.46 Although several 
states have construed or modified it in ways that perpetuate certain 
40. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 233, § 70 (1956). 
41. See Cal. Stat. 1927, ch. 62, p. 110. See also Laws of Missouri 157 (1927) Qudicial 
notice of sister-state law). Missouri now has the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign 
Law Act. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 490.070-.120 (1959). In 1957, California amended its 
judicial-notice statute to authorize notice of the law of a foreign country. Cal. Stat. 
1957, ch. 249. In 1965, as part of a general revision of its law of evidence, California 
again amended its judicial-notice statute to leave the matter within the trial court's 
discretion except when requested to take judicial notice by a party who gives notice 
to each adverse party and furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it 
to take judicial notice. CAL. Evm. ConE §§ 452-56 (effective Jan. 1, 1967). Although 
the 1957 and 1965 California statutes appear to be mandatory, in practical effect they 
are permissive. See Recommendation and Study Relating to Judicial Notice of the 
Law of Foreign Countries, 1 CALIF. I.Aw REv. CoMM'N I-1, I-14, I-19 (1957). 
42. 9A UNIFORM LAws ANN. 569 (1965). See also Annot., Uniform Judicial Notice 
of Foreign Law Act, 23 A.L.R.2d 1437 (1952). 
43. See Revlett v. Louisville & N.R.R., 114 Ind. App. 187, 51 N.E.2d 95 (1943). 
44. See In re Hunter's Estate, 125 Mont. 315, 236 P.2d 94 (1951). 
45. 9A UNIFORM LAws ANN. 318, 329 (1957). See also Franzen v. Equitable Life 
Assur. Sec'y, 130 N.J.L. 457, 33 A.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 1943). 
46. Oklahoma and the Virgin Islands appear to have repealed the Uniform Judi-
cial Notice of Foreign Law Act by implication by enacting the Uniform Interstate 
and International Procedure Act. 
626 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:613 
common-law practices, such as the pleading requirement,47 ·the Act 
has upgraded the process of determining foreign law in many juris-
dictions. Moreover, a number of states have enacted legislation sim-
ilar to the Uniform Act48 and more than a dozen states have gone 
further and adopted statutes that either authorize or require judicial 
notice to be taken of the law of foreign nations.49 The strict com-
mon-law practice or something comparable to it continues to prevail 
in only a handful of states. 50 
47. See N.J. Laws 1941, ch. 81, § 1, at 193; S.C. CODE ANN. § 26·62 (1962); WASH. 
REv. CODE § 5.24.040 (1963). See also Kingston v. Quimby, 80 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1955). 
The New Jersey statute was amended in 1960, N.J. Laws 1960, ch. 52, § 48, to make 
reasonable notice an alternative to pleading. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:82-27 (Supp. 1966); 
see In re Damato's Estate, 86 N.J. Super. 107, 206 A.2d 171 (Super. Ct. 1965). See 
generally Rafalko, Pleading, Proving and Obtaining Information on Foreign Law, 43 
U. DET. L.J. 95, 101-09 (1965); Comment, Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 38 Wash. 
L. REv. 802 (1963). 
48. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2573 (3d ed. 1940); see Boswell v. Rio De Oro Uranium 
Mines, Inc., 68 N.M. 457, 460-61, 362 P.2d 991, 994 (1961). 
49. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27.2504 (Supp. 1965); CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 310-11, 450-60 
(effective Jan. 1, 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 52-163, -164 (1960); KAN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 60-409 (1964); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 233, § 70 (Supp. 1956); MICH. COMP. LAws 
§§ 600.2114, .2118 (1962); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1762 (1956); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:82-27 
(Supp. 1966); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. &: R. 4511; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-4 (1953); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 12, §§ 1704.01-.03 (Supp. 1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-273 (1957); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 5711 (1961) (semble). See also V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4926-28 (Supp. 1966); SCHLES-
INGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 130 (2d ed. 1959). In Maryland the court may take judicial 
notice of the law of any jurisdiction that is "based upon the common law of England." 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 47 (1957). A very broad construction was given this statute 
in Reisig v. Associated Jewish Charities, 182 Md. 432, 34 A.2d 842 (1943) Gudicial 
notice of Palestinian law during period of British mandate). 
The New York experience with judicial notice statutes is interesting. Between 
1944 and 1963, New York was one of the jurisdictions in which the courts had discre-
tion to take judicial notice of the law of a sister state or foreign country. N.Y. CIV. 
PRAc. ACT § 344-a; see Saxe, New York Extends Judicial Notice to Matters of Law, 
28 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 86 (1944). Since 1963, rule 4511 of the Civil Practice Law and 
Rules requires a New York court to take judicial notice of the law of all jurisdictions 
within the United States, including its territories, but leaves judicial notice of the 
law of foreign countries to the trial judge's discretion, except when "a party requests 
it, furnishes the court sufficient information to enable it to comply with the request, 
and has given each adverse party notice of his intention to request it." The New 
York provision also permits the court to consider any material, "whether offered by 
a party or discovered through its own research,'' and expressly leaves the determina-
tion of foreign law to the judge. See generally 5 WEINSTEIN, KORN &: MILLER, NEW YORK 
CIVIL PRACTICE 1r,f 4511.03-.04 (1966). The New York provision is very similar to UNI• 
FORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 9-10 (1953) and the new California Practice. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. 
L. &: R. 3016(e), also enacted in 1963, requires the "substance" of a foreign country's 
law to be pleaded. This new formula is intended to liberalize the pleading require-
ment in that state. See 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN &: MILLER, op. cit. supra, 1111 3016.13-.17; 5 
id., 11 4511.05. A retrogressive construction of N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. &: R. 3016(e) and 4511 
is suggested in Sommerich &: Busch, Judicial Notice of Law Under New Civil Practice 
Law and Rules, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 18, 1962, p. 4, col. 1. The debate over the statute's 
interpretation may now be academic because of the forward-looking and commendable 
decision in Gevinson v. Kirkeby-Natus Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 71, 270 N.Y.S.2d 989 
(1966). 
50. SoMMERICH &: BUSCH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PR.OOF, app. C 
(1959) lists seven states in which the "common law prevails" and one state, Louisiana, 
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The trend toward judicial notice of foreign law was accompanied 
by the adoption in 1920 of the Uniform Proof of Statutes Act,151 
which gives prima fade evidentiary effect to foreign publications 
printed with "the authority of" or "commonly recognized in" the 
courts of a foreign jurisdiction. This Uniform Act has been enacted 
in twenty states and the Virgin Islands; similar legislation exists 
in many other jurisdictions.152 In addition, several states extend 
prima fade evidentiary effect to volumes containing foreign judicial 
opinions as well as to foreign statutory materials.153 Still another 
group of statutes permits judicial notice of special classes of foreign 
written law and its construction.154 Although primarily intended to 
eliminate the need for authentication of copies of foreign legislative 
materials, these acts also facilitate proof of the law's content. 
Unfortunately, many state statutes have not succeeded in over-
coming the common-law conception of foreign law; for example, 
state courts frequently have taken the position that judicial-notice 
statutes do not affect pleading requirements.155 In Greiner v. 
Freund,56 a New York appellate court rejected the plaintiff's request 
that judicial notice be taken of Austrian law and affirmed the dis-
missal of his complaint, characterizing its failure to set forth the 
substance of the applicable passages of Austrian law as a "complete 
disregard of the requirement of the plain and concise statement of 
material facts .... "157 
Adherence to common-law precepts despite statutory modifica-
tion has been discernible outside New Yark. The Massachusetts 
judicial-notice statute, which is mandatory in tone, has been ren-
in which the "common law prevails" except for the Uniform Proof of Statutes Act. 
In point of fact, there is legislation in each of the seven named states that deviates in 
one or more respects from common-law practice and Louisiana enacted the Uniform 
Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act after the publication of the book. 
51. 9B Uniform Laws Ann. 401 (1957). 
52. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 599.02 (1957). The Virgin Islands appears to have re-
pealed the Uniform Proof of Statutes Act by implication when it enacted the Uniform 
Interstate and International Procedure Act. 
53. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. &: R. 45ll(d). 
54. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. ConE § 6602. 
55. See, e.g., Greear v. Paust, 202 Minn. 6!13, 279 N.W. 568 (1938). 
56. 286 App. Div. 996, 144 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1955). 
57. Id. at 997, 144 N.Y.S.2d at 767. But cf. Pfleuger v. Pfleuger, 304 N.Y. 148, 106 
N.E.2d 495 (1952) (Pennsylvania law); Olson v. Kilian, 203 Misc. 847, 119 N.Y.S.2d 94 
(Sup. Ct. 1953) (Ontario statute). The difficulties of pleading foreign law were com-
pounded by the formalism of code pleading, which resulted in considerable time and 
energy being devoted to the classic question whether the pleading set out the desired 
"facts" or contained "conclusions" or "evidence." See, e.g., Meijer v. General Cigar Co., 
73 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 273 App. Div. 760, 75 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1947). See 
also Andretto Bank A.G. v. Goodbody &: Co., 15 Misc. 2d 395, 181 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. 
Ct. 1958). 
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dered permissive in application by a judicially imposed requirement 
that counsel direct the court's attention to the relevant portions of 
foreign law before it will be noticed.158 To generalize, the accum-
ulated experience in New York, Massachusetts, and other states 
during the first half of this century indicates that judicial notice has 
not been taken, regardless of statutory language, unless the parties 
furnish the court a reasonable amount of information about the 
foreign law. What constitutes a sufficient quantum of information 
to activate the court seems dependent on the esoteric quality of the 
foreign law in issue and the level of the trial judge's self-confidence. 
The explanation for the tenacity with which the courts have 
retained the primeval attitude toward foreign-law issues probably 
lies in (I) a continued judicial reluctance to engage in the often diffi-
cult process of ascertaining alien law, (2) the fear that the average 
trial judge cannot be fully entrusted with the job but must be given 
the fullest possible assistance of counsel, and (3) a refusal to believe 
that the proof-of-foreign-law statutes require a departure from the 
traditional modes of pleading and proof or that they represent an 
attempt to establish a degree of equality between the proof of 
domestic and foreign law.159 These inhibitions are exemplified by 
the following dictum from Arams v. Arams60 concerning the effect 
of New York's first judicial-notice statute: 
[I]f cases can be decided according to whatever law the judge sees 
fit to apply and is able to discover by his own private researches 
undisclosed to the parties, then much that hitherto has been re-
garded as essential to the right to pronounce judgment-the raising 
of an issue determinable by reference to the law of a specified place, 
and an opportunity to know what the deciding tribunal is consider-
ing and to be heard with respect to both law and fact-would seem 
to have been abolished. I am unwilling to assume that a power so 
contrary to the plainest principles of fair dealing and due process of 
law was intended or has been conferred .... 
I think this new enactment was intended merely to dispense with 
certain formalities respecting the manner in which the law of the 
State or country, whose law is first appropriately invoked and deter-
mined to be applicable, may be brought to the attention of the court 
by the parties, and, in case they omit something pertinent, to give 
the judge the right to make further researches in order to supple-
ment or round out what the parties have presented so as to make an 
58. See Kynch v. Trustees of New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 320 Mass. 339, 69 N.E.2d 
575 (1946); Hanson v. Hanson, 287 Mass. 154, 191 N.E. 673 (1934); 32 MASS. L.Q. No. 
II, at 20 (1947). See also Comment, Judicial Notice and Deposition Practice in 
International Litigation, 1966 DuKE L.J. 512, 517-23. 
59. See Mangrelli v. Italian Line, 208 Misc. 685, 144 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1955). 
60. 182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1943). 
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accurate determination as to what the law of that State or country 
really is. In short, the enactment was intended as a safety valve 
against miscarriages of justice due to mistake, and not as a charter 
to every judge to apply whatsoever law he likes and can find .... 61 
This oft-quoted passage from Arams completely ignores the possibil-
ity that the statute was intended to recast the basic methodological 
premises for proving foreign law. Regrettably, Arams has given 
succor to those who believe that judicial notice of foreign law places 
too great a research burden on the court and is unfair to the litigants 
because it does not guarantee early formal notice that an issue of 
foreign law is present and does not provide any restraint on the 
court's unsupervised independent investigations.62 
The saturnine judicial experience under the first generation of 
statutes dealing with the proof of foreign law suggests the propriety 
of re-examining the assumption that judicial notice is the most effi-
cacious technique for the determination of alien law. One's uncer-
tainty as to the workability of the judicial-notice method is rein-
forced by a perusal of the secondary literature, which indicates that 
the subject has generated a debate of considerable intensity among 
numerous protagonists. The leading critic of the common-law ap-
proach condemns it as "over-expensive, time-consuming, cumber-
some and often confusing."63 Arguing that foreign-law experts are 
costly, biased, and insufficiently instructive, and that the technical 
rules of evidence prevent a full elaboration of the issues, he goes 
beyond the judicial-notice technique and advocates court-appointed 
61. Id. at 3!10-31, 45 N.Y.S.2d at 253-54. 
62. For example, in Matter of Mason, 194 Misc. 308, 86 N.Y.S.2d 2!12 (Surr. Ct. 
1948), the court refused to undertake any research into Italian banking regulations. 
See also Sonnesen v. Panama Transp. Co., 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569 (1948); SoM-
MERICH &: BUSCH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 64-69 (1959). In 
Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank, 11 Misc. 2d 397, 173 N.Y.S.2d 509 
(Sup. Ct. 1958), however, the court took judicial notice of Italy"s foreign exchange laws. 
Generally ignored is the actual holding in Arams: 
Where the complaint alleges facts which fairly may be assumed to create an 
obligation under the law of any civilized country, the plaintiff need not spe-
cifically allege the law of the State or country in which the things relied upon 
as giving rise to the asserted obligation took place, considerations of justice and 
convenience making it proper in such cases to cast upon the defendant the burden 
of showing, if that be the fact, that the law of such State or country is contrary 
to that assumption; but where the complaint alleges facts which do not make it 
reasonably certain that any civilized country would regard them as creating the 
asserted obligation, the plaintiff must allege the law of the State or country in 
which the things relied upon as giving rise to such obligation took place, con-
siderations of justice and convenience making it proper in such cases to cast that 
burden upon the plaintiff .••. 
182 Misc. at 3!15, 45 N.Y.S.2d at 257. 
63. Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign Countries, 3 AM. J. COMP. L. 60, 66 
(1954). See also 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2573 (3d ed. 1940); Nussbaum, The Problem 
of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018 (1941). 
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experts who will be compensated initially by the government and 
ultimately by the losing party. 64 On the other side, two of the most 
vocal defenders of traditional notions sum up their views as follows: 
Honesty requires admission on the part of bench and bar alike of 
relative unfamiliarity with th~ laws of civil code countries and of 
other foreign jurisdictions. Our law imposes no duty upon lawyer 
or judge to know the laws of other jurisdictions. Under such cir-
cumstances, "initiative" could well become rashness, and although 
well meaning, could easily be disastrous to the rights of the parties. 
On the other hand, our present system of proving foreign law 
offers a practical procedure whereby a judge may familiarize himself 
with the relevant details of a foreign system of laws by playing the 
part of audience and then inquisitor, while the foreign law experts 
are exposed to the truth-searching effects of direct and cross-exam-
ination. It is a fact that many a trial judge operating under present 
procedures does use the parties or their advocates as his assistants 
in establishing the content of the law.65 
Given this intransigence on basic issues, it is not surprising that the 
developments over the past half-century have been somewhat eclectic, 
producing a hybrid of common-law and statutory techniques and a 
rather ambivalent judicial application of the latter. 
The debilitation of the judicial-notice provisions is unfortunate, 
inasmuch as many of the more vituperative broadsides issued by 
animadverters of the statutory developments miss the mark. In 
the context of determining foreign law, judicial notice is not uti-
lized as a device to exclude proof of a fact assumed to be within 
the court's knowledge, but rather is employed to simplify proof 
by permitting the use of approximately the same procedures as 
are available for ascertaining domestic law. 66 Thus, judicial notice 
of foreign law does not encourage an unthinking extension of the 
assumption of judicial omniscience as to certain facts or act as a 
substitute for proof; it is merely a shorthand description-perhaps 
an unfortunate one-for rationalizing the process of proving foreign 
law. This distinction was articulated in the Ninth Annual Report of 
the Judicial Council of the State of New York: 67 
64. See Nussbaum, Proof of Foreign Law in New York: A Proposed Amendment, 
57 COLUM. L. REV. 348 (1957). 
65. SOMMERICH & BUSCH, FOREIGN LAW-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 120·21 
(1959). See also Drachsler, Judicial Initiative in the Proof of Foreign Law, A.B.A. SEC. 
INT'L & COMP. L., PROCEEDINGS 126 (1956); McKenzie &: Sarabia, The Pleading and 
Proof of Alien Law, 31 TuL. L. REv. 353 (1956); Stem, Foreign Law in the Courts: 
Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 23 (1957). 
66. See Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts Under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, 12 MINN. L. REv. 439, 466 (1928). See also McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 326 (1954); 
Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARv. L. REv. 269 (1944). 
67. 9 N.Y. Jun. COUNCIL REP. 267 (1943). 
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Rather than a dispensation from the need of proof, a dispensa-
tion from technical mles of proof is intended by the proposed ex-
tension of the doctrine [of judicial notice]. It is submitted that 
although rules of evidence serve their purpose well when ordinary 
facts are being proved to a lay jury, they unduly hamper the court 
when it seeks to determine the rule of law (whether it be a "foreign" 
law or a local ordinance) applicable to a case. Under the proposed 
new section [N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act§ 344-a], the courts will be enabled 
to proceed directly to the determination of applicable rules of law, 
instead of wasting time, money and effort on such collateral questions 
as whether the rules of evidence have been satisfied and the "proof" 
of such law has been properly made.68 
Furthermore, the fear that judicial-notice statutes permit a court 
to surprise the litigants with a decision based upon its own private 
research seems more apparent than real. As will be developed more 
fully at a later point,69 except in the most unusual circumstances, a 
court would be remiss if it did not apprise the parties of the result 
of its research and offer them a chance to refute it or introduce 
further material; a failure to do so might even constitute reversible 
error.70 As long as a proper judicial respect for the adversary system 
can be assumed, it is difficult to perceive any objection to widening 
the scope of the court's investigation into the substance of foreign 
law. 
These were the premises of the authors of the Uniform Inter-
state and International Procedure Act, which, in conjunction with 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, represents a second-generation 
deviation from the common-law fact theory and presages a new 
chapter in the history of proving foreign law. Article IV of the new 
Uniform Act was drafted on the assumption that judicial attitudes 
regarding the character of foreign law have matured and that the 
fear of the difficulties of ascertaining foreign law has substantially 
abated. Consequently, it abandons both the common-law fact theory 
and the somewhat schizoid practice under the judicial-notice statutes 
in favor of an isotopic relationship between the determination of 
foreign law and the determination of domestic law. The act substi-
tutes a reasonable-notice requirement for the former pleading pre-
requisite, widens the scope of inquiry to permit examination of 
everything relevant to the foreign-law issue, allows the court to do 
its own research, leaves the determination of foreign law to the 
68. Id. at 272. 
69. See text accompanying notes 186-90 infra. 
70. See Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 7 RECOR!> OF 
N.Y.C.B.A. 280, 294-95 (1952). See also SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 142 (2d ed. 
1959). 
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court, and authorizes plenary review on appeal. Article IV of the 
Uniform Act is reinforced by article V, which is a modernization 
and expansion of the Uniform Proof of Statutes Act that attempts to 
minimize the formality and detail involved in proving foreign 
official records.71 In almost all respects, the new practice under Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 44 and 44.1 will parallel that under 
the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act. Although 
the new act's relative youth and the lack of experience under it 
prevent confident appraisal of its future, it is worth noting (after 
disclaiming any design to engage in self-directed encomiums or 
panegyrics), that several recent state cases completely reject the fact-
theory dogma72 and seem to confirm the judgment of the act's drafts-
men that the time is ripe for a volte-face regarding the fact character• 
ization of foreign law. 
C. Consequences of Failing To Establish Foreign Law 
The problem of affixing consequences to a failure to establish 
the applicable foreign law is of sufficient magnitude to warrant brief 
independent treatment. Because this facet of determining foreign 
law lies in the penumbra! area between conflict of laws and evidence, 
it has proven to be an extraordinarily complex question, and a 
uniform judicial treatment of the subject has not emerged in the 
United States.73 With only a few exceptions,74 the problem has not 
71. Article V of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act eliminates 
the need for certification of the authority of the attesting official and permits chain 
certification of the attested copy. Chain certification allows a consular official to issue 
his certificate on the basis of his knowledge concerning a signature appearing on any 
certificate in a chain of certificates beginning with the certificate relating to the orig• 
inal attestation and proceeding up the authentication hierarchy; each official in the 
chain certifies the signature on the preceding certificate. The act also provides the 
court with discretionary power to admit a document that is uncertified, although 
attested, or a summary of the record rather than a copy. This provision represents a 
departure from the common-law rule and numerous statutes, which require a literal 
copy of the record. Section 5.03 of the act is a modification of the Uniform Proof of 
Statutes Act and provides an alternative, simplified method for proving the written 
law and the executive, legislative, and judicial acts of any jurisdiction. Finally, article 
V expedites proof of the lack of any record and preserves a number of other methods 
for proving foreign official records. 
72. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. O'Grady, 97 Ariz. 9, 396 P.2d 246 (1964); Choate v. 
Ransom, 74 Nev. 100, 323 P.2d 700 (1958); Gevinson v. Kirkeby-Natus Corp., 26 App. 
Div. 2d 71, 270 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1966). In Gevinson, Presiding Justice Breitel commented: 
"non-forum law is not and never was a question of fact except in an artificial proce-
dural sense. Today, all such non-forum law in this State and in most States is treated 
as if it were a question of law in the court of first instance and on appellate review." 
26 App. Div. 2d at 74, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 993. 
73. See generally Sommerich &: Busch, The Expert Witness and the Proof of For-
eign Law, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 125, 138-44 (1953); Annot., Presumption as to Law of 
Foreign Countries, 75 A.L.R.2d 529 (1961). Professor Currie has suggested that much 
of the judicial confusion is attributable to the fact theory, which he believes caused 
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been dealt with in the judicial-notice statutes and neither the Uni-
form Interstate and International Procedure Act nor Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 44.l expressly purports to come to grips with it. 
The abbreviated discussion in the next few pages is designed merely 
to complete the statement of the historical antecedents of current 
attitudes toward foreign law and to set the stage for later analysis75 
of what may prove to be one of the most perplexing aspects of the 
new federal practice. 
In an apparent minority of American jurisdictions (the number 
undoubtedly was larger when the common-law view of foreign law 
commanded greater allegiance from American judges), a plaintiff's 
failure to prove foreign law is equivalent to an inability to establish 
a cause of action under domestic law and requires dismissal of his 
complaint, usually on the merits.76 Courts in these jurisdictions also 
will strike a defense based on foreign law unless it is shown to be 
cognizable under the relevant law.77 These Draconian consequences 
are a natural outgrowth of the formerly pervasive vested-rights or 
territorial philosophy of conflict of laws78 and, more directly, the 
progeny of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cuba 
R.R. v. Crosby,79 in which an employee's action against his employer 
for personal injuries sustained in Cuba was dismissed because 
Cuban law was not established. In his opinion for the Court, Mr. 
Justice Holmes said: 
With very rare exceptions the liabilities of parties to each other are 
fixed by the law of the territorial jurisdiction within which the 
wrong is done and the parties are at the time of doing it .... That, 
and that alone, is the foundation of their rights. 
[T]he only justification for allowing a party to recover when 
the cause of action arose in another civilized jurisdiction is a well-
the question of the consequences of a failure to establish the law of the jurisdiction 
referred to under a choice-of-law rule to be "ceded by the domain of conflict of laws 
to the domain of evidence." Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 
58 COLUM. L. REV. 964, 970-77 (1958). 
74. E.g., CAL. Evm. ConE § 3ll(a) (effective Jan. I, 1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:82-27 
(Supp. 1965). 
75. See text at notes 306-31 infra. 
76. See, e.g., Rositski v. Rositski, 329 Mo. 662, 46 S.W .2d 591 (1931); Riley v. 
Pierce Oil Corp., 245 N.Y. 152, 156 N.E. 647 (1927). 
77. See Aslanian v. Dostumian, 174 Mass. 328, 54 N.E. 845 (1899) (dictum). See also 
Dainese v. Hale, 91 U.S. 13 (1875); McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 VAND. L. REv. 296, 
308 (1952). 
78. See 1 BEALE, CoNFucr OF LAws § 5.2 (1935); 2 id. § 377.2; REsTATEMENT, 
CONFucr OF LAws §§ 1, 378-79 (1934). The effect of the recent changes in conflicts 
doctrines on the consequences associated with a failure to prove foreign law are 
discussed at text accompanying notes 320-31 infra. 
79. 222 U.S. 473 (1912). 
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founded belief that it was a cause of action in that place. The right 
to recover stands upon that as its necessary foundation. It is part 
of the plaintiff's case, and if there is reason for doubt he must allege 
and prove it.so 
The Crosby approach is most commonly applied when the foreign 
cause is statutory-wrongful-death actions, for example-or the 
foreign law is not based on the common law.81 It is rarely employed 
when the law of another common-law jurisdiction is involved.82 
One of the most questionable applications of the vested-rights 
theory appears in Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co.,83 which in-
volved a tort action instituted by an Arkansas plaintiff against a 
Delaware corporation in a New York federal court. The lawsuit 
was dismissed at the close of the plaintiff's case because he was 
unwilling, and perhaps unable, to prove the law of Saudi Arabia, 
the adventitious locale of the accident. On appeal, the Second Cir-
cuit felt bound by New York law, which placed the burden of prov-
ing foreign law on the plaintiff, and affirmed the dismissal, although 
Judge Frank's opinion expressed considerable displeasure with the 
result. Further discussion of Walt on, which has achieved the status 
of a cause celebre among comparativists and conflicts cognoscente, 
will be deferred to a later point. 84 
The harsh effects of either a dismissal on the merits or the strik-
ing of a defense for failing to establish alien law have been avoided 
in most states by employing one of a series of judicially created 
presumptions that reject the assumption that a default in proof 
demonstrates that the asserted right of action or defense does not 
exist under foreign law. The effect of these presumptions is to per-
mit the court to decide the case on its merits85 and, in theory, their 
goal is to enable a court to reach the same result that would have 
80. Id. at 478-79. 
81. See Annot., Presumption as to Law of Foreign Countries, 75 A.L.R.2d 529, 
532-34 (1961). See also Whitford v. Panama R.R., 23 N.Y. 465 (1861). 
82. See Langdon v. Young, 33 Vt. 136 (1860). 
83. 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956), 43 IowA L. R.Ev. 125, 
32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 377 (1957). 
84. See text accompanying notes 109-12, 325-28 infra. 
85. See generally 3 BEALE, CoNFLicr OF LAws §§ 622A.l-23.l (1935); SoMMERICH 8e 
BUSCH, FORlllGN LAW-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 75-80 (1959); Currie, On the 
Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 964, 977 (1958); Kales, 
Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 HARV. L. REv. 401 (1906); von Moschzisker, Pre-
sumptions as to Foreign Law, 11 MINN. L. R.Ev. 1 (1926); Wachtell, The Proof of 
Foreign Law in American Courts, 69 U.S.L. REV. 526, 580, 585-88 (1935); Current 
Legislation, Judicial Notice of the Law of Foreign States, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 476 
(1920); Comment, Judicial Notice and Deposition Practice in International Litigation, 
1966 DUKE L.J. 512, 513-14; Comment, Conflict of Laws-Judicial Notice of Foreign 
Law, 30 MICH. L. R.Ev. 747, 755-61 (1932). 
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been achieved had the case been heard by a court in the appropriate 
foreign country. The actual utilization of the presumptions, how-
ever, seems to reflect a desire to apply the law of the forum absent 
a strong showing that another law controls.86 If this is true, the use 
of presumptions rather than a direct application of domestic law 
probably represents a form of deference to the "vested rights" 
theory, from which, until recently, there has been little open devia-
tion. 
Perhaps the oldest and most convenient device for bypassing the 
need to prove foreign law in order to avoid the harsh consequences 
of a failure of proof, and a device that has been a progenitor of a 
number of other evasive procedures, is the postulate that when 
the principle of law at issue is "rudimentary," it can be presumed 
to subsist in all civilized jurisdictions. This view is supported by 
dictum in Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion in Crosby and is most fre-
quently applied in cases involving intentional torts.87 The absence 
of any extensive reliance on this presumption over the years reflects 
the obvious fact that no consensus exists as to which principles of 
law are "rudimentary." 
The most frequently invoked presumption appears to be that 
foreign law is identical to the law of the forum. 88 An extreme ex-
ample of this approach is Louknitsky v. Louknitsky,89 in which Chi-
nese marital-property law was presumed to be the same as Califor-
nia's community-property law. Although this particular decision 
86. In Monroe v. Douglass, 5 N.Y. 447, 452 (1851), the court observed: "[T]he laws 
of the country to whose courts a party appeals for redress, furnish, in all cases, prima 
facie, the rule of decision; and if either party wishes the benefit of a different rule or 
law ••• he must aver and prove iL" See also Hill v. Wilker, 41 Ga. 449 (1871); Leaven-
worth v. Brockway, 2 Hill. 201 (N.Y. 1842). 
87. Sec, e.g., Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Rivers, 211 Fed. 294 (2d Cir. 
1914); Parrot v. Mexican Cent. Ry., 207 Mass. 184, 93 N.E. 590 (19ll). See also Mackey 
v. Mexican Cent. Ry., 78 N.Y. Supp. 966 (N.Y. City Ct. 1902). An interesting corollary of 
the "rudimentary principles" doctrine is that the court need not apply the lex loci 
when a tort occurs in an "uncivilized" country but is free to apply the law of the 
country that has the closest nexus to the parties. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. 
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 
120, 129 (1904); Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
352 U.S. 872 (1956). 
88. See generally 3 BEALE, CONFUCT OF LAws § 622A.2, at 1679-80 (1935); CHESHIRE, 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 129 (5th ed. 1957); Note, Evidence: Presumptions as to 
the Law of Foreign Countries, 42 CAuF. L. REv. 701 (1954). Some states have codified 
the presumption. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:82-87 (Supp. 1965). 
89. 1211 Cal. App. 2d 406, 266 P.2d 910 (Dist. CL App. 1954). See also Doiron v. 
Vacuum Oil Co., 164 La. 15, II!! So. 748 (1927); Gallard v. Winans, Ill Md. 434, 74 Atl. 
626 (1909); Annot., Presumptions as to Law of Foreign Countries, 75 A.L.R.2d 529 
(1961). Section 3II(a) of California's Evidence Code expressly authorizes the application 
of California law when the law of a foreign country "cannot be determined," if the 
court can do so consistently with the United States and California Constitutions. 
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may be preferable to a dismissal for failure of proof or even to a 
Herculean, but time consuming and ex.pensive, effort by court and 
litigants to devine and decipher foreign law, it hardly represents an 
aesthetic or rational application of the identity presumption. Given 
its use in Louknitsky, qualms about the presumption assuming 
Frankenstein qualities are understandable, especially when it is real-
ized that the task of overcoming it usually will fall on a party who, 
absent the presumption, would not have the burden of establishing 
the existence of a cause of action or defense under foreign law. 
Thus, a plaintiff with a valid cause of action under forum law but 
none under the governing foreign law may reap the benefits of the 
presumption at the expense of a somnolent defendant or one who 
lacks the resources to investigate foreign law. Moreover, the party 
who normally has the burden of showing that domestic and alien 
law diverge often will remain silent because domestic law is favor-
able to him, although in many instances he may be the party in the 
best position to prove the foreign law. 
Most states hav.e accorded more limited dimensions to the iden-
tity presumption than California did in Louknitsky. For example, 
the presumption usually has not been applied when the foreign 
cause is based upon a statute or when damages include a penal ele-
ment;90 in some cases it has been limited to the law of a sister state 
or of those foreign countries that still adhere to the common law.91 
Some jurisdictions have been even stricter and held that the pre-
sumed identity applies only to that part of a foreign country's juris-
prudence that is analogous to "common law" or have extended the 
presumption only to those countries whose law is "fundamentally" 
the same as forum law.92 Another variation of the identity presump-
tion calls for the application of forum law when no other law has 
been brought to the court's attention.93 T~is use of local law usually 
90. See generally Grow v. Oregon S.L. Ry., 44 Utah 160, 138 Pac. 398 (1913). 
91. See Banco de Sonora v. Bankers' Mut. Cas. Co., 124 Iowa 576, 100 N.W. 532 
(1904); Savage v. O'Neil, 44 N.Y. 298 (1871); Stokes v. Macken, 62 Barb. 145 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1861). When the roots of a state's jurisprudence are traceable to a foreign 
country, the general presumption of identity usually will override this common-law 
limitation. E.g., Bostrom v. Segnros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Tex. 1963), 
modified on other grounds, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965) (Texas and Mexico); cf. 
Record Truck Line, Inc. v. Harrison, 109 Ga. App. 653, 137 S.E.2d 65 (1964). 
92. See generally Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19- HARv. L. REv. 401, 
410-13 (1906); Annot., Presumption as to Law of Foreign Countries, 75 A.L.R.2d 529, 
538-39 (1961). One curious presumption identifies the foreign law only with the forum's 
common law, even when the forum's common law has been changed by statute. See 
Reidman v. Macht, 98 Ind. App. 124, 183 N.E. 807 (1932). The net effect may be the 
application of a set of legal principles that is not in force either in the foreign coun-
try whose law is to be applied or in the forum. 
93. See Van Wyck v. Hills, 4 Rob. 140 (La. 1843); Burgess v. Western Union Tel. 
Co., 92 Tex. 125, 46 S.W. 794 (1898). 
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is predicated upon the hypothesis that the conduct of the parties-
their failure to assert foreign law-represents acquiescence in the 
court's application of forum law.94 
Although many commentators have referred to the use of these 
presumptions as "naive" or "unrealistic," they generally have ap-
plauded the application of forum law out of sympathy for the results 
achieved or because of their antipathy toward the vested rights 
theory of conflict of laws. Several scholars have offered conceptual 
frameworks to rationalize the application of the forum's law. One 
effort of this type is Professor Arthur Nussbaum's "Substantial 
Justice Theory," which permits a court to apply domestic law when-
ever the parties appear content with local law or whenever the appli-
cation of forum law would be "just," as measured by the difficulties 
and costliness of proving foreign law under the common-law methods 
and by whether forum law provides "a perfectly reasonable disposi-
tion of the litigation."95 Professor Nussbaum, however, would apply 
foreign law, under something akin to the public-policy concept, in 
matrimonial disputes and whenever a substantial disparity exists 
between the philosophy underlying the relevant portions of local 
and foreign substantive law. 
Perhaps the most penetrating analytical rejection of the treat-
ment accorded a failure to prove foreign law under Crosby and 
Walton has been advanced by Professor Brainerd Currie, who advo-
cates the use of forum law absent a request by one of the parties that 
another law be applied. 96 According to the Currie thesis, if a party 
does request the application of foreign law, he has the burden of 
establishing the relevant rules of decision under that law.97 Unlike 
94. See, e.g., Watford v. Alabama-Florida Lumber Co., 152 Ala. 178, 44 So. 567 
(1907): Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260, 84 A.2d 725 (1951). See also SoMMERICH &: BuscH, 
FOREIGN I.Aw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 78-80 (1959). The parties' tacit agree-
ment that the court apply forum law in this context should be distinguished from 
a stipulation by the parties that their contract be governed by the law of a particular 
country. See Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 
1039-40 (1941). 
95. See Nussbaum, supra note 94, at 1039-44. Note that if the recent statutory 
modifications of the common-law proof methods effectively reduce the cost and diffi-
culty of proving foreign law, one of the legs of Professor Nussbaum's theory will be 
weakened. 
96. Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 964, 
1001 (1958). English practice after the seventeenth century seems to have been of 
like tenor. See id .. at 967-70. 
97. A result not too different from that suggested by Professor Currie was reached 
in Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260, 267, 84 A.2d 725, 728 (1951), 37 CORNELL L.Q. 748 
(1952). Both Professor Currie and the Leary court argue that the deficiencies of the 
"territorial" or "vested rights" approach to determining and applying foreign tort 
cases is best exemplified by Walton. See also 5 WEINSTEIN, KoRN &: MILLER, NEW 
YORK CML PRACTICE ,r,r 4511.02, .06 (1966). One of the important objections 
pointed out by Professor Currie to the Crosby-Walton approach is that it calls for a 
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the use of presumptions, this approach is not based on the fiction 
that foreign law is being applied by proxy; it is an unabashed utiliza-
tion of forum law. Direct application of forum law absent a request 
to apply foreign law is advantageous in terms of administrative 
simplicity, certainty, and, because it avoids a forfeiture of rights 
for a failure of proof, fairness. A traditionalist might object to Pro-
fessor Currie's thesis on the ground that it may result in a reversal 
of the burden of going forward and perhaps even the ultimate bur-
den of persuasion when a request to apply foreign law is made. Yet 
this already has occurred in jurisdictions employing one of the iden-
tity presumptions. An even more fundamental retort to this objection 
to the Currie approach is that traditional notions about burdens of 
proof on issues of fact are relevant to the proof of foreign law only 
if the fact characterization of foreign law is accepted. I£ it is rejected, 
as it should be, a number of pathways to follow on the quest for a 
governing law become manifest. But more of this later.98 
III. PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
A. Raising an Issue of Foreign Law 
I. The Traditional Pleading Requirement 
Prior to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal courts 
embraced the fact theory of alien law and insisted that a party 
intending to rely on foreign law give formal notice in his plead-
ings.99 As did the state courts,100 the federal courts required the sub-
stance and effect of foreign law to be pleaded; it was not necessary 
dismissal for a failure of foreign-law proof without it being certain that there is any 
foreign law on the point or, even if there is, that the foreign law expresses an important 
public policy. Currie, supra note 96, at 1003. Therefore, the vested-rights approach 
may result in the dismisal of a cause when foreign law is so uncivilized that the forum 
would not have applied it even if it had been established. See note 87 supra. 
98. See text accompanying notes 306-31 infra. 
99. See, e.g., Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912); Liverpool &: Great W. Steam 
Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889); Rowan v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 515 
(5th Cir. 1941); cf. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Glenwood Irrigation Co., 265 Fed. 594 (8th 
Cir. 1920). The generally accepted notion that a federal court judicially notices the 
laws of all the states, see text accompanying notes 146, 149-50 infra, eliminates the 
need to plead the law of the state in which the court is sitting or the law of any 
other state. See, e.g., Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218 (1885); United States Rubber Co. v. 
Poage, 297 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1962); Wade v. Lynn, 181 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ohio 
1960); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 103 F. Supp. 47 (D. Del. 1952); Straub v. Jaeger, 
9 F.R.D. 672 (E.D. Pa. 1950). But cf. Anderson v. National Producing Co., 253 F.2d 
834 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 906 (1958). The party relying on the law of another 
state does have the obligation to call its applicability to the court's attention, how-
ever. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 126 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1942). See also Jan-
nenga v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 288 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
100. See text accompanying notes 19-22, 55-58 supra. 
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to include a verbatim transcript of the foreign law or the materials 
supporting the pleader's interpretation of it.101 In several cases, how-
ever, the pleader was required to set forth a reasonably specific 
abstract of the controlling provisions of foreign law.102 A failure to 
plead foreign law in the requisite detail generally resulted in a 
dismissal with leave to replead.103 
This pattern persevered virtually unchallenged for many years 
after the Federal Rules were adopted.104 Finally, in 1955, the Second 
Circuit, in Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd.,105 sanctioned the 
taking of judicial notice of the English law of estoppel under sec-
tion 344-a of the New York Civil Practice Act, which the court ap-
plied pursuant to Federal Rule 43(a), even though the parties neither 
pleaded nor attempted to prove the content of English law. The 
court concluded that inasmuch as Federal Rule 8(a) requires only 
"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief," it is unnecessary to plead the legal theory on 
which the claim is based.106 Siegelman was characterized as "a bomb-
shell" and disapproved of by some commentators107 but received the 
101. See, e.g., United States v. National City Bank, 7 F.R.D. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); 
cf. Coronet Phosphate Co. v. United States Shipping Co., 260 Fed. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) 
(admiralty). Under the Conformity Act, 17 Stat. 196 (1872), the pleading rules of the 
forum state guided the federal courts in determining the sufficiency of a foreign-law 
statement. See, e.g., Panama Elec. Ry. v. Moyers, 249 Fed. 19 (5th Cir. 1918). 
102. See Poras v. Gabor Bano, 24 F.R. Serv. 8a.474 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Lehnertz v. 
Societe Anonyme Beige d'Exploitation de Ia Navigation Aerienne, 8 F.R.D. 319 
(S.D.N.Y. 1948); Keasbey &: Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, I F.R.D. 626 (E.D. Pa. 1941). 
In McKenzie&: Sarabia, The Pleading and Proof of Alien Law, 30 TuL. L. REv. 353 
(1956), the authors suggest that the preferable practice is to include detailed alle-
gations concerning the applicable foreign law in the pleadings. 
103. See, e.g., Harrison v. United Fruit Co., 143 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); 
Keasbey &: Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, supra note 102. See also Supine v. Compagnie 
Nationale Air France, 100 F. Supp. 214 (E.D.N.Y. 1951). 
104. See, e.g., Liechti v. Roche, 198 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1952); Harris v. American 
Int'! Fuel 8: Petroleum Co., 124 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Pa. 1954); Empresa Agricola 
Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 57 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Chemacid, 
S.A. v. Ferrotar Corp., 3 F.R.D. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). But see Keeffe, Landis &: Shaad, 
Sense and Nonsense about Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REv. 664, 685 (1950). The plead-
ing requirement also survived in admiralty. See Prol v. Holland-America Line, 234 
F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); text accompanying notes 113-14 infra. 
105. 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955). 
106. Id. at 196. 
107. SOMMERICH 8:: BUSCH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 26 
(1959); Busch, When Law Is Fact, 24 FoRDHAM L. REv. 646 (1956). One commentator 
opined that Siegelman did not eliminate pleading and proof of foreign law. Drachs-
ler, Judicial Initiative in the Proof of Foreign Law, A.B.A. SEC. !NT'L 8: COMP. L., 
PROCEEDINGS 126, 128 (1956). In view of the plain language of the opinion concerning 
pleading, the statement seems difficult to support as an absolute proposition. 
The cries of surprise seem inappropriate since a similar conclusion was reached 
in Jansson v. Swedish Am. Line, 185 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1950), although the opinion in 
that case did not contain an extended analysis of the question and was rendered 
without reference to Rule 8(a). See also Rosenthal v. Compagnie Generale Trans-
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approbation of others.108 Moreover, the text of the court's opinion 
created considerable uncertainty as to the proper scope to be given 
the case. 
Approximately a year after Siegelman, the Second Circuit was 
confronted by Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., which has 
previously been briefly described.109 In Walton the court refused to 
take judicial notice of the law of Saudi Arabia under the same state 
statute that was applied in Siegelman. After noting the criticism that 
had been levelled at the earlier case, Siegelman was distinguished 
because it involved English law-a body of law "an American court 
can easily comprehend"; Walton was said to require the application 
of a jurisprudence "not easy" to ascertain.11° As to its failure to 
invoke section 344-a of the New Yark Civil Practice Act, the Second 
Circuit stated: 
a court "abuses" its discretion under that statute perhaps if it takes 
judicial notice of foreign "law" when it is not pleaded, and surely 
does so unless the party, who would otherwise have had the burden 
of proving that "law," has in some way adequately assisted the court 
in judicially learning it.111 
This passage is the court's only direct reference to the pleading 
question. 
The impact of Wal ton on the pleading of foreign law in the 
federal courts prior to 1966 is unclear. Perhaps its significance was 
that it demonstrated the limitations on the discretion a federal district 
court might exercise in employing judicial notice in the absence of 
pleading, a point left very much in doubt by Siegelman. The case also 
may be viewed as a ukase to the federal courts not to invoke a state 
judicial-notice statute under circumstances in which it would be in-
atlantique, 14 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The decision in Rosenthal seems to be based 
upon the rudimentary-principles concept, which was used to excuse not only a failure 
to plead French law but a failure to prove it as well. The court stated: 
The rule seems to be that a plaintiff asserting a rudimentary right generally 
recognized in civilized countries may assume like recognition in the applicable 
jurisdiction and need not affirmatively allege the existence of the right and the 
imposition of liability for its violation. 
Id. at 35. The court relied on Cuba R.R., Jansson, and Compagnie Generale Trans-
atlantique v. Rivers, 211 Fed. 294 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 232 U.S. 727 (1914). In Harris 
v. American Int'! Fuel & Petroleum Co., 124 F. Supp. 878 0fl .D. Pa. 1954), the court 
mistakenly referred to Jansson in concluding that foreign law must be pleaded. 
108. Note, 69 HARV. L. REv. 563, 564-65 (1956). 
109. 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956); see text accompanying 
notes 83-84 supra. 
110. 233 F.2d at 544. Only one of the three judges on the Walton panel, Judge 
Frank, the author of the opinion, also was a member of the Siegelman panel. 
111. Id. at 544. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. Acr § 344-a has been replaced by N.Y. CIV. PRAc. 
L. & R. 4511. The numerous implications of Walton are analyzed in Currie, On the 
Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 964 (1958). 
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appropriate for a state court to do so. Finally, Walton may have had 
no bearing on the pleading of foreign law in the federal courts 
because it turned on the plaintiff's refusal to prove Saudi Arabian 
law rather than his failure to plead it. A dismissal for lack of proof 
as to the existence of a cause of action under foreign law is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the Siegelman notion that Federal 
Rule 8(a) does not require foreign law to be pleaded. In view of 
the plethora of theses that can be conjured up, it is not surprising 
that the post-Siegelman and Walton foreign-law pleading decisions 
were somewhat inconsistent and re.fleeted the uncertainty generated 
by the two cases.112 
The admiralty pleading practice before the promulgation of 
112. This was particularly true in the district courts in the Second Circuit. In 
Telesphore Couture v. Watkins, 162 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1958), the court ignored 
Siegelman and stated, in dictum, that the pleader must set out the substance of foreign 
law and "appropriate citations of the applicable statutes and one or more citations of 
decisional law, if there be any." Id. at 730. See also Poras v. Gabor :Bano, 24 F.R. 
Serv. 8a.474 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (pleading requirement said not changed by Federal Rules; 
Siegelman not cited). The Walton court also noted that section 344-a of New York's 
Civil Practice Act did not affect the Federal Rules. Cf. Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal 
Venezolana, 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). In Luckett v. Cohen, 145 F. Supp. 155 
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), Judge Murphy, again in dictum, stated that pleading foreign law was 
not required in view of Siegelman, but went on to say: 
However, assuming Mexican law is the law to be applied, why should not plaintiff 
plead ~e law he thinks applicable. His answer is that the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit in so many words has said it was not necessary. Although he 
might not have to plead it under Siegelman he would be better advised to do 
so since he will eventually have to prove it, if in fact Mexican is the applicable 
law. 
Id. at 157. See also :Bakhshandeh v. American Cyanamid Co., 211 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 
1962) (Iranian law not pleaded). A square holding dismissing the complaint with 
leave to amend for failure to plead the foreign law upon which the claim was based 
is found in Harrison v. United Fruit Co., 143 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). The decision 
is consistent with Siegelman and Walton only if those cases are read as requiring 
pleading whenever it would be improper for foreign law to be judicially noticed by 
a federal court pursuant to state law-a strained interpretation because of the weak, 
if not nonexistent, interrelationship between what should be pleaded under Rule 8(a) 
and the propriety of using Rule 43(a) to take judicial notice under state law. 
Outside the Second Circuit, the post-Siegelman and -Walton and pre-1966 status 
of pleading foreign law also was unclear. In Philp v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 
1958), the Ninth Circuit rejected a request to take judicial notice of Peruvian law, 
concluding that in light of Crosby "appellant's complaint, having failed to allege his 
right to recover," had to be dismissed. Id. at 948. The court cited Walton but did not 
refer to Siegelman. The same year the Second Circuit wrestled with Siegelman, the 
District Court of Delaware decided F.A.R. Liquidating Corp. v. :Brownell, 130 F. Supp. 
691 (D. Del. 1955), a case involving the Trading With The Enemy Act. At a pretrial 
conference following the Third Circuit's reversal of an earlier grant of summary 
judgment by the trial court, a foreign-law issue was interposed by the defendant for 
the first time. The court held that because it had not been pleaded, foreign law 
could not be interjected at that point and would not be listed as a triable issue in 
the pretrial order-a result somewhat inconsistent with Siegelman. The decision ac-
tually may turn on the district court's belief that its freedom to define the issues for 
trial was circumscribed by the prior decision of the court of appeals. In Pederson v. 
United States, 191 F. Supp. 95 (D. Guam 1961), the court expressly applied Siegelman 
and held the pleading of foreign law unnecessary. 
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Federal Rule 44.1, which applies to both civil and admiralty litiga-
tion, appears to have been less confused but slightly more burden-
some than the practice on the civil side of the court. Whereas Civil 
Rule S(a) required only a short and plain statement of the claim, 
former Admiralty Rule 22 required the pleader to set forth "the 
various allegations of fact upon which the libellant relies." This 
standard was interpreted as requiring more than conclusory state-
ments as to the substance and effect of foreign law;113 an unadorned 
statement that a right of action existed under the laws of a foreign 
country was insufficient.114 
An evaluation of the conflicting judicial views on pleading for-
eign law will provide a useful transition to a discussion of Federal 
Rule 44.1. A pleading requirement is supported by the metaphysics 
of the fact theory of foreign law1115 and numerous federal decisions 
rendered prior to Siegelman. The significance of the latter point 
is somewhat questionable, however, because Siegelman was the first 
decision rendered under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 
analyze the impact of Rule S(a) on the pleading requirement. Earlier 
post-1938 cases were content to intone the common-law rule and 
cite pre-1938 decisions or other post-1938 cases that had relied ex-
clusively on cases decided before the Federal Rules were adopted.116 
A pleading requirement also might be justified as a notice device. 
Simply put, it is unrealistic to expect a court to sense the presence 
113. See Evangelinos v. Andreavapor Cia. Nav., S.A., 291 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1961); 
Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also 
Wall Street Traders, Inc. v. Sociedad Espanola de Construccion Naval, 236 F. Supp. !158 
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). Prior to the advent of the Admiralty Rules, a federal admiralty court 
was not bound to follow state practice under the Conformity Act but could develop 
its own pleading practice. In Coronet Phosphate Co. v. United States Shipping Co., 
260 Fed. 846, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), the court seems to have done precisely that with 
regard to foreign law by stating that the pleader "is bound to set out its substance 
so that the court may judge whether it has the effect which he ascribes." See also 
The Jean Jadot, 14 F. Supp. 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1935). But cf. The Alps, 19 Fed. 139 
(S.D.N.Y. 1883) (pleading of English law not required because plaintiff's claim was 
small and defendant could not have been misled). 
114. See Evangelinos v. Andreavapor Cia. Nav., S.A., supra note 113; Iafrate v. 
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 106 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). 
115. The two most important federal-practice texts lend credence to the fact theory 
as a basis for a pleading requirement. See IA BARRON &: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 253 (Wright ed. 1961); 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,i 8.17[9] (2d ed. 
1966). Professor Moore suggests a rapprochement between the conflicting views whereby 
foreign statutes "if easily accessible" would be referred to in the pleadings but foreign 
decisions would not. This suggestion does not obviate any of the basic objections to 
a pleading requirement and interposes an unnecessary fount of contention. 
116. See, e.g., Rowan v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 515 {5th Cir. 1941); Empresa 
Agricola Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 57 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). 
Even the pre-Siegelman opinions in the Jansson litigation, see note 107 supra, focused 
on the fact that both parties knew foreign law controlled the case and did not men-
tion the possibility that former practice had been changed by the Federal Rules. 
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of a foreign-law issue without any guidance from the litigants, and 
it is desirable to eliminate the possibility that parties will be surprised 
by a sudden invocation and application of foreign law. But whether 
the pleading stage is either the only or the most advantageous point on 
the litigation spectrum for requiring that notice be given of the 
relevance of foreign law is questionable. This doubt is reinforced by 
the fact that the Federal Rules represent a drastic departure from the 
practices current when the common-law rule relating to pleading 
foreign law was formulated,117 and the perpetuation of the original 
rule can be justified only if it is harmonious with the norms and 
objectives of the existing pleading mandates. 
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that foreign law does raise an 
issue of fact, the Federal Rules do not call for the pleading of facts 
or recitals of the type required by the pleading systems in vogue 
during the gestation and maturation of the fact theory. Moreover, 
the pretrial center of gravity of present day federal litigation has 
moved from the pleadings toward the deposition and discovery 
phase. This shift in emphasis was designed to alleviate the pleadings 
of some of the manifold burdens they formerly carried and to elimi-
nate much of the hypertechnicality and time consuming motion 
practice that was characteristic of code and common-law pleading; 
aspects of the former systems that rarely furthered the disposition of 
cases on their merits. Nothing in the Federal Rules indicates that 
these policy objectives are inapplicable when the pleader is trying to 
raise an issue of foreign law or that actions involving an issue of alien 
law are to be encumbered by a heavier pleading burden. Indeed, as 
the Second Circuit pointed out in Siegelman, the unqualified text 
of Rule 8(a) is evidence to the contrary.118 
Perhaps even more fundamental is the questionable utility of a 
pleading requirement. It is futile to require a party to identify the 
governing foreign law and elaborate on its content at the pleading 
stage; an attorney cannot be expected to have a sufficient mastery of 
the operative facts at an embryonic stage of the litigation to enable 
him to discharge a pleading requirement meaningfully. A rule that 
requires counsel to engage in extensive and expensive forays into the 
complexities of the jurisprudence of one or more foreign countries 
before the viscera of the action have been exposed is of dubious 
117. See generally IA BARRON &: HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 251 
(Wright ed. 1961); 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,J 8.05 (2d ed. 1966); cf. Fernandez v. 
Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
118. The federal courts generally have rejected the argument that certain classes 
of litigation allegedly having peculiar characteristics should be governed by "special" 
pleading requirements. See, e.g., Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957). 
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value. Moreover, a mandatory pleading requirement often will have 
the effect of intimidating an uncertain pleader into alleging the 
relevance of foreign law in order to protect himself against the pos-
sibility of waiver, which in turn engenders reliance on the part of his 
adversary and causes him to devote energy to a foreign-law issue that 
is formally raised in the pleadings but may later prove to be vapor-
ous. Another weakness of a pleading requirement is that it does not 
guarantee a definitive or binding statement concerning foreign law 
because the Federal Rules take a liberal stance regarding pleading 
amendments119 and hypothetical and alternative statements;120 more-
over, a party is not compelled to elect among several potentially 
applicable laws at the pleading stage.121 Given the pitfalls of plead-
ing alien law, a federal court would be remiss if it did not take a 
liberal attitude toward requests to amend a pleading containing a 
statement of foreign law. 
Inasmuch as the objective of providing notice of a party's inten-
tion to rely on foreign law can be secured at any reasonable point 
anterior to or during trial and the pleadings do not bind the parties 
to any particular theory or statement of foreign law, there is little 
justification for a mandatory pleading rule. A pleader is not required 
to cite local statutes or decisions or set forth their substance and 
effect in an action predicated upon domestic law. Why should he be 
required to do so in an action involving foreign law? No satisfactory 
answer is readily apparent. Indeed, it is difficult to identify any 
reason other than the historic tendency to characterize the law of a 
foreign country as a fact-a characterization whose genesis is obscure 
and whose significance lies outside the pleading orb.122 Even conced-
ing that foreign-law issues often present unique problems of identi-
fying and procuring source materials or of divining the intent of 
legal materials written in a strange language and predicated on a 
jurisprudence and history variant from our own, these are insuffi- -
cient bases for departing from the basic precepts of Federal Rule 
pleading. Long before the appearance of Rule 44.1, the federal courts 
should have distinguished the giving of notice of a foreign-law issue 
-a legitimate, but by no means exclusive, pleading goal-from the 
process of ascertaining and applying the content of foreign law; it is 
only in the latter context that the difficulties presented by alien law 
119. FED. R. Crv. P. 15. 
120. FED. R. Crv. P. S(e). 
121. See Finne v. Koninklinjke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V., 11 F.R.D. !1!16 
(S.D.N.Y. 1951). See also Empresa Agricola Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 
57 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). 
122. See text accompanying notes 7-18 supra. 
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might justify some departure from the treatment accorded domestic 
law. 
2. The Reasonable Written Notice Requirement 
of Federal Rule 44.1 
In preparing its proposals regarding the determination of foreign 
law for submission to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the Commission and Advisory Committee on 
International Rules of Judicial Procedure and the drafting group 
of the Columbia Law School Project on International Procedure 
extensively debated and finally rejected a suggestion that a sub-
paragraph requiring the pleading of foreign law be added to Federal 
Rule 9. Variations on the following formulation were considered: 
When setting forth a claim or defense governed by the law of a 
foreign country or its political subdivision, the pleader shall identify 
the country or subdivision and state generally the substance of the 
foreign law. 
It was decided that a provision of this type would be antithetical to 
the basic premises of Federal Rule pleading and that it might en-
courage unfruitful motion practice directed to the sufficiency of the 
foreign-law statement or require the court to determine foreign-law 
issues at too preliminary a point in the lawsuit. Once the notion of 
a special pleading rule was abandoned, it was agreed that a rule 
covering a range of foreign-law problems in a manner consistent 
with the treatment accorded analogous problems by the Federal 
Rules should be proposed to the Judicial Conference's Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The first sentence of Rule 44.1 reflects that philosophy. It re-
quires a party who intends to raise an issue of foreign law to "give 
notice in his pleadings or other reasonable written notice."123 This 
passage is designed to minimize the opportunity for unfair surprise 
and to eliminate the confusion that followed Siegelman and Walton 
by making it clear that pleading is not a prerequisite to raising an 
issue of foreign law. An attorney who intends to invoke foreign law 
now has sufficient temporal flexibility to investigate his client's case 
fully before raising the issue; the absence of any compulsion to plead 
foreign law should avoid premature conclusions and poorly-timed or 
wasteful research efforts.124 When a pleader is uncertain whether 
123. As a result of the unification of civil and admiralty procedure in 1966, Rule 
44.I applies also to admiralty cases. The notice requirement in criminal cases is 
discussed in note 5 supra. , 
124. The new Rule seems consistent with a number of state statutes, see, e.g., 
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foreign law applies or is in doubt as to which country's law controls, 
he may refrain from asserting foreign law until it is convenient for 
him to do so. In many instances, of course, the relevance of foreign 
law is apparent from the outset and an attorney will find it relatively 
simple and desirable to satisfy the first sentence of Rule 44.1 by 
giving notice in his pleading of his intention to raise a foreign-law 
issue. 
Rule 44.1 simply calls for "reasonable written notice"; neither the 
statutes nor the judicial decisions of a foreign country need be cited or 
set out in haec verba. Since the Rule does not require the "substance" 
or "effect" of foreign law to be pleaded, it is evident that the primary 
function of the notice is not to spell out the precise contents of 
foreign law but rather to apprise the court and the litigants of its 
relevance to the lawsuit-an objective that can be achieved with a 
minimum of formality and without a high degree of specificity.125 
The Rule does insist upon a certain quantum of information, how-
ever. A notice merely announcing that "counsel intends to raise an 
issue concerning the law of a foreign country" obviously would be 
insufficient. The spirit of the "reasonable written notice" standard 
requires the notice giver to specify the segment of the controversy 
he believes is governed by foreign law and to identify the country 
whose law is thought to control. When it is unclear whether foreign 
law is in issue or when the identity of the relevant law is uncertain 
at the time compliance with Rule 44.1 is attempted, the party giving 
notice may protect himself by stating his intentions alternatively or 
hypothetically.126 
Should events" following the service of the notice prove its con-
tents to be inaccurate, the liberal amendment provisions in Federal 
Rule 15 provide a safety valve for modifying a notice given in the 
pleadings, 127 and these provisions can be used by analogy to establish 
CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 310-11, 450-60 (effective Jan. 1, 1967); Mn. ANN. ConE art. 35, 
§ 50 (1957); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. &: R. 45ll(b), and the tenor of judicial construction 
given the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act in some states, see, e.g., 
Kingston v. Quimby, 80 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1955); Colozzi v. Bevko, Inc., 17 N.J. 194, 
110 A.2d 545 (1955). 
125. The conclusory words "substance" and "effect" have generated considerable 
confusion when used in some state foreign-law pleading provisions. See, e.g., 3 
WEINSTEIN, KoRN &: MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRAcnCE ,J 3016.16 (1966). 
126. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2); cf. Tsangarakis v. Panama S.S. Co., 197 F. Supp. 
704 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Empresa Agricola Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 57 
F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). 
127. Cf. Daniel Lumber Co. v. Empresas Hondurenas, S.A., 215 F.2d 465, 470 (5th 
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 (1955). See also IA BARRON &: HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL 
PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 442 (Wright ed. 1961); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE 
,r 15.08(2) (2d ed. 1966). 
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standards for modifying a notice given outside the pleadings. A trial 
court's willingness to permit a party to deviate from his notice will 
depend upon a variety of factors, including (I) the length of time 
that has elapsed between the original notice and the attempt to 
amend, (2) the notice giver's good faith in submitting the first notice 
and seeking its correction, (3) the complexity of the foreign-law 
issues, (4) the extent to which other parties have relied on the orig-
inal notice or may be prejudiced by the change, and (5) the court's 
attitude toward the mandates in Rule 15 directing that amendments 
be allowed whenever the interests of justice would be served. 
The specific content of the notice should not be viewed as im-
mutable or used to restrict a party's proof at trial unreasonably. 
Once an issue as to a certain country's law has been raised, the notice 
giver's proof should not be limited to the particular statutes or deci-
sions that may have been identified in the notice. An adverse party 
cannot complain if the court looks beyond those references to other 
portions of the applicable foreign law or if the party who gave notice 
seeks to support his position with additional materials.128 The vari-
ance problem becomes more complex when a party seeks to depart 
from his notice by interjecting the law of a nation other than one 
mentioned in the original notice. In this situation, the court must 
consider the same factors that are pertinent to a pleading amend-
ment or a variance between pleading and proof and, when the shift 
is sought after trial has commenced, an attempt must be made to 
evaluate the amendment in light of the impact it may have on the 
parties and their trial preparation. 
The new Rule is properly silent as to when the notice should be 
served inasmuch as that is a function of the circumstances in each 
case. Obviously, the timing of the notice is one aspect to be con-
sidered in determining whether a notice is "reasonable." According 
to the Advisory Committee's Note to the Rule: 
The stage which the case has reached at the time of the notice, the 
reason proffered by the party for his failure to give earlier notice, 
and the importance to the case as a whole of the issue of foreign law 
sought to be raised, are among the factors which the court should 
consider in deciding a question of the reasonableness of a notice.129 
The court thus has broad discretion to accept or reject a notice 
tendered at any point in the proceedings and, as is true of an attempt 
128. Cf. Continental Assur. Co. v. Henson, 297 Ky. 764, 181 S.W.2d 431 (1944). 
129. Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 44.1, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. ll7, US (1966), 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. 
&: AD. NEWS 807, 808. 
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to modify a notice, can draw upon its experience in analogous con-
texts, such as pleading amendments and variances.130 Generally, how-
ever, a party should not be permitted to raise a foreign-law issue after 
the pretrial conference is held, absent extenuating circumstances.131 
Notice may be given by any party who "intends to raise" an 
issue of foreign law. Normally, this means that the party whose cause 
of action or defense is based on foreign law is responsible for calling 
the relevance of foreign law to the attention of the court and the 
other litigants. When the foreign-law issue is of a collateral nature 
in an otherwise entirely domestic action-for example, a question 
in an American naturalization controversy of the validity of a mar-
riage or the legitimacy of a child under the law of another country 
-the notice-giving burden will fall on the party who plans to rely 
on foreign law when the particular issue ultimately is litigated. 
The problem becomes more complex when the action appears to 
depend upon foreign law but the plaintiff chooses to proceed as if it 
were governed by forum law and does not give notice under Rule 
44.1. If the defendant believes that the applicable foreign law pro-
vides no redress for the plaintiff's grievance, he will probably chal-
lenge the latter's right to recover on that basis. Does this mean that 
the obligation to give notice has shifted to the defendant, or is he 
free at any point in the litigation to spring his defense that the plain-
tiff's action is governed by an alien law that affords no relief? Since 
the defendant is a party who "intends to raise" an issue of foreign 
law, the text of the new Rule seems to require his giving notice. The 
conclusion is the same from a policy perspective. The function of 
the first sentence of Rule 44.1 is to insure that the presence of a 
foreign-law issue is called to the attention of the court and the 
litigants as early as possible. It would be atavistic to permit the 
defendant, or any party, to secrete an issue of foreign law until his 
adversary has irretrievably relied on domestic law. The defendant 
must be obliged to assert his belief that the plaintiff's right to re-
cover depends on foreign law. There do not appear to be any con-
siderations warranting an antipodal conclusion. The burden of 
130. Cf. Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 246 F. Supp. 634, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 
1965). In Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Gorter, 254 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1958), the 
defendant mistakenly relied on the law of British Columbia. Just as the case was being 
submitted for decision, the defendant moved to amend its answer to show that the 
law of the Dominion of Canada was applicable. The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial 
court's denial of the motion because the defendant's reliance on the law of British 
Columbia was excusable error and permitting the amendment would not prejudice 
the plaintiff. 
131. See Valdesa Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Frota Nacional de Petroleiros, 848 F.2d 
33, 36-38 (3d Cir. 1965). The relationship between the pretrial conference and foreign 
law is discussed at text accompanying notes 226-30 infra. 
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givmg notice is a light one and compliance does not affect the 
choice-of-law rules or bear on the consequences flowing from a 
failure to establish foreign law. Thus, if the defendant is obliged 
to give notice, he does not thereby assume the burden of persuading 
the court on that issue132 or waive the effect of the plaintiff's failure 
to establish his rights should the court ultimately decide that -the 
case is governed by foreign law .133 
According to the Advisory Committee, once notice is given by 
one party, it "serves as a basis for presentation of material on the 
foreign law by all parties" without the issuance of subsequent 
notices.134 However, if a party believes that a markedly different 
portion of the law referred to in the original notice is relevant or 
wishes to assert the law of a different country, the text of the Com-
mittee's Note does not seem apposite and it is advisable for him to 
serve his own notice. A second notice presumably is not necessary 
when a party merely intends to challenge the first notice giver's con-
struction and suggested application of foreign law, as would be the 
case when the defendant wishes to base his defense on a portion of 
the code that the plaintiff claims furnishes him with a cause of 
action.135 
B. Determining an Issue of Foreign Law 
I. Proof of Foreign Law 
a. The pattern prior to Federal Rule 44 .1. Shortly after the estab-
lishment of the federal judiciary, the United States Supreme Court 
put its imprimatur on the fact characterization of foreign law136 and 
the federal courts predictably adopted the common-law pattern of 
proof. As a result, the party alleging the applicability of foreign law 
was assigned the burden of proving it by competent evidence and 
132, See Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grasso, 186 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1951). See also 
Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940). 
133. The consequences of failing to establish foreign law in the federal courts are 
discussed at text accompanying notes 306-31 infra. 
134. Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 44.I, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 117, 118 (1966), 1966 U.S. CODE CoNc. 
&: AD. NEWS 807, 808; cf. Wilson v. Dailey, 191 Md. 472, 62 A.2d 284 (1948). 
135. Cf. Continental Assur. Co. v. Henson, 297 Ky. 764, 181 S.W.2d 431 (1944); 
H. &: J. Gross, Inc. v. Fraser, 140 Mont. 95, 368 P.2d 163 (1962). Although they occa-
sionally may provide useful analytical pegs, the notions of "estoppel" and "waiver" 
should not be overworked in this context. See also Comment, Judicial Notice of For-
eign Law, 38 WASH. L. REV. 802, 805, 815 (1963). In order to avoid the type of calci-
fication that so often accompanies these verbal shorthands, the court always should 
return to the objectives of the first sentence of Rule 44.I and to considerations of 
fairness. 
136. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) I, 38 (1801). 
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the federal courts rejected all supplications to the effect that they 
had inherent power to take judicial notice of foreign law.137 
The federal courts have recognized four exceptions to the proof 
requirement. The first applies to so-called rudimentary principles of 
law. In Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Rivers138 this notion 
was invoked in an action by a female passenger against a French 
steamship company for injuries incurred as a result of a vicious and 
wanton attack by one of the defendant's employees. The Second 
Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the action failed 
because the plaintiff did not plead and prove French law, stating 
that it would be "almost an insult to any self-respecting, civilized 
country" to fail to assume that the employee's conduct was redressible 
under its law.139 The court put the burden of proving the lack of a 
cause of action under French law on the steamship company. Further 
elaboration of the rudimentary principles doctrine is found in Judge 
Learned Hand's opinion in E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co.:140 
The extent of our right to make any assumptions about the law of 
another country depends upon the country and the question in-
volved; in common-law countries we may go further than in civil 
law; in civilized, than in backward or barbarous. We can say more 
in the case of France or Italy, than of Abyssinia, or Afghanistan ... , 
less, than in the case of England or Australia. No doubt, when there 
137. See, e.g., Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 
397 (1889); Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 400, 426 (1852); Armstrong v. Lear, 33 
U.S. (8 Pet.) 52 (1834); Strother v. Lucas, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 763 (1832); Commissioner v. 
Hyde, 82 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1936); In re Circle Trading Corp., 26 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 
1928; Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Chantry, 136 Fed. 316 (5th Cir. 1905); Mexican Nat'l R.R. 
v. Slater, 115 Fed. 593 (5th Cir. 1902), aff'd, 194 U.S. 120 (1904). See also United States 
ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1943) (habeas corpus petition); Normann 
v. Schmidt, 125 F.2d 162 (C.C.P.A. 1942); Ex parte Hing, 22 F.2d 554 (W.D. Wash. 
1927); Hockett v. Alston, 3 Indian Terr. 432, 58 S.W. 675 (1900) (law of Cherokee 
Nation); Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. Is. 46 (1915). The attitude of 
the federal courts toward foreign law and its proof is exemplified by the following 
passage from Shapleigh v. Mier, 83 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1936), afj'd, 299 U.S. 468 (1937): 
It [Mexican Law] remains foreign law to be proven as a fact when written by 
production of copies of the Constitution and statutes, and in other respects by 
the testimony of experts. The writings are to be construed by the judge as other 
writings in evidence, but if uncertain in meaning or application evidence of 
experts is again admissible to aid the construction. . • • Any other rule would 
not work, for the judge could hardly be truly conversant with the law of Mexico 
and would have no access to the forum; and if he were free, as in case of taking 
judicial notice, to consult any book or person in his discretion, the parties liti-
gant would have no means of knowing what he relied on and no sure means of 
putting the truth before him. 
Id. at 676. See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay, 210 Fed. 810 (2d Cir. 1913); 
Shelton v. Canadian No. Ry., 189 Fed. 153 (C.C.D. Minn. 1911); Seton v. Delaware Ins. 
Co., 21 Fed. Cas. 1093 (No. 12675) (C.C.D. Pa. 1808); Robinson v. Clifford, 20 Fed, Cas. 
1001 (No. 11948) (C.C.D. Pa. 1807). 
138. 211 Fed. 294 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 232 U.S. 727 (1914). 
139. Id. at 298. 
140. 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931). 
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is no evidence, we are always much limited in cases where the 
common-law does not prevail; but we are not quite without power 
in commercial matters arising in one of the great commercial coun-
tries of Western Europe .... We can assume that in Italy an agree-
ment of carriage creates obligations, generally measured by the lan-
guage used ... ~ We may not, however, assume anything as to how 
far a carrier by contract is allowed to set a value upon the goods he 
carries; as to that we know nothing. Prima facie, the agreement is 
a contract; he who maintains that in a given situation it is not, must 
prove the law of Italy.141 
At first glance, the rudimentary principles theory appears to be 
an attractive mechanism for eliminating the need to prove foreign 
law, especially if it is applied with the reasoned flexibility suggested 
by Judge Hand. It is curious, therefore, that despite the recognition 
of the doctrine for the better part of a century--certainly an ade-
quate time for it to mature and expand-it has been used, except in 
a handful of cases, only in actions involving grossly antisocial con-
duct on the part of the defendant. Relatively few judges have in-
voked it and the federal courts have yet to agree on the propriety of 
applying it in such basic contexts as negligence142 and the master-
servant relationship.143 
The second exception to the proof requirement permits the fed-
eral courts to take judicial notice of the principles of international 
law and the maritime law of western nations.144 According to a num-
ber of decisions, only the well established and widely recognized 
rules of international and maritime law are within the aegis of this 
exception.145 For example, the federal courts have refrained from 
taking judicial notice of deviations from general maritime law 
adopted by individual nations. 
The two remaining special rules are isomorphic and can be con-
sidered together. Under the third exception, a federal court is 
obligated to apply the judicial decisions and statutes of the several 
states, not merely the law of the state in which it happens to be 
141. Id. at 117. 
142. Compare Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
352 U.S. 872 (1956), with Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1962), 
and Jansson v. Swedish Am. Line, 185 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1950), and Rosenthal v. Com-
pagnie Generale Transatlantique, 14 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
143. See Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912). 
144. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); The New York, 175 U.S. 187 
(1899); The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 370 (1885); The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 
(1871); Lawlor v. Incres Nassau S.S. Line, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 764 (D. Mass. 1958). See 
also McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 VAND. L. R.Ev. 296, 310 (1952). 
145. See, e.g., Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart &: Sons, Ltd., 336 U.S. 
386, 396 (1949). See also Yang-Tsze Ins. Ass'n v. Furness, Withy &: Co., 215 Fed. 859 
(2d Cir. 1914), appeal dismissed, 242 U.S. 430 (1917). 
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sitting.146 The fourth exception actually is a group of closely related 
incursions on the proof requirement. Collectively they permit the 
federal courts to notice the foreign law in force in an area prior to 
its accession by the United States, the law in force in a territory 
before it became a state, the law common to a foreign country and a 
territory that has become a state,147 and the law in the colonies and 
in England prior to the American Revolution.148 
A reasonably persuasive rationale for each of the four exceptions 
is easy to articulate. Considerations of administtative convenience 
and fairness presumably underlie the rudimentary principles doc-
trine. The notion that a party asserting a "fundamental" or "rudi-
mentary" right should not be forced to prove that foreign law 
recognizes the obvious has a certain appeal. The intemational-and-
maritime-law exception apparently assumes that these principles are 
widely recognized, have the approbation of the courts in most na-
tions, are easily ascertainable, and, for all practical purposes, have 
been assimilated into domestic law. Accordingly, it is deemed appro-
priate to ask the federal courts to apply this body of rules without 
formal proof. The relatively few cases applying these two exceptions 
may well be a testament to their limited value. In most instances it 
probably is easier to prove foreign law than to establish that it is 
"rudimentary" in character or, in the case of international or mari-
time law, "well-established." 
Exceptions three and four are based on very different considera-
tions and are really by-products of our federal polity and the role of 
the federal judiciary under the Constitution rather than aspects of 
any policy relating to the proof of foreign law. Because the Supreme 
Court's power to review state court decisions brings it into daily 
contact with the law of one or more states, it is inconceivable that 
146. See, e.g., Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218 (1885); Pennington v. Gibson, 57 U.S. 
(16 How.) 65, 81 (1853); Owings v. Hull, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 607, 625 (1835) (Louisiana law 
applied). See also Martin's Adm'r v. Baltimore &: O.R.R., 151 U.S. 678, 678 (1894); 
Salsberg v. Modern Transfer Co., 824 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1963); Parkway Baking Co. v. 
Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958); McDermott v. John Hancock Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 255 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 935 (1959); Colello v. 
Sundquist, 137 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), afj'd, 229 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1956); lA 
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE t;f 0.316[2] (2d ed. 1961). But see Anderson v. National Pro-
ducing Co., 253 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 906 (1958). 
147. See, e.g., United States v. Chaves, 159 U.S. 452 (1895); United States v. Perot, 
98 U.S. 428 (1878); Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542, 557 (1854); 
United States v. Turner, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 663 (1850); Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Marshall, 
91 Fed. 933 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 173 U.S. 705 (1899) (dictum); cf. Lokpez v. Sotelo, 
70 P.R.R. 475 (1949). See also Panama Elec. Ry. v. Moyers, 249 Fed. 19 (5th Cir. 1918); 
Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Glover, 107 Fed. 356 (5th Cir. 1901). 
148, See, e.g., Loree v. Abner, 57 Fed. 159 (6th Cir. 1893). 
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the Court would treat issues of state law differently than other ques-
tions of law. In addition, all levels of the federal judiciary are re-
quired to determine issues of state law when sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction and, by virtue of the Rules of Decision Act,149 must do 
the same in a variety of contexts when adjudicating federal-question 
cases. Moreover, from the inception of the national judicial system, 
the federal courts, without any concern for the technicalities of proof, 
have referred to the laws of the several states-and to English law-
for guidance in determining what state and federal law is or should 
be in a variety of contexts.15° Courts that have grown accustomed 
to this process cannot be expected to pay serious attention to an 
argument that they are incapable of performing a comparable func-
tion when they are asked to apply state law. 
It obviously is eminently sensible to permit the federal courts 
to take notice of the law of each of the nation's constituent units, 
whether it be their current law or their ancient law. But does it 
make sense to denominate the Spanish or French law formerly in 
force in parts of the South and Southwest, or the )aw of Louisiana, 
as "law" when it must be applied by a federal court in New York, 
and then to characterize the present law of Spain or France as "fact," 
when the consequence of this nomenclature is to superimpose on the 
latter the same rules of proof as are used to determine an automobile's 
speed or a traffic light's color?151 The two situations certainly cannot 
be distinguished on the basis of the burden they will impose on the 
court. Of course, it is plausible to argue that absent the type of 
policy justifications that are at the root of the third and fourth 
exceptions to the proof requirement, the federal courts should not 
be burdened with the task of delving into foreign law and should be 
permitted to rely on adversarial presentations. Beyond this hypothe-
sis, for which there is little existing empirical evidence or judicially 
articulated support, there is little to commend the existing distinc-
tion. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not deal directly with 
the proof of foreign law prior to 1966. Between 1938 and 1966 most 
149. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964). 
The relationship among the Rules of Decision Act, a number of related statutes, the 
proof of foreign law in the federal courts, and Rule 44.1, is discussed at text accom-
panying notes 431-519 infra. 
150. Between the decisions in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), and Erie 
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the federal courts frequently engaged in this 
type of an investigation to ascertain general federal common law. E.g., Baltimore 8c 
O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893). 
151. See United States v. Turner, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 663, 668 (1850). 
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federal courts adhered to prior practice by refusing to take judicial 
notice of foreign law and insisting that it be proved as a fact.152 The 
four exceptions to the proof requirement retained their limited 
virility but the courts manifested no proclivity to expand them.153 
A few courts departed from the common-law rule and took judicial 
notice of foreign law, but usually only of extremely primordial legal 
principles and without any enlightening discussion.154 
Several federal courts deviated from common-law techniques by 
relying on the passage in Federal Rule 43(a) providing that all 
evidence 
shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the 
United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in 
the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or 
under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of general juris-
diction of the state in which the United States Court is held.155 
The first two grounds for admissibility are of little relevance to this 
discussion since there are no general federal statutes dealing with 
proof of foreign law156 and the pre-1938 practice of proving alien 
law in equity seems to have been the same as it was on the law side 
of the federal courts. The third basis for admission-the "rules of 
152. See, e.g., Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
352 U.S. 872 (1956); Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955); 
Esso Standard Oil, S.A. v. The Gasbras Sul, 239 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Prol v. 
Holland-America Line, 234 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Tsangarakis v. Panama S.S. 
Co., 197 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Nicolas Eustathiou &: Co. v. United States, 154 
F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Va. 1957); The Vulcania, 32 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). See also 
Emmerich v. May, 130 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
153. See, e.g., Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1962); Lawlor v. 
Incres Nassau S.S. Line, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 764 (D. Mass. 1958); Rosenthal v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 14 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
154. See Dulles v. Katamoto, 256 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1958) (judicial notice that 
person born in Japan is a Japanese citizen); Guzman v. Gleason, 234 F. Supp. 145 
(D.D.C. 1964) (common-law marriages not recognized in the Philippines); Fianza CIA 
Nav. S.A. v. Benz, 178 F. Supp. 243 (D. Ore. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 
490 (9th Cir. 1960) (judicial notice that certain commercial transactions were bona fide 
and in due course under Panamanian law). 
155. FED. R. C1v. P. 43(a) is intended to favor the admissibility of evidence. Pro• 
fessor Moore has stated that it "revolutionizes federal evidence, and in general places 
admissibility upon the sole basis of relevancy and materiality." 5 MooRE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE ,J 43.02[3] (2d ed. 1966). 
156. Two federal statutes of somewhat limited application are worthy of mention. 
According to the Federal Register Act, 49 Stat. 502 (1935), 44 U.S.C. § 307 (1964), any 
material concerning foreign law that appears in the Federal Register can be judicially 
noticed. Similarly, § 1741 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1741 (1964), which incorpo-
rates the practice under FED. R. C1v. P. 44, facilitates the introduction in evidence of 
foreign official documents and records, including various documents relating to the law 
of a foreign country such as statutes, administrative regulations, and judicial decisions. 
See Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLOM. L. REv. 
1015, 1042-46 (1965). Because of the great freedom Rule 44.l gives the trial judge, 
§ 1741 and Rule 44 will be of limited utility in the proof of foreign law. 
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evidence" applied in the courts of the state in which the district 
court is sitting-proved to be more fruitful. It enabled a federal court 
sitting in a state with a liberal attitude toward the introduction of 
foreign-law materials to exercise the same freedom as a state court 
in that jurisdiction even if the material was technically inadmissible 
under some widely accepted principle of evidence. For example, a 
federal court in a state that had enacted the Uniform Proof of 
Statutes Act could accept an official publication of a foreign statute 
without further proof.157 In those states that had enacted a permis-
sive or mandatory judicial-notice statute, a federal court theoretically 
could apply it to foreign law under Rule 43(a). Indeed, a number 
of cases assumed that Rule 43(a) permitted a federal court to take 
judicial notice of facts whenever a state court would, 158 and this 
construction was extended to judicial notice of foreign law without 
hesitation;159 this was done even though Rule 43(a) is only a rule 
of admissibility and it is not self-evident that the judicial-notice 
doctrine falls within its ambit. Doubts about this use of Rule 43(a) 
were alluded to in Siegelman but the court endorsed Professor 
Moore's view that the Rule applies to judicial notice because "the 
statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence govems";160 
the Second Circuit concluded that "the most convenient method of 
presenting the foreign law is obviously not to have to introduce 
evidence on it at all, but simply to treat it in the same fashion as 
domestic law."161 
But the willingness to employ state judicial-notice statutes under 
Rule 43(a) did not radically alter the established pattern. The fed-
eral courts tended to be conservative in their use of the forum state's 
judicial-notice statute and generally refrained from resorting to it 
unless a state court would have taken judicial notice in a comparable 
157. Conceivably, a copy of a foreign statute could satisfy the Uniform Proof of 
Statutes Act but not qualify under the pre-1966 text of Federal Rule 44. 
158. E.g., Golaris v. Jewel Tea Co., 22 F.R.D. 16 (N.D. Ill. 1958). See also Insurance 
Research Serv., Inc. v. Associates Fin. Corp., 134 F. Supp. 54 (M.D. Tenn. 1955). 
159. See Lady Nelson, Ltd. v. Creole Petroleum Co., 286 F.2d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1961) 
(dictum); Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955); Petition 
of Petrol Shipping Corp., 37 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Telesphore Couture v. 
Watkins, 162 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); Empresa Agricola Chicama Ltda. v. 
Amtorg Trading Corp., 57 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). See also Gediman v. Anheuser 
Busch, Inc., 299 F.2d 537, 544 n.6 (2d Cir. 1962); Krasnow v. National Airlines, Inc., 
228 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1955). 
160. See 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1[ 43.09 (2d ed. 1966). 
161. 221 F.2d at 196. One writer has complained that the Siegelman decision goes 
beyond the limits placed on N.Y. CIV. PRAc. Acr § 344-a by the New York courts, par-
ticularly Sonnesen v. Panama Transp. Co., 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569 (1948), cert. 
denied, 337 U.S. 919 (1949). See Busch, Reply to Report on "Judicial Initiative in the 
Proof of Foreign Law," A.B.A. SEC. INT'L &: COMP. L., PROCEEDINGS 136 (1956). 
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case.162 Moreover, even today, only about one-fourth of the states 
permit or require judicial notice to be taken of foreign law and in 
many of these states the courts have been parsimonious in their 
utilization of the statutes.163 Thus, in most federal courts proof of 
the law of foreign countries continued to follow the same inefficient 
and needlessly prodigal pattern employed prior to 1938-the intro-
duction of some combination of official publications, duly authenti-
cated copies of documents concerning foreign law, oral expert testi-
mony, formal depositions of experts who were unavailable to testify, 
and a variety of other miscellany.164 
b. The effect of Federal Rule 44.1. The procedure for proving 
foreign law has been substantially changed by the second sentence 
of Federal Rule 44.1, which provides a uniform procedure for all the 
district courts-thereby eliminating the need to rely on state practice 
in those states in which it has been advantageous to do so in the 
162. This restraint is best exemplified by several decisions in the New York federal 
courts. In Hausman v. Bailey, 22 F.R.D. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), a stockholder's derivative 
suit, the court declined to take judicial notice of Venezuelan law on a motion to 
dismiss, preferring to treat it as a fact to be proved at trial. See also Bakhshandeh 
v. American Cyanamid Co., 211· F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Harrison v. United 
Fruit Co., 143 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Murphy v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 
111 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd, 203 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1953). Again, in Telesphore 
Couture v. Watkins, 162 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1958), a request to take judicial notice 
of certain Quebec statutes was rejected; the court felt it lacked the "facilities" to 
do so and believed that counsel had the duty to research Quebec law and present 
the fruits of their efforts to the court. Much the same reasoning led the court to 
refrain from noticing Greek law in Petition of Petrol Shipping Corp., 37 F.R.D. 437 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Wall Street Traders, Inc. v. Sociedad Espanola de Construe-
don Naval, 245 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (admiralty case involving law of Spain). 
Only in Royal Exch. Assur. v. Brownell, 146 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), afj'd, 257 
F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1958), did the Southern District of New York reject conflicting ex-
pert testimony and assert its power to take judicial notice; as in Siegelman, however, 
English law was involved. Cf. Nicholas E. Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 349 
F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1965). 
During the period embraced by these federal cases, New York state courts took 
judicial notice of the laws of Quebec, Estate of McDougald, 272 App. Div. 176, 70 
N.Y.S.2d 200 (1947), Holland, In re Baruch's Estate, 131 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Surr. Ct. 1954), 
Ontario, Olson v. Kilian, 203 Misc. 847, 119 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1953), and Italy, 
Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank, 11 Misc. 2d 397, 173 N.Y.S.2d 
509 (Sup. Ct. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 6 N.Y.2d 454, 160 N.E.2d 836, 190 N.Y.S.2d 
352 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959). See also Mangrelli v. Italian Line, 208 
Misc. 685, 144 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (dictum); Matter of Grant-Suttie, 205 Misc. 
640, 129 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Surr. Ct. 1954); Nussbaum, Proof of Foreign Law in New York: 
A Proposed Amendment, 57 CoLuM. L. REv. 348 (1957). In Southwestern Shipping, 
the court received considerable aid from counsel. 
163. See text accompanying notes 49, 55-58 supra. 
164. See, e.g., Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kennedy, 199 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C. 
1961), rev'd on other grounds, 319 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 965 
(1964). The court always has been the ultimate arbiter of the admissibility of foreign-
law material. In Federal Ins. Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 540 
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), the court rejected as insufficient an attempt to establish the law of 
Italy by introducing the digest of Italian law appearing in Martindale-Hubbell Law 
Directory. 
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past and liberating the federal courts in the remaining states from 
the common-law practice.165 The new Rule permits the court to 
consider any material that is relevant to a foreign-law issue, whether 
submitted by counsel or unearthed by the court's own research, and 
without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence.166 
The purpose of this provision is obvious. One of the objectives of 
Rule 44.l is to abandon the fact characterization of foreign law and 
to make the process of determining alien law identic with the method 
of ascertaining domestic law to the extent that is possible. Thus the 
trial judge's freedom of inquiry no longer is encumbered by restraints 
on his research or by the rules of admissibility, which may be useful 
in the context of fact issues tried to a jury but are of no utility in 
establishing the content of foreign law. 
Since the new Rule dissipates former inhibitions, the court may 
consider any material the parties wish to present. Statutes, adminis-
trative material, and judicial decisions can be established most easily 
by introducing an official or authenticated copy of the applicable 
provisions or court reports supported by expert testimony as to their 
meaning.167 The task of procuring an acceptable copy of a foreign 
official record has been facilitated substantially by the extensive revi-
sion of Federal Rule 44, which was adopted with Rule 44.l 
in 1966.168 In addition to primary materials and expert testi-
mony, a litigant may present any other information concerning 
foreign law he believes will further his cause, including secondary 
sources such as texts, learned journals, 169 and a wide variety of 
unauthenticated documents relating to foreign law. The trial judge 
is free to accept these items and ascribe whatever probative value he 
165. The second sentence of Rule 44.1 states: "The court, in determining foreign 
law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or 
not submitted by a party or admissible under Rule 43." The full text of the Rule is 
set out in note 5 supra. 
166. Cf. UNIFORM RUI.ES OF EVIDENCE 10(2). 
167. See Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 400, 426 (1852); Chemical Bank N.Y. 
Trust Co. v. Kennedy, 199 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 319 
F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 965 (1964); The Atlanta, 82 F. Supp. 
218 (S.D. Ga. 1948). See also Esso Standard Oil, S.A. v. The Gasbras Sul, 239 F. Supp. 
212 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). It obviously is inadvisable to rely on an unelaborated text of a 
foreign statute or decision. Counsel should offer the court enough background infor-
mation to permit it to comprehend the relevance of the proffered material to the 
litigation. See, e.g., Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 191 F. Supp. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 
1961), aff'd, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962). 
168. FED. R. C1v. P. 44.1 is virtually identical to Article V of the Uniform Inter-
state and International Procedure Act, which is outlined in note 71, supra. 
169. Although some of the early cases contain debate on the point, the federal 
courts have relied on foreign-law treatises for some time. E.g., The Maggie Ham-
mond, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 435, 452 (1869); The Pawashick, 19 Fed. Cas. 5 (No. 10851) (D. 
Mass. 1872). 
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thinks they deserve; early decisions limiting the court's power to 
consider legal materials that were not properly attested or were 
inadmissible under the rules of evidence have no precedential value 
under Rule 44.1.110 
Written or oral expert testimony accompanied by extracts from 
foreign legal materials probably will continue to be the basic mode 
of proving foreign law.171 A foreign-law expert is not required to 
meet any special qualifications; indeed, he need not even be ad-
mitted to practice in the country whose law is in issue.172 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that federal courts have not felt bound by the 
testimony of experts and upon occasion have placed little or no 
credence in their opinions.173 In Bostrom v. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A.,174 
for example, the court commented on the plaintiff's Mexican law 
expert as follows: 
The witness was a native of Germany and studied law there. He 
left Germany during the period of the exodus in the middle 
thirties. . . . He has never obtained a license to practice law any-
where. . . . The only official recognition of his law study was the 
action in 1960 of his native state of Bavaria in conferring on him 
the honorary title of "Landgerichstrap," which means Judge of the 
Superior Court. The honorary appointment was given, to use his 
170. See Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 400, 426-30 (1852); Church v. Hubbart, 
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804). See generally The Pawashick, supra note 169. 
171. See Jose Taya's Sons v. Compania Arrendataria de Tobacos de Espana, 
280 Fed. 825 (2d Cir. 1922); Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D. 
Mass. 1966); Esso Standard Oil, S.A. v. The Gasbras Sul, 239 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 
1964); Maiorino v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). A number of the 
deficiencies of expert testimony are outlined in GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAw 48-50 
(2d ed. 1949). See also SoMMERICH & BUSCH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND 
PROOF 41-48 (1959); Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 
1204, 1243-44 (1966); Stem, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 
45 CALIF. L. REV. 23, 38 (1957). 
172. See Nicolas Eustathiou & Co. v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Va. 
1957); Murphy v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 111 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), afj'd, 
203 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1953). There is an intimation in Panama Elec. Ry. v. Moyers, 
249 Fed. 19 (5th Cir. 1918) that the trial judge could have qualified as an expert in 
Panamanian law if he had been called to testify. 
173. E.g., Nicholas E. Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d 465 (2d 
Cir. 1965); Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1949); Merinos Viesca y 
Compania, Inc. v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co., 83 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 299 U.S. 547 (1936); Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 191 F. Supp. 206 
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), afj'd, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Daniel Lumber Co. v. 
Empresas Hondurenas, S.A., 215 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 
(1955); Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941 (2d 
Cir. 1930). In Panama Elec. Ry. v. Moyers, 249 Fed. 19 (5th Cir. 1918), the trial court's 
refusal to admit evidence on the law of Panama offered by a judge of that country 
was held to be reversible error. The lower court had rejected the testimony on the 
ground that it did not want "to delegate . • • the right to pass upon the issues 
involved in this case." Id. at 22. 
174. 225 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Tex. 1963), modified on other grounds, 347 F.2d 168 
(5th Cir. 1965). 
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words, in "the course of what is called 'restitution' ". He is foreign 
law librarian for one of the large county law libraries in California, 
which has a collection of books on the laws of some foreign coun-
tries, including Mexico. He has had no· formal education in the 
Spanish language; but he has studied it on his own to the extent 
that he considers he can read and translate it, though he cannot 
speak it well. He has written "articles on the law of the Republic 
of Mexico," and has testified in two· cases on the laws of that country 
as well as in one case on those of Norway. There was no indication 
of the nature of such writings and testimony or that they had any 
relation to the questions involved in this case. As far as the evi-
dence goes, the articles might have been of such general nature that 
a government professor could have written them. A good lawyer or 
law professor from Mexico could have been produced at practically 
the same expense; and a deposition of one of them would have cost 
considerably less. In a case involving questions of foreign law, a 
party owes the court the duty of producing an expert witness whose 
learning and experience equal or surpass custody of law books, a 
general interest in the subject, and a willingness to testify on any 
phase of the laws of any foreign country .... 115 
As intimated in Bostrom, the federal courts expect adequate expert 
testimony on foreign law and the failure to produce it may damage a 
litigant's case. The latter point is illustrated by Dulles v. Kata-
moto,176 in which the United States government attempted to prove 
Japanese law by producing a statement written by one Japanese 
official to another and two opinions from nonlawyers. The court 
concluded that the absence of "the testimony of an experienced 
Japanese practitioner" raised an inference that the law was contrary 
to the construction advanced by the govemment.177 
The passage in Rule 44.1 expressly authorizing the court to en-
gage in its own foreign-law research, a prerogative frequently exer-
cised on issues of domestic law, is an improvement over prior prac-
tice for a number of reasons.178 All too often counsel will do an 
175. Id. at 230-31. When the expert seems qualified, the court usually will honor 
his testimony. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay, 210 Fed. 810 (2d Cir. 1913). 
176. 256 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1958). 
177. Id. at 547. See also Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart &: Sons, 
336 U.S. 386, 397 (1949) (court unimpressed by personal consultations with three 
Belgian maritime lawyers that were not on the record). Some courts have insisted that 
written expert testimony must be sworn. E.g., Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 
191 F. Supp. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), affd, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962). 
178. A number of federal courts exercised considerable independence in examining 
foreign law on their own before receiving express authorization to do so. E.g., Bostrom 
v. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Tex. 1963), modified on other grounds, 
347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965); cf. Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., 
281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407 (1933). See also Daniel Lumber Co. v. 
Empresas Hondurenas, S.A., 215 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 
(1955). In Nicholas E. Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 
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inadequate job of researching and presenting foreign law or will 
attempt to prove alien law in such a partisan fashion that the court 
is obliged to go beyond their offerings. On occasion, the trial judge 
will have better foreign-law resources than counsel or, because of his 
personal background or prior exposure to a particular country's 
law, have greater expertise in researching and applying foreign law 
than the attorneys. In these circumstances it would be foolish to 
restrict the court's line of vision to the materials formally presented 
in evidence by the parties. 
The trial judge's freedom to engage in his own research gives 
him maximum flexibility as to the material to be considered and 
the methodology to be employed in determining foreign law in a 
particular case. To exercise his discretion under the new Rule 
responsibly, the judge must take account of a variety of factors, in-
cluding the importance of foreign law to the case, the complexity 
of the foreign-law issue, and how best to meet the needs of and be 
fair to both litigants. In many instances the judge will not utilize 
the prerogatives found in the second sentence of Rule 44.1. Nothing 
in the Rule requires him to engage in private research; his right to 
insist upon a complete presentation by counsel on the foreign-law 
issues has been preserved. The Rule recognizes that judges are 
reluctant to research and determine foreign law without some assis-
tance from the attomeys179 and does not obligate them to undertake 
that burden.180 At a minimum, however, federal trial judges pre-
1965), Judge Friendly undertook the task of investigating Greek law when the expert 
testimony proved unsatisfactory. He eventually relied on a discussion of the same 
issue in an earlier federal case. Doubt as to the propriety of this practice was ex-
pressed in Di Sora v. Phillips, 10 H.L. Cas. 624, 639-40, 11 Eng. Rep. 1168, 1175 (1863) 
and in SOMMERICH & BUSCH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 64-69 
(1959). See also note 295 infra. 
179. See, e.g., Petition of Petrol Shipping Corp., 37 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); 
Wall Street Traders, Inc. v. Sociedad Espanola de Construccion Naval, 236 F. Supp. 
358, 359 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Telesphore Couture v. Watkins, 162 F. Supp. 727 
(E.D.N .Y. 1958). 
180. The Rule also refrains from using the term "judicial notice" because of the 
widespread confusion and controversy concerning the character of that doctrine. See 
Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 964, 981-
1001 (1958), for a brilliant "expose" of the vagaries and deficiencies of the use of 
the judicial-notice doctrine in this context. If the court is so disposed, it may be able 
to secure aid in determining foreign law from the foreign ministry or department 
of justice of the foreign country, see, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 218 
(1942); SMIT, ITALIAN AND AMERICAN PROCEDURES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN 
LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 15-17 (1962); Miller, International Cooperation 
in Litigation Between the United States and Switzerland: Unilateral Procedural Ac-
commodation in a Test Tube, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1069, 1107-08 (1965); cf. Westfal-
Larsen & Co. v. United States, 41 F.2d 550 (N.D. Cal. 1930), or from a reliable private 
agency, such as the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Private Law 
in Germany, that is willing to prepare an opinion on the law of a particular country. 
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sumably should continue to take judicial notice under the four 
traditional exceptions to the proof requirement.181 Moreover, it 
must be remembered that one of the policies inherent in Rule 44.1 
is that, whenever possible, foreign-law issues should be resolved on 
their merits and on the basis of a full evaluation of the available 
materials. To effectuate this policy, the court is obliged to take an 
active role in the process of ascertaining foreign law. The notice 
requirement and the mode of proof were deliberately left flexible 
and informal to encourage court and counsel to regard the deter-
mination of foreign law as a co-operative venture requiring an open 
and unstructured dialogue among all concerned.182 Thus, a judicial 
practice of automatically refusing to engage in research or to assist 
or direct counsel would ·be inconsistent with one of the Rule's basic 
premises. 
In many respects, proof of foreign law under the new Rule is 
similar to the pattern employed in a number of foreign countries. 
Because the rules of evidence are less of an impediment in civil-law 
countries than in common-law jurisdictions, most European courts 
are extremely flexible in receiving information concerning foreign 
law183 and a number of them permit their courts to engage in ex 
parte foreign-law investigations.184 In Latin America, courts in na-
See also GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAw 51 (2d ed. 1949). Some of the deficiencies of 
relying on opinions furnished by foreign officials are outlined in Rafalko, Pleading, 
Proving and Obtaining Information on Foreign Law, 43 U. DET. L.J. 95, 97-98 (1965). 
See also SOMMERICH &: BuscH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 55-57 
(1959). To date nothing of consequence has materialized from a number of sugges-
tions that the United States enter into arrangements with other countries for the 
exchange of legal materials and opinions. See, e.g., Part VII, Art. 12, Harvard Research 
in International Law, Draft Convention on Judicial Assistance, 33 AM. J. INt'L L. 112 
(Supp. 1939). See also Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and 
a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 546-47, 552-53, 556-62 (1953). 
181. See text accompanying notes 138-51 supra. 
182. Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 44.1, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 117, 118-19 (1966), 1966 U.S. CODE 
CONG.&: Ao. NEWS 807, 808-09. 
183. See generally KUHN, PRIVA'IE INTERNATIONAL LAW 100-03 (1937); Shaper &: 
Smit, The Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN LITIGATION: EUROPE 382, 
394-95 (Smit ed. 1965); Sommerich &: Busch, op. cit. supra note 180, at 105-16; Kuhn, 
Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 86 (1945); Miller, supra note 180, 
at 1127-29; Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1027 
(1941). 
184. For example, § 293 of the German Code of Civil Procedure states: 
The law prevailing in another country, the customary law and charters need to 
be proved only in so far as they are unknown to the Court. In ascertaining these 
legal norms the Court is not confined to the evidence adduced by the parties; 
it may use, also, other sources of information and may make any orders necessary 
for their utilization. 
See I STEIN-JONAS-SCHONKE, KoMMENTAR ZUR ZMLPROZESSORDNUNG (18th ed. 1953). See 
also Kassationsgericht of the Canton of Zurich, Oct. 12, 1951, 11 SCHWEIZERISCHES 
JAHRBUCH FUR INTERNATIONALES RECHT (ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL) 302-
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tions that adhere to the Bustamente Code must judicially notice the 
law of any other country that has adopted the Code.185 A more 
cautious attitude toward the proof of foreign law prevails in those 
nations with a Napoleonic Code tradition.186 
A question that frequently generates debate is whether the trial 
court should be required to give notice to the parties whenever it 
examines foreign-law materials not submitted by counsel or when-
ever it espies a foreign-law issue not raised by the parties, researches 
the question, and then applies alien law. Although Rule 44.1 is 
silent on the point, the Advisory Committee's Note negates the 
existence of any such duty. This conclusion finds support in the 
analogous treatment now accorded to domestic-law issues in the 
federal courts. Since a court often applies the product of its private 
research into domestic law without prior notice to the litigants, it 
should not be required to give notice in the foreign-law situation 
as a matter of course. 
Common sense and the same policy considerations underlying 
the notice requirement in the first sentence of Rule 44.1 necessitate 
some qualification of the proposition that the court need never give 
notice, however. If the court either unearths material that varies 
markedly from that offered by the parties or plans to utilize foreign 
law in a way not contemplated by the parties, notice and an opportu-
nity to react to the court's research should be given.187 A similar 
obligation exists when the trial court raises an issue of foreign 
law on its own or decides that the case is controlled by the law of 
a country other than the one whose law the parties believed to be 
applicable.188 As a practical matter, the interaction between counsel 
03 (1954); GINSBURG &: BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN ,I 12.06 (1965); Dolle, 
De l'application du droit etranger par le juge interne, 44 REvuE CRITIQUE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONALE PRIVE 233 (1955). 
185. Sixth International Conference of American States, Code of Private Inter-
national Law, Jan. 16-Feb. 20, 1928, arts. 408·13, reprinted in Pan Am. Law and 
Treaty Ser. No. 34, at 38, 65-66. 
186. See, e.g., Herzog & Smit, France, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN LmGATION: 
EUROPE 119, 149-52 (Smit ed. 1965); Rigaux &: Miller, Belgium, in id. at 30, 50-51. 
Although the fact theory is prevalent in Europe, a number of civilian scholars have 
rejected it. E.g., MEILI, DAS INTERNATIONALE CIVILPROZESSRECHT 134-40 (1904). See also 
Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1019-20 (1941). 
187. See SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 142 (2d ed. 1959); Wyzanski, A Trial 
Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1296, (1952). See also 
GINSBURG &: BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN ,I 12.06(b) (1965); Davis, Judicial 
Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 945, 974-78 (1955). 
188. In either of these situations, the court's obligation to apprise counsel of what 
it is doing may well be of due-process dimensions. Cf. Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 
(1917). The failure to give notice in these situations also might violate the parties' 
right to stipulate as to the controlling law. 
The second sentence of FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1, which is identical to the second sen-
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and trial judge throughout the lawsuit makes it likely that the 
parties will have knowledge of the judge's intentions and research 
activity.189 Consequently, a blanket requirement that the trial court 
give formal notice whenever it goes beyond the presentation by 
the parties regardless of the triviality of the issue or the deviation 
from the record is unsound and was properly characterized by the 
Advisory Committee as "an element of undesirable rigidity . . . [in] 
the procedure for determining issues of foreign law."190 
2. Foreign Law Prior to Trial 
a. Pretrial discovery. Issues of foreign law can be framed, 
molded, and even resolved prior to trial in a number of ways. Many 
of the most important mechanisms for accomplishing this are found 
in the deposition and discovery practice set out in Federal Rules 26 
through 37. Oral and written examinations, interrogatories to 
parties, and requests for admissions often are used to refine and 
sharpen disputed issues, record expert testimony on foreign law, 
and gather information and foreign legal materials. 
Federal Rule 28(b) enumerates several methods for securing 
testimony or opinions from people in a foreign country for use on 
a summary-judgment motion or at trial.191 The least expensive but 
probably the slowest and most cumbersome of these is the letter 
tence of Rule 44.1, does not violate tbe right of confrontation in tbe sixtb amendment 
if foreign-law issues are viewed as matters of law ratber tban fact. See 4 BARRON &: 
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2191 (Wright ed. 1961 Supp. 1966); Rez-
neck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1276, 1307 (1966). 
189. The problem of counsel not being aware of tbe court's independent activities 
may be more serious on tbe appellate level. See notes 301-05 infra and accompanying 
text. 
190. Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 44.1, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89tb 
Cong., 2d Sess. 51, 52 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 117, 119 (1966), 1966 U.S. CODE 
CONG. &: AD. NEWS 807, 809. An unnecessary degree of concern over the Advisory 
Committee's position regarding notice is voiced in Cohn, The New Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1245-46 (1966). 
The new California Evidence Code takes a more cautious position tban does Federal 
Rule 44.1. Section 454(b) of California's code provides tbat when a "court resorts to 
tbc advice of persons learned" in tbe law of a foreign country, "such advice, if not 
received in open court, shall be in writing." Section 455(a) goes on to state tbat before 
tbc jury is instructed or tbe case submitted, tbe parties must be given a reasonable 
opportunity to present "information relevant to ..• tbe tenor of tbe matter to be 
noticed.'' Subdivision (b) of tbe same section adds tbat "if tbe trial court resorts to any 
source of information not received in open court . . • such information and its source 
shall be made a part of tbe record in tbe action and tbe court shall afford each party 
reasonable opportunity to meet such information before judicial notice of tbe matter 
may be taken.'' 
191. See, e.g., Danisch v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 19 F.R.D. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 
1956). See also Harris v. American Int'l Fuel &: Petroleum Co., 124 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. 
Pa. 1954). 
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rogatory. In the past, federal courts were reluctant to issue a letter 
rogatory to obtain expert testimony from abroad without a showing 
that comparable testimony was unavailable in this country.192 Be-
cause Rule 44.1 permits the court to use any material relevant to a 
foreign-law issue, a more permissive attitude toward securing testi-
mony by letter rogatory is likely in the future. Moreover, the prece-
dential value of pre-1963 cases denying the use of a letter rogatory 
for procuring information concerning foreign law is questionable 
since these cases were decided when Federal Rule 28(b) stated that 
"letters rogatory shall be issued only when necessary or convenient," 
a passage that was construed to permit a letter rogatory only when tes-
timony on notice or by commission was impossible or impracticable 
to obtain.193 Since 1963, Rule 28(b) has provided that the absence of 
another means of securing testimony is not a prerequisite to the use 
of a letter rogatory; a trial judge may now issue a letter whenever it 
would be advantageous to do so.194 If sounder, more impartial, or 
less expensive testimony can be procured by letter than is available 
in this country or than is obtainable pursuant to a notice or commis-
sion, a letter rogatory should be issued. 
The scope of discovery on a foreign-law issue is not unlimited. 
For instance, a party may not be able to interrogate his adversary 
as to the details of the foreign law relied upon by the latter. In 
Fisherman & Merchants Bank v. Burin,1915 a request for citations to 
relevant portions of English law was denied. In an opinion some-
what at variance with the common-law fact theory of foreign law, 
the court rejected the argument that the defendant was entitled to 
the information because "foreign law must be pleaded and proven 
as any other evidentiary matter" and held that since the applic-
ability of foreign law is a question for the court, the opinion of 
another party as to its content is an improper subject for interroga-
tories under Federal Rule 33. "Parties are not called upon to express 
opinions or conclusions."196 A decision contrary to Burin is Bern-
stein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschap-
192. See American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 32 F.R.D. 372 
(D. Minn. 1963); United States v. Dunn, 55 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). See also 
Holliday &: Sons v. Schultzeberge, 57 Fed. 660 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893). 
193. See, e.g., United States v. Matles, 154 F. Supp. 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Branyan v. 
Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, 13 F.R.D. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
194. See Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 
(II), 77 HARV. L. REv. 801, 812-13 (1964); Comment, Revitalization of the International 
Judicial Assistance Procedures of the United States: Service of Documents and Taking 
of Testimony, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1375, 1391-92 (1964). 
195. 11 F.R.D. 142 (S.D. Cal. 1951). 
196. Id. at 145. 
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pij,191 in which the plaintiff filed interrogatories asking the defen-
dant to specify the foreign law upon which its defenses were based. 
The defendant refused to respond, claiming that the necessary infor-
mation was wholly within the knowledge of his attorney. The court, 
emphasizing the fact characterization of foreign law and expressing 
the belief that interrogatories are designed to narrow the issues, 
ordered the defendant to state "the substance of the foreign law 
relied upon ... with appropriate citation of applicable statutes and 
one or more citations of decisional law, if any."198 It seems ironic 
that Burin, a case that rejected the fact theory, denied discovery 
whereas Bernstein, a straightforward application of the fact theory, 
resulted in a liberal utilization of discovery. 
A request that a party divulge the passages of foreign law or the 
legal materials he intends to rely on technically falls within the 
scope-of-examination standard in Rule 26(b). Nonetheless, a number 
of federal decisions in contexts analogous to foreign law have agreed 
with Burin that legal opinions are not a proper discovery subject199 
and have refused to allow a party to depose his adversary's experts or 
to inspect reports prepared by them.200 On the other hand, discovery 
has been permitted when essential to the moving party's case and 
when comparable testimony cannot be obtained elsewhere;201 in the 
realm of foreign-law issues, this standard might be satisfied if one 
party's expert on a particular country's law is the only one readily 
available. Reluctance to permit discovery in this context stems from 
the belief that it is unfair to permit one litigant to obtain the fruits 
of his opponent's diligence without contributing his own effort. In 
addition, the lofty conception of the role of trial counsel and of the 
integrity of the adversary system that emerges from the work-product 
197. 11 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
198. Id. at 49; cf. Kendall v. United Air Lines, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) 
(expert opinion compelled from engineer in defendant's employ). 
199. See generally 2A BARRON &: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL ·PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 768, 
at 321-26 (\Vright ed. 1961); 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1111 26.16[4], 33.17 (2d ed. 
1966). 
200. See, e.g., Hoagland v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 34 F.R.D. 458 (E.D. Tenn. 
1963); E.I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.R.D. 237 (D. 
Del. 1959); Dipson Theatres, Inc. v. Buffalo Theatres, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 313 (\V.D.N.Y. 
1948). But see Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. United States, 39 F.R.D. l (D. C~Io. 1966). 
201. See, e.g., United States v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 
1960); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio 
1947), afj'd sub nom. Sacks v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 
1948); Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594 (\V.D. Pa. 1947). See 
also 2A BARRON &: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 652.5 (\Vright ed. 
1961); 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 26.24 (2d ed. 1966); Friedenthal, Discovery and 
Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455 (1962); Develop-
ments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 1031-32, 1038 (1961). 
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concept of Hickman v. Taylor202 acts as a powerful restraint on 
examinations into an adversary's trial preparations. 
An immutable rule that foreign law is not a fit subject for pre-
trial examination probably is unwise. Although this article advo-
cates the abandonment of the common-law approach to foreign law 
and the substitution of an equation between foreign and domestic 
law to the extent feasible, it would be disingenuous to ignore the 
burden often entailed in investigating and preparing foreign-law 
issues for trial. In light of the high cost of procuring foreign-law 
materials and experts, a party should be permitted to use discovery 
to mark off the periphery of the foreign law in issue, even if it results 
in a slightly wider scope of inquiry than is available on issues of 
domestic law. 
It might be useful to distinguish between pretrial discovery in-
quiries that serve to define or narrow the scope of a foreign-law issue 
and those that attempt to commit a party to a particular construction 
of foreign law or require him to do research that could as easily be 
undertaken by the party seeking disclosure. Admittedly this dichot-
omy is vulnerable to the charge that it will prove to be highly 
evanescent in many contexts or that it represents little more than 
an abdication to the trial court's judgment of the balance to be struck 
between an interrogator's bona {ides and the possible salubrious im-
pact discovery may have on the litigation's progress. Yet, the latter is 
exactly the type of judgment federal district judges are thought 
competent to make. It also is true that the court may have to exer-
cise more than the normal amount of control during discovery to 
avoid abuse but this will be a relatively transitory drain on judicial 
energies and should become inconsequential once guidelines for 
discovery have been established. 
The same elastic approach is useful with regard to discovering 
the opinions of foreign-law experts. Whenever there is a significant 
discrepancy in the litigants' ability to gain access to experts or when-
ever a party can make a persuasive showing that examination of his 
adversary's expert or of the expert's opinion is necessary to prepare 
for trial, discovery should be allowed on appropriate terms and 
conditions. For example, it would be entirely appropriate for the 
court to direct the examining party to reimburse his opponent for 
part of the expert's fee.203 Another possibility is a court-appointed 
202. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). An exhaustive analysis of the considerations relevant to 
the discovery of information obtained from an expert appears in Friedenthal, supra 
note 201, at 469-88. 
203. See Henopen Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 33 F.R.D. 306 (D. Del. 1963); 
United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963). 
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expert who would be examined by both parties and whose fee could 
be assessed in any manner that seems equitable.204 
In some instances the scope of pretrial examination has been 
limited by the contents of the pleadings. The oft-cited decision in 
Empresa Agricola Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp.205 held 
that absent a foreign-law issue in the pleadings, written interroga-
tories on foreign law are improper because they are not relevant to 
the subject matter of the action, as is required by Rule 26(b). The 
propriety of restricting discovery to matters that are raised by the 
pleadings was dubious even at the time Empresa Agricola was de-
cided, inasmuch as Rule 26(b) defines "relevant" for purposes of 
pretrial examination in terms of the "subject matter" of the litiga-
tion, which clearly embraces more than what is found within the 
four corners of the pleadings.206 Now that Rule 44.l eliminates any 
need to plead foreign law, the limitation on discovery voiced in 
Empresa Agricola makes no sense and should be ignored. Moreover, 
satisfaction of the new Rule's notice requirement certainly is not a 
prerequisite to using discovery to gather information, documents 
relevant to foreign law, or facts.207 If Rule 44.1 were thus inter-
preted, the flexibility of its notice-giving mechanism would be badly 
compromised, for in many instances discovery will be needed in 
advance of notice to enable a party to make a reasoned judgment as 
to the applicability of foreign law. 
Federal Rule 36, which permits a party to ask another litigant to 
admit facts and concede the genuineness of documents, is another 
discovery device occasionally used to ascertain foreign law.208 At a 
minimum, Rule 36 is an appropriate vehicle for eliminating con-
troversy as to the authenticity of copies of foreign legislative, admin-
istrative, and judicial materials and for facilitating their use at 
trial.209 Inasmuch as Rule 44.1 renders the rules of admissibility 
inapplicable to foreign-law materials, this use of Rule 36 usually will 
204. Cf. Nussbaum, Proof of Foreign Law in New York: A Proposed Amendment, 
57 CouJM. L. R.Ev. 348 (1957). 
205. 57 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). 
206. See 2A BARRON &: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 647 (Wright 
ed. 1961); 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1J 26.16 (2d ed. 1966). 
207. See text accompanying notes 128-31 supra. 
208. Technically, Rule 36 is not a discovery device since it presupposes knowledge 
by both parties. See Conway, Admissions of Fact Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 26 J.B.A.D.C. 421, 422 (1959); Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 
HARV. L. R.Ev. 940, 968-70 (1961). 
209. See McKenzie, The Proof of Alien Law, in A.B.A., SEc. INT'L &: COMP, L., PRO• 
CEEDINGS 50, 52 (1959); McKenzie &: Sarabia, The Pleading and Proof of Alien Law, 
30 TuL. L. R.Ev. 353, 365·67 (1956). 
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be of little moment to the determination of foreign law.210 A more 
rewarding utilization of Rule 36 would be to procure admissions as 
to the interpretation or relevance of specific portions of foreign law. 
But there is some question as to whether this is an appropriate 
application of the Rule. In Fuhr v. Newfoundland-St. Lawrence 
Shipping Ltd.,211 a request was made for an admission that the word 
"code" in the Panamanian Labor Code is equivalent to "title." The 
request was vacated, the court holding that Rule 36 requires only 
that a party admit material within his knowledge or reasonably 
ascertainable by him. The defendant also was asked to admit that 
the plaintiff was covered by the Panamanian Labor Code, a seminal 
issue in the case. In rejecting this request the court stated that the 
"expression of opinions of the opposing attorney or party, or the 
interpretation or applicability of foreign law to the particular facts 
appear not to be within the purview of the Rule,"212 an attitude con-
sonant with the view, previously encountered in connection with 
the Burin and Bernstein decisions,213 that legal opinions and con-
clusions are beyond the scope-of-examination standard of Rule 26(b). 
Had the Fuhr court wanted to bring the request within the 
compass of Rule 36, it could have done so by feigning obeisance to 
the fact characterization of foreign law. It therefore seems slightly 
perverse that simply because Rule 36 refers to "matters of fact," 
strict application of the fact theory permits a request to admit an issue 
of foreign law whereas the domestic-foreign law analogy leads to a 
contrary conclusion. Although the text of Rule 36 makes it clear 
that the draftsmen of the Federal Rules did not wish pure questions 
of law to be the subject of a request to admit, it is unlikely that they 
intended Rule 36 to be governed by a strict application of the 
210. A request under Rule 36 could be of some tactical significance when a party 
wishes to use unauthenticated copies of foreign legal materials and fears that the 
court will give them less weight than they would receive if their accuracy and authen-
ticity were acknowledged by all parties. 
211. 24 F.R.D. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
212. Id. at 13. The court did permit requests for admissions as to the accuracy of 
translations. Curiously, it apparently did not occur to anyone that an admission as to 
the accuracy of a translation is itself premised on opinions and conclusions of law. 
See also Moumdjis v. The Ionian Trader, 157 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Va. 1957) (requests 
for admission of opinion letters denied under the admiralty counterpart of Rule 36). 
In Princess Pat, Ltd. v. National Carloading Corp., 223 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1955), the 
defendant refused to admit or deny certain requests concerning Brazilian customs reg-
ulations and attempted to justify this refusal with the assertion that the requests raised 
questions of law and not fact. The district court treated the unanswered requests as 
admitted and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 
213. See text accompanying notes 195-204 supra. 
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nebulous law-fact distinction or, for that matter, that they had the 
question of the Rule's relationship to foreign-law issues in mind 
when they formulated it. 
It might be possible to rationalize the matter by differentiating 
between situations in which foreign law is relevant to a factual issue, 
which often occurs in litigation governed by domestic law, and in-
stances in which foreign law provides the rules of decision for the 
entire lawsuit. A request under Rule 36 would be proper only in 
the former context. Unfortunately, this distinction has a highly 
arbitrary and artificial tone to it. A better approach might be to 
employ the type of flexibility suggested for defining the proper scope 
of discovery on an issue of foreign law;214 that is, to permit a request 
to admit whenever it appears that it is made in good-faith, that it 
will serve to narrow the scope of the foreign-law issues, and that it 
is not a ruse to weld a party to a particular construction of foreign 
law.211s For example, when a defendant is unable to prepare his case 
efficiently because of uncertainty as to the governing law, it might 
be appropriate to allow him to use Rule 36 to obtain a disclaimer 
from the plaintiff as to the applicability of a particular country's 
law. Since a party served with a request to admit is free to deny if he 
disagrees with his opponent or if he is legitimately uncertain as to 
the proper response, the plaintiff need not be burdened or disad-
vantaged by the request.216 
b. Summary judgment. The summary-judgment motion has 
provided a forum for determining issues of foreign law prior 
to trial. In Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,211 the ques-
tion whether one of the plaintiffs had a right of action under 
Portuguese law was decided on the basis of the defendant's affidavits 
from experts in Portuguese law. The plaintiff had sought to fend off 
summary judgment by arguing that foreign law was a fact and could 
not be determined on affidavits, but failed to present anything per-
suasive contradicting the defendant's affidavits. Thus, the court, 
which had asked and had granted time for the submission of evi-
dence on Portuguese law, felt it had no alternative but to conclude 
that there was no genuine issue concerning Portuguese law. The 
court opined that if such an issue existed, the plaintiff would have 
214. See text accompanying notes 202-04 supra. 
215. See Finman, The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Procedure, 71 YALE 
L.J. 371, 409-16 (1962). 
216. See, e.g., In re Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 14 F.R.D. 219 (W.D. Pa. 1953). 
217. 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 
1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954). 
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offered something indicating that the defendant's experts were in 
error.218 
Despite Komlos, successful summary-judgment motions directed 
toward issues of foreign law have been infrequent. Almost invari-
ably, the motion has been denied when there is a conflict in the 
papers presented on the motion or among the foreign-law experts 
or when any doubt exists as to the tenor of the foreign law; the use 
of these standards derives from the theory that factual disputes are 
not to be resolved on a summary-judgment motion but must be 
reserved for trial.219 In Pisacane v. Italia Societa Per Azioni di 
Navigazione,220 for example, the question was whether the suit was 
time barred under Italian law. The answer depended on the validity 
under the Italian Civil Code of a provision in a steamship passage con-
tract limiting the time for commencing suit against the carrier. The 
court denied the motion because the "question is one of fact," which 
the court felt could not be adjudicated on summary judgment. In fair-
ness to the court, its resolution of the motion probably was influ-
enced by the presence of only one affidavit on Italian law. 
218. See also Bachmann v. Blaw-Knox Co., 198 F. Supp. 617 (W.D. Pa. 1961); Born 
v. Norwegian America Line, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Werkley v. Konin-
klijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V., 110 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y.), complaint dismissed, 
111 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Egyes v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 71 F. Supp. 560 
(E.D.N.Y. 1947), afj'd, 165 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1948). Summary judgment can be granted 
against a defendant who fails to establish a defense under foreign law. See Chemical 
Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kennedy, 199 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd on other 
grounds, 319 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 965 (1964). 
219. See Albert v. Brownell, 219 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1954) (semble); Hausman v. 
Bailey, 22 F.R.D. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (motion to dismiss); N.V. Levensverzekering-
Maatschappij van de Nederlanden v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 116 (D. Conn. 1954) 
(dictum); Mosbacher v. Basler Lebens Versicherungs Gesellschaft, 111 F. Supp. 551 
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); Heiberg v. Hasler, 1 F.R.D. 735 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). See also Wall Street 
Traders, Inc. v. Sociedad Espanola de Construccion Naval, 245 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 
1964); 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1J 56.17(25) (2d ed. 1966); SoMMERICH &: BUSCH, 
FoREIGN LAw-A GumE TO PLEADlNG AND PROOF 81-89 (1959). But see Caribbean S.S. 
Co. v. La Societe Navale Caennaise, 140 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Va.), afj'd, 239 F.2d 689 
(4th Cir. 1956). Some federal courts have taken the position that foreign law "is a 
problem for factual determination" and that a summary-judgment motion is "inap-
propriate." E.g., Eastern Commercial Bank, S.A.L. v. General Mut., Inc., 34 F.R.D. 
260 (E.D. Pa. 1963). These cases are little more than variations on the "fact" syndrome 
and may mask a judicial feeling of insecurity when confronted with foreign law. 
There also has been a judicial disinclination to determine an issue of foreign law in 
advance of trial on motions addressed to the court's discretion when the resolution of 
the issue would not terminate the litigation. See, e.g., Markovic v. National City Bank, 
12 F.R.D. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (court refused to investigate Yugoslavian law on a mo-
tion for permissive intervention). See also Wendell v. Holland-America Line, 30 F.R.D. 
162 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). This attitude seems defensible on the ground that if the case is 
destined for trial, there is no point in determining a foreign-law issue that might 
become moot. 
220. 219 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See also Caruso v. Italian Line, 184 F. Supp. 
862 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Murphy v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 111 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 
1953), afj'd, 203 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1953). 
February 1967] Federal Rule 44.1 and Foreign Law 671 
The propriety of deferring determination of a foreign-law issue 
from summary judgment to trial, as is true of the propriety of the 
treatment given alien law in other contexts, partially depends upon 
the validity of the common-law fact approach. If the fact character-
ization is replaced by an analogy between foreign and domestic law, 
as is being advocated in this article, then a conflict over foreign law 
is not a dispute over a material fact within the meaning of Federal 
Rule 56 and a court should feel free to resolve a foreign-law issue on 
a summary-judgment motion. 
The argument in favor of the domestic-foreign law analogy in 
the summary-judgment context is reinforced by the statement in the 
last sentence of Rule 44.1 that the court's determination of foreign 
law is to be treated "as a ruling on a question of law.''221 This passage 
is intended to encourage the processing of foreign law in the trial 
court in a way that will insure proper appellate review222-an ob-
jective that obviously applies to the handling of summary-judgment 
motions. It would not be consonant with the Rule's philosophy to 
conclude that the determination of a foreign-law issue at trial is to be 
treated as a question of law but is to be treated as a question of fact 
when the resolution is sought on a summary-judgment motion. To 
carry out the mandate in Federal Rule 44.1, conflicts concerning the 
content of foreign law should not automatically be held to raise a 
"genuine issue as to any material fact" and prevent summary judg-
ment under Rule 56. 
In cases such as Pisacane, therefore, when the proof before the 
court on a summary-judgment motion is not harmonious or is un-
persuasive or inconclusive, the court should request a further show-
ing by counsel, engage in its own research, or direct that a hearing 
be held, with or without oral testimony, to resolve the issue.223 A 
combination of these courses will insure as detailed a foreign-law 
presentation as might be anticipated at a full trial on the merits.224 
221. The full text of Federal Rule 44.I is set out in note 5 supra. 
222. See text accompanying notes 293-98 infra. 
223. In Heiberg v. Hasler, 45 F. Supp. 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1942), a special master was 
appointed to ascertain French law in aid of a summary-judgment motion. 
224. The approach suggested in the text seems to have been employed in Carib-
bean S.S. Co. v. La Societe Navale Caennaise, 140 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Va.), afj'd, 239 
F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1956), in which the defendant moved for summary judgment against 
the plaintiff's claims based upon breach of contract, warranty, and fraud. The court 
rejected the plaintiff's contention that a dispute as to French law precluded summary 
judgment. 
It is fundamental that, if there be a disputed issue of a material fact, the 
Court should not grant summary judgment. In this case there is no dispute as to 
the factual situation, although experts on French law have disagreed as to the 
interpretations to be placed thereon. Should the case be heard on its merits, these 
same "disputes" would exist and the Court would then be obliged to accept the 
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When the grant or denial of summary judgment turns on an issue 
of foreign law, there is no reason to permit the respondent to rest 
on his pleadings or to rely on the placebo that the issue cannot be 
resolved until trial, at which time oral testimony and cross-examina-
tion will be available. This suggestion is consistent with the 1963 
amendment to Rule 56(e), which eliminates reliance on the plead-
ings and obliges a party to defend against the motion with whatever 
competent material is at his disposal. The 1963 change expresses the 
almost universal understanding that summary judgment is designed 
to probe a formal paper dispute to see if a litigable issue actually is 
present. 225 
The advantages of resolving a foreign-law issue at the summary-
judgment stage are obvious. In Pisacane, a decision as to the validity 
of the contractual condition might well have terminated the litiga-
tion without trial and effectuated the primary purpose of the sum-
mary-judgment procedure-adjudication without trial of cases in 
which material facts are not in dispute and in which a full eviden-
tiary display to a trier of fact is unnecessary. In addition to situations 
similar to Pisacane, a determination of foreign law on a summary-
judgment motion would be desirable when the facts are stipulated 
and the issue is either whether a cause of action exists or whether an 
action is barred because of some affirmative defense. 
c. Pretrial conference. A final device for dealing with foreign-
law issues before trial is the pretrial conference.226 Inasmuch as the 
conference usually takes place after both parties have prepared for 
trial and have had a chance to appraise their cases realistically, it 
often provides a good occasion for reaching agreement on alien 
law.227 Even if the foreign-law questions cannot be determined at the 
interpretation of one or more of the experts or, in the alternative, arrive at its 
own conclusion upon a review of the French law and decided cases. 
A disputed interpretation of a foreign law does not raise a material issue of fact 
sufficient to preclude action on a motion for summary judgment where, as in this 
case, counsel agree that all of the pertinent foreign law has been properly sub-
mitted as evidence. 
Id. at 20-21. See also Werkley v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V., 100 F. 
Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y.), complaint dismissed, Ill F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (decision 
on motion reserved pending submission of affidavits of experts on Indian law). 
225. See Dressler v. MV Sandpiper, 331 F.2d 130, 131-35 (2d Cir. 1964); 3 BARRON 
&: HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1235, 1235.1 (Wright ed. 1961); 6 
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACIICE ,I,I 56.22-.23 (2d ed. 1966). 
226. See FED. R. C1v. P. 16; Harris v. American Int'! Fuel &: Petroleum Co., 124 F. 
Supp. 878 (W.D. Pa. 1954). See also McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 VAND. L. REv. 296, 
308 (1952). 
227. The parties are at liberty to stipulate as to the content of foreign law and 
frequently will be encouraged to do so by the court. See, e.g., Harris v. American Int'! 
Fuel &: Petroleum Co., supra note 226. 
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conference, they can be identified, the scope of inquiry defined, the 
number of expert witnesses limited, and the modes of proof delin-
eated. In some instances, the judge may appoint a special master to 
aid in ascertaining the content of foreign law.228 As a practical mat-
ter, the pretrial conference may afford a party his last opportunity 
to raise a foreign-law issue and to satisfy the notice requirement in 
the first sentence of Rule 44.1.229 Any request to depart from the 
pretrial order by raising a foreign-law issue or altering its contours 
will be carefully scrutinized by the court.230 
3. Determination of Foreign Law by Judge or Jury 
The drafts of the new Rule prepared by the Columbia Project 
and the Commission and Advisory Committee on International 
Rules of Judicial Procedure provided that the determination of 
foreign law "shall be made by the court and not by the jury." A 
similar passage was included in the Commission and Advisory Com-
mittee's drafts of the Uniform Interstate and International Proce-
dure Act, and section 4.03 of that act as promulgated states: "The 
court, not [the] jury, shall determine the law of any governmental 
unit outside this state." In the course of redrafting the Federal Rule, 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules deleted the reference to 
court determination in the Commission's drafts. The Committee's 
Note accompanying Rule 44.1 explains the Rule's silence on the 
point with the assertion that "the rules refrain from allocating func-
tions as between the court and the jury," but it goes on to indicate 
the advantages of judicial, rather than jury, determination of foreign 
law.231 Another possible implication of the Advisory Committee's 
decision not to include in the Rule an express provision delegating 
foreign-law questions to the judge is that such a statement possibly 
might infringe the constitutional right to jury trial in federal civil 
actions.232 Since the Rule's text leaves the question at large and the 
228. Cf. Heiberg v. Hasler, 45 F. Supp. 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1942). 
229. See Valdesa Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Frota Nacional de Petroleiros, S.A., 348 
F.2d 33, 36-38 (3d Cir. 1965). 
230. A court's willingness to permit a foreign-law issue to be raised after the pre-
trial conference will depend in part on the detail with which the pretrial order de-
fines the legal issues and on whether the relevance of foreign law was discussed at 
the conference. In districts in which foreign-law issues appear with any frequency, it 
might be advisable for the judges at pretrial to inquire as a matter of course into 
the possible presence of such an issue. 
231. Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 44.1, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess. 51, 52 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 117, 119 (1966), 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &: 
AD. NEWS 807, 809. See also 2B BARRON &: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 998 (Wright ed. Supp. 1966). 
232. The second paragraph of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964), 
expressly removes the jury-trial right from the domain of the rulemakers. The con-
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courts presumably are free to develop the practice as they see fit, it 
is necessary to explore the topography of these constitutional con-
siderations. The odyssey begins, as do almost all inquiries concern-
ing the reach of the Constitution's jury-trial guarantee, with an 
examination of the treatment accorded issues of foreign law at the 
time the seventh amendment was adopted. 
a. The English and American experience. The English author-
ities are sparse and shed little light on the jury-trial question. This 
dearth of precedent probably stems from the English courts' reluctance 
until comparatively recently to take jurisdiction over foreign causes 
and from their penchant for applying common law even after they 
finally began to adjudicate these controversies.238 Despite the pau-
city of authority, many of the English secondary sources penned 
after the middle of the nineteenth century cavalierly assert that such 
issues are for the jury; others simply state that foreign law is to be 
proved as a fact and do not speak to the jury issue.234 Nonetheless, 
the cases cited by the text writers for the jury-issue conclusion are 
not very persuasive. 
However, several decisions do illustrate somewhat the English 
practice during the last half of the eighteenth century. In the impor-
tant case of Mostyn v. Fabrigas,235 decided in 1774, Lord Mansfield 
stated that knowledge of the laws of a foreign country is secured "by 
admitting them to be proved as facts, and the court must assist the jury 
in ascertaining what the law is." The purport of this passage is obscure 
inasmuch as Lord Mansfield's opinion does not specify what facet of 
the foreign-law issue was to be submitted to the jury or in what way 
the court was expected to "assist the jury." It also must be appre-
ciated that Mostyn was the first case in which Kings Bench seriously 
junctive quality of the Enabling Act's text-"such rules .•• shall preserve the right 
of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the 
Constitution"-leaves open the argument that the jury-trial right immunized against 
the activities of the rulemakers is broader than the right preserved by the seventh 
amendment. The interrelationship between the rulemaking power and Rule 44.1 is 
discussed at text accompanying notes 515-19 infra. 
233. See Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law, in 3 LAw: A 
CENTURY OF PROGRESS 342 (1937). The notion of the jury as a body of men chosen 
from the locale of the events in suit was not altered by statute until 1705. See 4 &: 5 
Ann, c. 16, § 6 (1705). In the seventeenth century and even well into the eighteenth 
century, English courts felt compelled to justify their assertion of jurisdiction over 
cases arising in a foreign country by requiring a fictitious allegation of venue in 
England. See, e.g., Dutch West India Co. v. van Moses, 1 Strange 612, 93 Eng. Rep. 
733 (K.B. 1795); Ward's Case, Latch. 3, 82 Eng. Rep. 245 (K.B. 1662). 
234. See BEST, EVIDENCE § 33 (5th ed. 1870); CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
130 (5th ed. 1957); DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAws 1107-10 (Morris ed. 1958); 1 TAYLOR, 
EVIDENCE § 5, at 8 (3d ed. 1858). 
235. 1 Cowp. 161, 174, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1028 (K.B. 1774). 
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considered applying foreign law in a personal tort case. Much of the 
opinion is devoted to the propriety of taking jurisdiction in such 
actions and to the obstacles presented by the English tradition of 
laying venue in and choosing a jury from the place where the events 
in dispute occurred. In context, therefore, the references in Mostyn 
to "proved as facts" and "assist the jury" may not have been con-
scious statements that all issues of foreign law were to be ascertained 
by the jury. They may simply reflect the type of verbal imprecision 
that usually accompanies doctrinal parturition and represent a 
vestige from the period in which all issues other than the domestic 
law of England were characterized as issues of fact.236 Lord Mans-
field's remarks also may betray a degree of uncertainty as to the 
proper judge-jury relationship in this context-an uncertainty 
caused by the extensive revision of the jury institution during the 
centuries preceding Mostyn from a body of witnesses to a group of 
fact-finders.237 Finally, the words "proved as facts" may refer to the 
mode of proof and not to the mechanics of adjudication. Some sup-
port for this hypothesis can be extrapolated from Lord Mansfield's 
fairly extensive discussion in Mostyn of the mode of proving foreign 
law in Privy Council and Chancery, neither of which employed a 
jury. 
In Male v. Roberts,238 an action for assumpsit at Common Pleas 
decided a quarter of a century after Mostyn, Lord Eldon observed 
that the law of Scotland "should be given in evidence to me as a 
fact."239 In another part of the same opinion he stated that "I can-
not take the fact of what that law is, without evidence."240 This lan-
guage from Male is inconsistent with Mostyn if the latter is read as 
236. See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra. 
237. It was not until the beginning of the seventeenth century that English juries 
were permitted to determine foreign facts. See Richardson v. Dowdele, Cro. Jae. 55, 
79 Eng. Rep. 47 (K.B. 1605). See also Sack, supra note 233, at 346-49. 
238. 3 Esp. 163, 170 Eng. Rep. 574 (C.P. 1800). 
239. Id. at 164, 170 Eng. Rep. at 574. A similar statement was made by Lord 
Kenyon in Iloehtlinck v. Schneider, 3 Esp. 59, 170 Eng. Rep. 537, 538 (C.P. 1799). In 
Inglis v. Usherwood, 1 East 515, 102 Eng. Rep. 198 (K.B. 1801), the plaintiff secured a 
verdict in an action in trover for certain goods delivered in Russia. When the case 
came before the full bench, the law of Russia, as reflected in a mercantile order, was 
quoted, construed, and applied by 'the court without any discussion of how it had 
been proven. Blad v. Banfield, 3 Swans. 604, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674) was a suit 
by a Dane to enjoin an Englishman from suing at law to redress a seizure of the 
Englishman's property in Iceland by the Danish authorities. The Dane claimed that 
the seizure was justified by a patent from the King of Denmark. The chancellor issued 
the injunction saying that the Dane's rights were clear and that "to send it to a trial 
at law, where either the Court must pretend to judge of the validity of the king's 
letters patent in Denmark ••• or that a common jury should try whether the English 
have a right to trade in Iceland, is monstrous and absurd." Id. at 607, 36 Eng. Rep. 
at 993. 
240. 3 Esp. at 165, 170 Eng. Rep. at 574. 
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requiring jury trial of issues of foreign law. To harmonize the re-
marks in Male and the suggested analysis of Mostyn, the following 
generalization is offered: at the close of the eighteenth century, 
English courts insisted that foreign law be proved in the same man-
ner as facts but the evidence was addressed to the bench for deter-
mination and application. This thesis is consistent with the emer-
gence of the fact theory of foreign law at approximately the time 
Mostyn and Male were decided. 
A case that is difficult to align with either the suggested analysis 
or the jury-issue conclusion of the English text writers is Trimbey 
v. Vignier,241 an action on two promissory notes at Common Pleas in 
1834. At trial a witness testified as to the law of France and trans-
lated a portion of its Code de Commerce. In reply to a series of 
inquiries by the court, the jury concluded that an endorsement of 
the notes was invalid under French law. The court then directed 
judgment for the defendant "reserving all questions of law." Subse-
quently, the plaintiff obtained a rule ordering the defendant to 
show cause why a new trial should not be directed or why judgment 
should not be entered for the plaintiff. The rule also called for 
further opinions on French law. At Nisi Prius, Chief Justice Tindal 
directed judgment for the defendant after re-examining and apply-
ing French law de novo. The reported opinion is too delphic to 
permit a description of the respective roles of court and jury with 
any confidence, although the treatment given the foreign-law issue 
at Nisi Prius belies any strong commitment on the part of the Eng-
lish judiciary to jury trial on such issues. 
In 1920, Parliament enacted the Administration of Justice Act,242 
section 15 of which provides that when foreign law must be ascer-
tained, "any question as to the effect of evidence given with respect 
to that law shall, instead of being submitted to the jury, be decided 
by the judge alone." Arguably, passage of this statute implies that 
prior practice was to the contrary, although one could as easily con-
clude that the statute codified the existing practice. Unfortunately, 
the parliamentary history does not inform us which is the correct 
legislative premise. Even if it did, query whether it would illum-
inate the nature of English practice in 1791. 
The limited evidence that can be gleaned from the opaque 
pronouncements by the English courts between 1750 and 1850, the 
241. 1 Bing. (N.C.) 151, UH Eng. Rep. 1075 (C.P. 1834). 
242. 10 &: 11 Geo. V., c. 81; see Lazard Bros. &: Co. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., [1933] 
A. C. 289 (H.L.). The 1920 Act was replaced by § 102 of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 &: 16 Geo. V., c. 49. 
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conclusory passages in the textbooks, and the current English statu-
tory provision is simply too skeletal to justify the conclusion that 
there was a settled practice of allowing the jury to ascertain the 
content of foreign law at the time the seventh amendment was added 
to our Constitution. Only a monumental exercise in reconstructing 
history could yield a persuasive case as to the existence or nonexis-
tence of such a practice. Inasmuch as the English judges did not even 
begin to cumulate any substantial experience with foreign law until 
the second half of the eighteenth century, the practice during the 
crucial period probably was highly fluid and differed from court to 
court. The inability to perceive a fixed English practice at the time 
the seventh amendment was adopted renders it difficult to conclude 
that the federal courts are constitutionally compelled by history to 
leave foreign-law issues to the jury.243 
Turning to the practice in the United States, the jury-trial ques-
tion was not treated uniformly by state courts during the period 
following the formation of the Union.244 In a few states, the courts, 
either without relying on precedent or on the basis of extremely 
questionable authority, held that every issue of fact had to be deter-
mined by the jury, including an issue of foreign law; the trial judge 
in these states commented on the evidence of foreign-law but did 
not give a direction on it.245 Courts in a more significant number of 
243. In Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943), petition for rehearing denied, 
320 U.S. 214 (1943), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the directed-
verdict mechanism violated the seventh amendment because it differed from the jury 
control devices available in 1791. The Court's opinion seems to be a counterpoint of 
a number of themes. First, "the amendment did not bind the federal courts to the 
exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the common law in 
1791" but "was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most 
fundamental elements •••• " Id. at 390, 392. Second, the rules regulating "the jury's 
role on questions of fact" had not become "crystallized in a fixed and immutable 
system." Id. at 391. Third, "the passage of time has obscured much of the procedure 
which then may have had more or less definite form ...• " Id. at 392. Fourth, "apart 
from the uncertainty •.• which follows from an effort at purely historical accuracy, 
the consequences flowing from the view" may be "sufficient to refute it." Id. at 392. 
But cf. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913). 
244. See generally Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 
45 CALIF. L. REv. 23, 27 (1957); Annot., Determination of Question Relating to For-
eign Law as One of Law or of Fact, 34 A.L.R. 1447 (1925); Annot., Construction and 
Effect of Foreign Statutes or Judicial Decisions as Question for Court or for Jury, 68 
A.L.R. 809 (1930). 
245. See Dyer v. Smith, 12 Conn. 384 (1837); Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517 
(1823); Ingraham v. Hart, 11 Ohio 255 (1842) (one justice dissenting). The cases relied 
upon by the Connecticut court in Norton and Dyer all are readily distinguishable 
and the two decisions apparently were overturned by the Connecticut legislature in 
1840. See Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 360 (1847). See also Hale v. New Jersey 
Steam Nav. Co., 15 Conn. 539 (1843). The Ohio court in Ingraham did not cite any 
authority to support its position. In THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 
258 (1898), the author states that the practice of giving issues of foreign law to the 
jury "has a wide acceptance" but cites no cases in support of that proposition. The 
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jurisdictions limited their application of the fact theory to the mode 
of proof and construed and applied foreign law without the aid of 
a jury.246 In Pickard v. Bailey,241 for example, the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court stated that "foreign law, like foreign judgments, 
are to be proved as facts, and the better opinion is that the evidence 
should be addressed to the court, and not to the jury."248 This ap-
pears to have become the predominant state practice by the middle 
of the nineteenth century. In Massachusetts and a few other juris-
dictions, the courts traditionally have left all uncontroverted issues 
of foreign law and questions of statutory and decisional interpreta-
tion to the judge, but have permitted the jury to resolve conflicts 
in expert testimony or draw any necessary inferences or analogies 
therefrom. 249 Perhaps the best articulation of this view appears in 
the North Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Hooper v. Moore.250 
The court analyzed the authorities and was not 
able to find any case where the question of the law of another 
state, or foreign country, has been left to be decided by a jury, with-
out instructions from the court, in regard to it, except the case of 
Moore v. Gwyn, 5 Ire. Rep. 187 [sic] .... 251 
remark in de Sloovere, The Functions of Judge and Jury in the Interpretation of 
Statutes, 46 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1086, 1104 n.71 (1933), that the number of cases holding 
that foreign law is for the jury is "legion," clearly is an overstatement. 
The early state cases in which the jury played a dominant role in the ascertain-
ment of foreign law may be explained in terms of the enthusiasm for the jury and the 
unpopularity of the royal judges during the colonial and revolutionary periods. See 
THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 253-57 (1898); Scott, Trial by Jury and 
the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REv. 669, 677-78 (1918); Comment, The 
Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 171-77 (1964). 
Some of this sentiment undoubtedly survived the formation of the Union and makes 
analysis of the judge-jury relationship and the fact-law dichotomy during the first half 
of the nineteenth century hazardous and relatively unrewarding. 
246. See, e.g., Inge v. Murphy, 10 Ala. 885 (1846); De Sobry v. de Laistre, 2 Har. 
&: John. 164, 188-89 (Md. 1807); Charlotte v. Chouteau, 25 Mo. 465 (1857); Pickard v. 
Bailey, 26 N.H. 152 (1852); Sidwell v. Evans, 1 Pen. &: W. 383, 388 (Pa. 1830). See also 
Christiansen v. William Graver Tank Works, 223 Ill. 142, 79 N.E. 97 (1906); Thomson• 
Huston Elec. Co. v. Palroer, 52 Minn. 174, 53 N.W. 1137 (1893). 
247. 26 N.H. 152 (1852). 
248. Id. at 169. See also Hall v. Costello, 48 N.H. 176, 179 (1868); Ferguson v. 
Clifford, 37 N.H. 86, 98 (1858); Fourth Nat'! Bank v. Bragg, 127 Va. 47, 102 S.E. 649 
(1920), 11 A.L.R. 1034 (1921); Rood v. Horton, 132 Wash. 82, 89, 231 Pac. 450, 452 
(1924). 
249. See Electric Welding Co. v. Prince, 200 Mass. 386, 86 N.E. 947 (1909); 
Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Ellis, 172 Mass. 39, 51 N.E. 207 (1898); Ely v. James, 123 Mass. 
36 (1877); cf. Wylie v. Cotter, 170 Mass. 356, 49 N.E. 746 (1898). See also Trasher v. 
Everhart, 3 Gill&: Johns. 234 (Md. 1831); Harrison v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 168 N.C. 382, 
84 S.E. 519 (1915); St. Louis &: S.F. Ry. v. Conrad, 99 S.W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1906); Hite v. Keene, 149 Wis. 207, 134 N.W. 383 (1912). 
250. 50 N.C. 136 (1857). 
251. Id. at 139. In, Moore v. Gwynn, 27 N.C. 138 (5 Ire. Law. 187) (1844) the North 
Carolina court dealt with conflicting testimony as to the common law of a sister state. 
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if the existence of an unwritten law of another State, or foreign 
country, is not presumed or admitted, then its existence must be 
proved by competent witnesses, and the jury must then pass on the 
credibility of the witnesses, and it is the province of the court to 
inform the jury as to the construction, meaning, and legal effect 
of the law, supposing its existence to be proven; and to this end, 
the court shall avail itself of the judicial decisions of the State or 
Country.252 
The New York rule has been inconstant since the beginning of 
this century. In Bank of China, Japan b The Straits, Ltd. v. 
/iforse,253 foreign statutes and decisions were construed by the court 
despite conflicting testimony; it was stated that although foreign law 
raises an issue of fact, once proof has been submitted the issue is 
subject to judicial determination. In subsequent decisions, however, 
the New York Court of Appeals appears to have moved toward the 
Massachusetts and North Carolina approach. In Hanna v. Lichten-
hein,254 the Court stated: 
On a trial of an issue of fact when the evidence furnished is 
conflicting or inconclusive the law of a foreign state may be a ques-
tion for the jury although ordinarily when the evidence is all fur-
nished it is the function of the judge to decide as to the law of a 
foreign state.255 
This approach was elaborated upon again in Fitzpatrick v. Inter-
national Ry.,256 this time with regard to foreign judicial decisions. 
When these [ court decisions] state the unwritten law of the foreign 
jurisdiction with reasonable certainty and clearness their applica-
tion should not be left to the speculation of twelve men. If instances 
should arise, which will be rare, where the decisions are so per-
plexing or doubtful that the experts disagree on the law we shall 
have to determine whether the question of the foreign law must 
then be solved by the jury. How the jury can do this as well as the 
judge, experienced in the law, I cannot quite appreciate.257 
At present, rule 45ll(c) of New York's Civil Practice Law and 
Rules expressly provides that issues of foreign law are to be deter-
252. 50 N.C. at 140. See also Charlotte v. Chouteau, 33 Mo. 194 (1862); Knight v. 
Wall, 19 N.C. 121 (1836); State v. Jackson, 13 N.C. 366 (1830) (criminal case); Oregon 
v. Looke, 7 Ore. 43 (1879). 
253. 168 N.Y. 458, 61 N.E. 774 (1901). 
254. 225 N.Y. 579, 122 N.E. 625 (1919). 
255. Id. at 583, 122 N.E. at 627. The court cited two Massachusetts cases at the 
end of the quoted passage. 
256. 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1929), 68 A.L.R. 801 (1930). 
257. Id. at 140, 169 N.E. at 117. 
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mined by the court and included in its charge to the jury. The 
provision does not indicate what is embraced by the term "deter-
mine" but it presumably empowers the New York courts to ascertain 
the substance of foreign law and to resolve any conflict in the testi-
mony.25s 
The early federal foreign-law cases are not particularly enlighten-
ing on the jury-trial question. In Talbot v. Seeman,259 decided in 
1803, the Supreme Court intoned the monotonous refrain that 
foreign law cannot be judicially noticed and has to be "proved as 
facts." Since the case was in admiralty, any attempt to divine its 
jury-trial implications would be profligate. A year later, the Court 
decided Church v. Hubbart,260 an action on the case involving two 
policies of marine insurance. The question before the court was 
whether the insured's brig had been seized by the Portuguese for 
illicit trade, a risk excluded by the policies. Documents purporting 
to be copies of edicts issued by the authorities at the place of seizure 
were introduced. The Supreme Court concluded that it was im-
proper to place these documents before the jury because they were 
defectively authenticated. Unfortunately for present purposes, the 
Court did not indicate why the documents had been offered to the 
jury. Inasmuch as the edicts pertained to the seizing of the plaintiff's 
ship, they probably were introduced to show that the ship had been 
seized by the Portuguese for involvement in illicit trade rather than 
to establish the Portuguese law of illicit trade. The former is a 
traditional fact question. If this hypothesis is correct, Church was 
not a foreign-law case in the sense that the jurisprudence of a foreign 
country provided the rules of decision, but was a domestic action in 
which the d~tails of a foreign occurrence were properly ascertained 
by the jury; as such it may be of little probative value for the current 
inquiry. A case more in point is United States v. Turner,261 a mid-
nineteenth century decision in which the Court recognized and com-
258. The question whether the predecessor of rule 45ll(c), N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act 
§ 344-a violated the jury-trial guarantee in the New York Constitution was 
raised but left open in Graybar Elec. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 292 N.Y. 
246, 250, 54 N.E.2d 811, 812 (1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 715 (1944). In Jongebloed v. 
Erie R.R., 297 N.Y. 534, 74 N.E.2d 470 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 855 (1948), the 
same argument, which apparently had been rejected below, was not considered by 
the Court of Appeals. Although it cannot be stated categorically that the issue has 
been foreclosed, the nonchalant treatment accorded it by New York's highest court 
would certainly so indicate. See Note, 18 ST. JoHN's L. R.Ev. 73 (1943). Compare SoM-
MERICH & BUSCH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 20-21 (1959), with 
SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 43-44, 131 n.(b) (2d ed. 1959). 
259. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 38 (1803). 
260. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 238 (1804). 
261. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 663 (1850). 
February 1967] Federal Rule 44.1 and Foreign Law 681 
mented upon the absurdity of leaving issues of foreign law to the 
jury: 
Witnesses, it appears, were examined in the District Court, to 
prove that this instrument was a perfect and complete grant by the 
laws of Spain then in force in the province of Louisiana in relation 
to grants of land; and the counsel for the appellees moved for an 
issue upon this point, to be tried by the jury. This motion was 
properly refused by the court, and the issues which the court di-
rected were confined to questions of fact. The Spanish laws which 
formerly prevailed in Louisiana, and upon which the titles to land 
in that State depend, must be judicially noticed and expounded by 
the court, like the laws affecting titles to real property in any other 
State. They are questions of law and not questions of fact, and are 
always so regarded and treated in the courts of Louisiana. And it 
can never be maintained in the courts of the United States that the 
laws of any State of this Union are to be treated as the laws of a 
foreign nation, and ascertained and determined as a matter of fact, 
by a jury, upon the testimony of witnesses.262 
The Turner Court did add the following dictum, however. 
[I]f the Spanish laws prevailing in Louisiana before the cession to 
the United States were to be regarded as foreign laws, which the 
courts could not judicially notice, the titles to land in that State 
would become unstable and insecure; and their validity or invalid-
ity would, in many instances, depend upon the varying opinions of 
witnesses, and the fluctuating verdicts of juries, deciding upon 
questions of law which they could not, from the nature of their 
pursuits and studies, be supposed to comprehend.263 
Because Turner involved the Spanish law in force in Louisiana 
before that state entered the Union, which brings it under one of 
the four traditional exceptions to the proof requirement,264 the 
Court's dictum cannot be regarded as a definitive statement on the 
jury-trial issue. Nonetheless, it is the most illuminating discussion of 
the relationship between jury trial and issues of foreign law that 
can be found in the Supreme Court decisions prior to the beginning 
of this century. 
Two early cases decided by Mr. Justice Washington on circuit 
may indicate that the usual practice in the federal trial courts 
shortly after those tribunals were established was for the judge to 
decide issues of foreign law absent special factors. In the first case, 
Seton v. Delaware Ins. Co.,265 the Justice set out the substance of 
262. Id. at 668. 
263. Ibid. 
264. See text accompanying notes 138-50 supra. 
265. 21 Fed. Cas. 1093 (No. 12675) (C.C.D. Pa. 1808). 
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certain Cuban commercial regulations in his charge to the jury and 
apparently limited the jury's function to applying the facts to the 
Cuban law as charged. In Consequa v. Willings,266 the question 
whether certain trade customs existed in Canton, China was left 
to the jury. In an extended discussion, Mr. Justice Washington 
concluded that normally foreign law, both written and unwritten, 
must be proved as a fact, but that after the submission of proof it 
was the court's task to ascertain the alien law and decide its effect. 
He added that when a custom or usage is sufficiently established to 
be treated as assimilated into the foreign country's law, it also is 
subject to judicial determination. However, when the existence of 
a custom or usage is not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the court 
may leave that limited question to the jury. Noting that the exis-
tence of the particular usage in issue had not been established 
beyond reasonable doubt, Mr. Justice Washington held that no 
error had been committed in submitting the question to the jury; 
neither its precise content nor its application to particular facts was 
before the jury. 
Reconstructing the federal practice in the years preceding the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it seems reasonable to say that 
when an issue of foreign law involved the interpretation of statutes, 
textual material, or judicial decisions it was treated as one of law 
for the court, as historically has been the case with all written docu-
ments.267 This approach seems best exemplified by a Supreme Court 
dictum from Finney v. Guy:268 
Although the law of a foreign jurisdiction may be proved as a fact, 
yet the evidence of a witness stating what the law of the foreign 
jurisdiction is ... is really a matter of opinion ... and courts are 
not concluded thereby from themselves consulting and construing 
the statutes and decisions which have been themselves proved, or 
from deducing a result from their own examination of them that 
may differ from that of a witness upon the same matter. In other 
words, statutes and decisions having been proved or otherwise 
properly brought to the attention of the court, it may itself deduce 
from them an opinion as to what the law of the foreign jurisdiction 
is, without being conclusively bound by the testimony of a witness 
who gives his opinion as to the law, which he deduces from those 
very statutes and decisions.269 
266. 6 Fed. Cas. 336 (No. 3128) (C.C.D. Pa. 1816). 
267. Cf. Trasher v. Everhart, 3 Gill&: Johns. 234 (Md. 1831); Union Cent. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Pollard, 94 Va. 146, 26 S.E. 421 (1896); Di Sora v. Phillipps, 10 H.L. Cas. 624, 
637-42, 11 Eng. Rep. 1168, ll74-75 (1863). 
268. 189 U.S. 335 (1903). 
269. Id. at 342. See also Eastern Bldg. &: Loan Ass'n v. Williamson, 189 U.S. 122, 
126 (1903); Mexican Nat'l R.R. v. Slater, 115 Fed. 593, 608 (5th Cir. 1902), afj'd, 194 
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The contours of federal practice were somewhat less certain when 
the expert testimony used to establish foreign law was in conflict. 
In Compania Transcontinental de Petroleo, S.A. v. Mexican Gulf 
Oil Co.,21° the Second Circuit stated that when the construction of 
a foreign statute is controverted, the court's conclusion is one of 
fact. Since a jury had been waived, the court expressly avoided the 
question under discussion. Nonetheless, in defining the scope of 
appellate review it did treat the lower court's resolution of the 
testimonial conflict as a fact determination. But in another pre-1938 
case, Merinos Viesca y Compania, Inc. v. Pan American Petroleum b 
Transport Co.,211 the same court stated: "The meaning of a foreign 
statute is for the court notwithstanding the conflict of testimony of 
experts."272 
Since 1938, a number of federal judges have determined foreign-
law issues without the aid of a jury and have justified their actions 
simply in terms of the jury not being a proper tribunal for such 
matters.273 The Fifth Circuit gave extensive consideration to the 
issue in Liechti v. Roche,274 which involved the availability of dam-
ages for pain and suffering under Panamanian law. The trial court 
had refused to submit the matter to the jury. After a review of many 
of the earlier federal cases, the appellate court simply concluded that 
"it was the judge's function to determine the state of the foreign 
law .... "2711 On the basis of Liechti, the District Court for the West-
ern District of Texas, in Daniel Lumber Co. v. Empresas Hon-
durenas, S.A.,216 treated a portion of a special verdict dealing with 
Honduran law as advisory and made its ovm "findings of fact" as to 
U.S. 120 (1904); Shelton v. Canadian No. Ry., 189 Fed. 153 (C.C.D. Minn. 19ll). In 
Barielle v. Bettman, 199 Fed. 838 (S.D. Ohio 1912), the court commented that the 
"existence" of foreign law is a matter of fact triable by a jury. The only authorities 
cited for that proposition were two old Ohio state court decisions. One, Evans v. 
Reynolds, 32 Ohio St. 163 (1877), does not deal with jury trial at all and the other, 
Ingraham v. Hart, 11 Ohio 255 (1842), makes the unsupported statement that foreign 
law is for the jury. 
270. 292 Fed. 846 (2d Cir. 1923). 
271. 83 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1936). 
272. Id. at 242. See also Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934). 
273. See Liechti v. Roche, 198 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1952); Harris v. American Int'! 
Fuel 8: Petroleum Co., 124 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Pa. 1954). But cf. United States v. 
Baumgarten, 300 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1962) (criminal case in which weight of expert's 
testimony left to jury). See also Bostrom v. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222 
(N.D. Tex. 1963), modified on other grounds, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965). In one case 
in which local law was applied pursuant to the presumption that it was the same 
as the applicable foreign law, the court apparently formulated the law of the case 
for the jury. See Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638, 642 (10th Cir. 1962). 
274. 198 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1952). 
275. Id. at 177. 
276. 215 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 (1955). 
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certain facets of that law. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit examined 
many of the authorities and concluded that the trial court had com-
mitted no error in deciding the foreign-law issues itself. Finally, in 
Jansson v. Swedish American Line,211 Judge Magruder observed, in 
dictum, that "a question of foreign law, though commonly stated to 
be one of fact, is for the court, not the jury."278 
b. History and policy applied. No federal case involving foreign 
law has been found in which the jury-trial question was considered to 
be of constitutional dimensions.279 The federal courts apparently have 
neither felt themselves constrained by the English precedents nor 
considered it necessary to advance any historical or constitutional 
defense for the judicial determination of issues of foreign law; they 
have thought it sufficient merely to point out the deficiencies of 
leaving foreign law to the jury. Although federal courts have char-
acterized issues of foreign law as "questions of fact" or "matters to 
be proved as facts" on innumerable occasions, these somniferous 
phrases apparently have encompassed only the manner in which 
evidence is presented to the court.280 Rather than statements of 
actual practice, the few existing judicial intimations favoring jury 
trial appear to be loose dicta, undoubtedly the result of a failure to 
distinguish foreign law as a "fact" for purposes of proof from foreign 
law as "law" for purposes of either assigning it for determination or 
defining the appropriate scope of appellate review. When the federal 
experience is examined against the backdrop of the early English 
and state court decisions, the irresistible conclusion is that there is 
no historic tradition of submitting foreign-law issues to the jury that 
is of sufficient clarity to warrant a present-day federal judge to hold 
that he is bound to do so as a constitutional matter. 
Even if venerable decisions did show that foreign law was triable 
by jury in 1791, there are at least two reasons why a shift in federal 
practice since then does not necessarily violate the integrity of the 
277. 185 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1950). 
278. Id. at 216. The same statement appears in Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel, 
196 F.2d 950, 957 n.6 (1st Cir. 1952). 
279. It is interesting to note that only one writer has seriously suggested the pos-
sible existence of a constitutional problem if foreign-law issues are determined by the 
judge. See McKenzie, The Proof of Alien Law, A.B.A. SEC. INT'L &: COMP. L., PRO· 
CEEDINGS 50, 51 (1959). See also McKenzie & Sarabia, The Pleading and Proof of Alien 
Law, 30 TuL. L. R.Ev. 353, 357-60 (1956). The point also is raised in a footnote in 
Note, Proof of the Law of Foreign Countries: Appellate Review and Subsequent Liti-
gation, 72 HARV. L. R.Ev. 318, 322 n.38 (1958). 
280. In Bostrom v. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222, 229 (N.D. Tex. 1963), 
modified on other grounds, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965), the court said: "Even in a 
jury case, the trial judge is the trier of fact as to the existence of foreign law and 
has the responsibility of construing it, if he finds it to exist." 
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seventh amendment. First, the rationale of any eighteenth century 
jury-trial practice would have been the fact characterization of 
foreign law, which means that the practice was an administrative, 
logical, by-product of the nomenclature of the day, rather than an 
attempt to effectuate any of the basic policies of the jury-trial guar-
antee. It would make little sense to preserve an eighteenth-century 
practice based on the fact theory-an approach that today has no 
significance, either procedurally or substantively, in light of our 
changed attitudes toward foreign law and the accessibility of infor-
mation about legal systems operating beyond our borders. Further-
more, one result of the second sentence of Federal Rule 44.I will 
be that foreign-law issues will not be presented in a form that fits 
the traditional pattern of proof to the trier of fact. Because of the 
inapplicability of the rules of evidence and the trial court's freedom 
to do its own research, foreign law will not be placed in evidence in 
the adversarial format upon which effective jury deliberation de-
pends. It thus will be difficult, if not impossible, to integrate the jury 
mechanism into the current motif for establishing foreign law. 
The second, perhaps obvious, point is that the seventh amend-
ment's jury-trial guarantee is not immutable; over the years it has 
proven to be sufficiently flexible and malleable to survive the con-
stant remolding necessitated by new problems and changed cir-
cumstances in many areas of the law.281 Professor Austin Wakeman 
Scott has described the range within which jury-trial practice may be 
modified to meet changing conditions as follows: 
Only those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent 
in and of the essence of the system of trial by jury, are placed beyond 
the reach of the legislature. The question of the constitutionality of 
any particular modification of the law as to trial by jury resolves 
itself into a question of what requirements are fundamental and 
what are unessential, a question which is necessarily, in the last 
analysis, one of degree. The question, it is submitted, should be ap-
proached in a spirit of openmindedness, of readiness to accept any 
changes which do not impair the fundamentals of trial by jury. 
It is a question of substance, not of form.282 
Several years after Professor Scott wrote these lines the Supreme 
Court, in Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co.,283 up-
281. The status and function of the jury also has been altered by political and 
social shifts in our society. See Comment, The Changing Role of the Jury in the 
Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964). 
282. Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARv. L. REv. 
669, 671 (1918). 
283. 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931). See also Walker v. New Mexico & S.P.R.R., 165 U.S. 
593, 596 (1897) (special interrogatory procedure not a violation of seventh amend-
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held the partial new trial procedure against a seventh-amendment 
challenge. It said: 
[T]he Constitution is concerned, not with form, but with substance. 
All of vital significance in trial by jury is that issues of fact be sub-
mitted for determination with such instructions and guidance by the 
court as will afford opportunity for that consideration by the jury 
which was secured by the rules governing trials at common law .... 
Beyond this, the Seventh Amendment does not exact the retention 
of old forms of procedure. It does not prohibit the introduction of 
new methods for ascertaining what facts are in issue .... 284 
In Ex parte Peterson285 the Court was asked to pass upon the 
appointment of an auditor of a type unknown at common law to 
investigate and file a report simplifying, but not determining, the 
disputed issues. Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, vali-
dated the procedure and commented that the seventh amendment 
"does not prohibit the introduction of new methods for determining 
what facts are actually in issue, nor does it prohibit the introduction 
of new rules of evidence."286 Admittedly this case is not directly 
analogous to the problem under discussion because the auditor in 
Peterson was not given express power to "determine" the facts. 
Nonetheless, Peterson does exemplify the permissibility of delegat-
ing the tasks of issue simplification and definition, which by their 
nature entail some degree of qualitative fact analysis and ascertain-
ment. Moreover, Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion does emphasize the 
need to manipulate the jury institution to make it an efficient instru-
ment for the administration of justice. 
In addition, federal courts have taken judicial notice of a variety 
of factual matters under Rqle 43(a) whenever state practice has pro-
vided the necessary authorization, without any suggestion that the 
seventh amendment has been violated. It is difficult to see how this 
practice differs from court determination of foreign law under Rule 
44.1 in any way that is material to the jury-trial right. Moreover, the 
federal courts always have taken judicial notice of the law of all the 
states, international and maritime law, and the law, usages, and 
customs in force in a territory prior to its incorporation into the 
United States.287 Is it reasonable to conclude that there is a constitu-
ment); Hosie v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 282 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 
365 U.S. 814 (1961) (separation of liability and damage issues upheld). 
284. 283 U.S. at 498. 
285. 253 U.S. 300 (1920). 
286. Id. at 309. 
287. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S. 546, 560-61 (1892); Jones v. United States, 
137 U.S. 202, 214-16 (1890); Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223 (1885); Pennington v. 
Gib§OP.1 57 v.s. (16 How.) 65, 81 (1853); United States v. Turner, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 
February 1967] Federal Rule 44.1 and Foreign Law 687 
tional right to have a jury ascertain the law of Spain but not the 
Spanish law in force in the territory of Louisiana prior to its pur-
chase by the United States? Of Italy but not of Indiana? How is the 
"vital significance" of the jury-trial right violated when a federal 
district judge in New York ascertains Italian law, instructs the jurors 
on its contents, and allows them to apply these instructions to the 
facts-the time-honored procedure employed by the New York fed-
eral courts in lawsuits governed by Indiana law? 
Once constitutional qualms are laid to rest, the most obvious and 
germane consideration of all-one that has been alluded to through-
out this discussion-is the simple, indisputable fact that the most 
appropriate organism in the judicial system for manipulating for-
eign legal materials is the judge, not the jury. The Supreme Court 
made it clear in Galloway v. United States288 that when history does 
not compel the conclusion that a jury trial right is constitutionally 
based, it is appropriate for the court to weigh the merits and de-
merits of utilizing the special talents of the respective arbiters. In 
the context of foreign law, the position of the scales is clear. To 
permit jurors to wrestle with foreign statutes or judicial decisions 
hardly seems calculated to minimize fortuity or maximize rationality 
in the litigative process. To assume that jurors can digest and then 
apply foreign legal materials with any degree of accuracy or dexter-
ity, no matter how carefully the court may indoctrinate them, is to 
engage in a fantasy. Jurors always have been viewed as less compe-
tent than judges to ascertain local law; why should we indulge in 
the hypocritical assumption that jurors are more qualified than 
judges to ascertain foreign law? The difficulties encountered and 
the expertise employed in determining foreign law are so similar to 
the problems and skills involved in a trial judge's daily manipula-
tion of domestic law that a supervening justification, seemingly 
absent here, is necessary for extracting foreign law from his com-
petence. 289 
663, 668 (1850); Owings v. Hull, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 607, 625 (1835); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 37-38 (1801). 
288. 319 U.S. 372, 392-96, petition for rehearing denied, 320 U.S. 214 (1943). Gallo-
way is discussed in note 243 supra. 
289. Virtually all of the scholars who have voiced an opinion on this subject have 
expressed the view that foreign-law issues should be left to the court. See, e.g., 1 
GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 486 (15th ed. 1892); SroRY, CONFLICT OF LAws § 638 (3d ed. 
1846); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2558 (3d ed. 1940); Thayer, "Law and Fact" in Jury 
Trials, 4 HARV. L REv. 147, 171-72 (1890). See also 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 621.5 
(1935); TSAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 257-58 (1898); 1 WHARTON, 
EVIDENCE § 303 (1877). But see WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw § 413 (1859). On 
the question of relative competence, see also Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the 
Law-fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1867, 1922-24 (1966). 
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The prospect of jury intrusion into the determination of foreign 
law is not made significantly more attractive by attenuating the 
jury's function. Even though the jury's historic role has been to 
weigh inferences and evaluate contradictory evidence regarding 
events and physical facts,290 the court is more competent to resolve 
testimonial conflicts concerning the interpretation of foreign law. 
In many cases the divergence between the competing evidentiary 
displays will be more apparent than real and will stem from seman-
tic debates engaged in by partisan experts rather than from funda-
mental jurisprudential disputes. Is there any doubt that a judge is 
in a better position than a jury to ferret out the real area of conten-
tion and analyze its dimensions? A fortiori when a basic disagree-
ment does exist as to the content of foreign law, the training and 
talent of a judge should be brought to bear to resolve the issue. A 
mature system, like prudent people, should entrust the process of 
examination, diagnosis, and treatment of its problems to a clinician 
rather than to an ad hoc group of dragooned laymen. 
It also is relevant that judicial determination of foreign law 
under Rule 44.1 clearly would be consistent with the tenor of pres-
ent day Anglo-American practice. All of the federal judges who have 
dealt with the question in recent years have ascertained and applied 
foreign law without the aid of a jury, and almost all state judges do 
the same under section 5 of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign 
Law Act, section 4.03 of the Uniform Interstate and International 
Procedure Act, or similar legislation.291 Moreover, recent decisions 
in states that do not have any statutory directive on the subject have 
held that the only sensible approach is to leave issues of foreign law 
to the trial judge. 292 
4. Appellate Review of Foreign Law Determinations 
Prior to the promulgation of Federal Rule 44.1, the scope of 
review given a determination of foreign law varied among the cir-
290. A rough analogy can be drawn between construing and determining the effect 
of foreign legal materials and doing the same with written commercial instruments. 
In the latter context the function traditionally has been one for the court. See, e.g., 
Bell v. Bruen, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 169 (1843); Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180 
(1805); Crowe v. Gary State Bank, 123 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1941). See also THAYER, A 
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 202-07 (1898). 
291. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 1761 (1956); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. &: R. 4511(c); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 8-4 (1953); cf. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1699 (1958). See also UNIFORM 
RULE OF EVIDENCE 10(4). 
292. E.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. O'Grady, 97 Ariz. 9, 396 P.2d 246 
(1964); Choate v. Ransom, 74 Nev. 100, 323 P.2d 700 (1958) (sister-state law). A state-
federal divergence in assigning the function of determining foreign law might moti-
vate forum shopping on the part of the plaintiff in diversity cases. See the discussion 
at text accompanying notes 395-405 infra. 
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cuits. Although several courts of appeals fully reviewed a district 
court's disposition of foreign-law issues,293 a trial court's findings 
occasionally were characterized as determinations of fact and sub-
jected only to limited re-examination.294 The latter approach repre-
sents another manifestation of the fact theory and, before proceeding, 
it seems appropriate to invoke the reasons advanced throughout this 
article for equating issues of domestic and foreign law and to in-
corporate them as evidence of the desirability of giving the two types 
of issues identical treatment on appeal. 
Presumably, appellate courts have been assigned the task of 
reviewing a trial court's legal conclusions because of their special 
expertise and competence in determining the existence, relevance, 
and application of rules of law. These particular qualities certainly 
are as valuable when the law of a foreign country is under examina-
tion as they are when the law of the forum is in issue. Indeed, the 
utilization of an appellate court's talents probably is of even greater 
importance in the case of foreign law than domestic law because 
of the special logistical difficulties encountered when dealing with 
the former. Inasmuch as reviewing courts usually have access to the 
legal materials offered and considered at trial, and in many instances 
have better foreign-law facilities at their disposal than do district 
courts, it is useful to permit appellate tribunals to re-examine 
foreign-law issues and apply their collegial powers exactly as is 
done on issues of domestic law. A more restrictive review of foreign-
293. See, e.g., Liechti v. Roche, 198 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1952) (dictum); Mexican 
Nat'! R.R. v. Slater, 115 Fed. 593, 608 (5th Cir. 1902), aff'd, 194 U.S. 120 (1904). See 
also Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 
1930). In a number of cases, courts of appeals have re-examined the trial court's 
determination of foreign law without commenting on the question of the proper 
scope of review. See, e.g., Nicholas E. Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d 
465 (2d Cir. 1965); Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel, 196 F.2d 950 (1st Cir. 1952). 
See also Daniel Lumber Co. v. Empresas Hondurenas, S.A., 215 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 (1955). 
294. See Reissner v. Rogers, 276 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 816 
(1960); Shapleigh v. Mier, 83 F.2d 673, 676-77 (5th Cir.), af!'d, 299 U.S. 468 (1936); 
Compania Transcontinental de Petroleo, S.A. v. Mexican Gulf Oil Co., 292 Fed. 846 
(2d Cir. 1923); Hudson River Pulp & Paper Co. v. H. H. Warner & Co., 99 Fed. 187 
(2d Cir. 1900). See also Burt v. Isthmus Dev. Co., 218 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 349 U.S. 922 (1955) (foreign law "is as reviewable as any other fact issue'); 
Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 23, 
27-28 (1957); Note, Proof of the Law of Foreign Countries: Appellate Review and 
Subsequent Litigation, 72 HARV. L. REv. 318 (1958). In McKenzie & Sarabia, The 
Pleading and Proof of Alien Law, 30 TuL. L. REv. 353, 355-56 (1956), the authors, 
after cloaking themselves in the mantle of the fact theory, proclaim that foreign-law 
material "is evidentiary in nature and hence exclusively for the lower court." (Em-
phasis in original.) Fortified by this "fact-evidence" schematic, they conclude that the 
test with respect to the correctness of the result reached in the trial court on an 
issue of foreign law should be whether there is "any evidence to sustain the trial 
court's finding." 
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law determinations than is usually accorded domestic law seems 
justifiable only when the oral testimony on alien law offered at trial 
is in conflict and the circumstances justify according special weight 
to the district judge's ability to evaluate credibility and demeanor.295 
To further its objective of treating foreign and domestic law 
alike to the extent feasible, the final sentence of Rule 44.1 provides 
that the trial court's determination of foreign law is to be viewed 
"as a ruling on a question of law.''296 This statement should resolve 
the confusion that formerly existed among the courts of appeals con-
cerning the scope of review of issues of foreign law and should give 
the appellate courts greater latitude than is permitted by the "clearly 
erroneous" test applied under Federal Rule 52(a) to findings of 
fact.297 Similar provisions appear in section 3 of the Uniform Judicial 
Notice of Foreign Law Act and section 4.03 of the Uniform Inter-
state and International Procedure Act. 
Effective plenary appellate review of foreign-law issues will be 
even more significant under Rule 44.1 than it was under former 
federal practice because of the district court's increased authoriza-
tion to determine foreign law, engage in its own research, and exam-
ine materials not presented by the parties. Full appellate review 
of the trial court's utilization of these powers seems necessary both 
as a restraint against abuse and as a precaution against the possibility 
of trial-court error. An unintended side effect of increasing both the 
district court's involvement in the determination of foreign law 
and the number of cases in which foreign law actually is ascertained 
295. See Remington Rand, Inc. v. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Indus-
trielles et Commerciales, S.A., 188 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The value of demeanor 
evaluation in the case of expert testimony on foreign law should not be overempha-
sized, however. It seems unlikely that the physical appearance and emotional state 
of a foreign-law expert will be sufficiently distinctive to provide insights into his 
competence that are not available from the record of his testimony. 
The argument for full review of trial-court determinations of foreign law may 
be compromised by the fact that plenary appellate review of a construction of forum 
law is partially justified on the value of the resulting stare decisis effect, see Brown, 
Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 55 HARV. L. R.Ev. 899, 905 (1943); decisions as to 
foreign law generally are not given such effect, see Nussbaum, The Problem of Prov-
ing Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1034-35 (1941). However, in a number of contexts 
foreign-law determinations have been relied upon in subsequent litigation. See Nich-
olas E. Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1965); Wood &: 
Sellek, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941, 944 (2d Cir. 1930); 
cf. Mary Duke Biddle, 33 B.T.A. 127 (1935), afj'd, 86 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1936), afj'd, 
302 U.S. 573 (1937). See also Note, Proof of the Law of Foreign Countries: Appellate 
Review and Subsequent Litigation, 72 HARv. L. REV. 318, 324-28 (1958). 
296. The full text of Rule 44.1 is set out in note 5 supra. 
297. This test appears to have been applied to a foreign-law issue in Reissner v. 
Rogers, 276 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 816 (1960); Remington Rand, 
Inc. v. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales S.A., 
188 F.2d lOll (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
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by the court may prove to be an increase in the number of appeals 
and a higher incidence of trial-court error on such issues.298 
A reasonable inference to be dra·wn from the new Rule's last 
sentence and the foreign-domestic law analogy is that appellate 
courts have the same freedom to examine foreign-law materials as 
is given to the trial courts under the second sentence of the new 
Rule.299 Thus, a court of appeals is free to consider not only the 
fruits of the trial court's independent research and the materials 
introduced by the parties in the lower courts, but also any informa-
tion that it has unearthed itself. By the same token, the attorneys 
should be permitted to present new foreign-law materials on appeal, 
subject, of course, to the usual caveats about overreaching and 
prejudice. soo 
A question that probably will occur more frequently under the 
new practice than it has in the past is the proper disposition of a 
case when the appellate court is convinced that the wrong foreign 
law was applied at trial, either because counsel failed to bring the 
correct law to the court's attention or because the choice-of-law rule 
was misapplied. The circuits appear to be divided as to whether this 
permits a direction for the entry of judgment or whether it consti-
tutes reversible error or necessitates a remand.301 In ]annenga v. 
Nationwide Life Insurance Co.,302 the court took a mediate position 
298. With the possible exception of appeals from those districts whose judges are 
particularly conversant with the law of a certain foreign country, the courts of ap-
peals should not afford the trial judge's foreign-law findings the same prima facie 
effect as often is given to his forum-law findings in diversity cases. See, e.g., Rudd-
Melikian, Inc. v. Merritt, 282 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1960); Massachusetts Bonding 8e Ins. 
Co. v. Julius Seidel Lumber Co., 279 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1960); Cranford v. Farnsworth 
&: Chambers Co., 261 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1958). See also H. K. Porter Co. v. Wire Rope 
Corp., 367 F.2d 653, 662-63 (8th Cir. 1966). 
299. Federal appellate courts have exercised this prerogative in the past. See, e.g., 
Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434 {2d Cir. 1949). 
300. See generally Note, Proof of the Law of Foreign Countries: Appellate Review 
and Subsequent Litigation, 72 HARv. L. REv. 318, 319-22 (1958). 
301. Compare Prudential Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 126 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1942), and 
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Glenwood Irrigation Co., 265 Fed. 594 (8th Cir. 1920), with 
Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958), and United 
States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 144 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1944). See also Pecheur Lozenge 
Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666 (1942); McClure v. United States Lines Co., 
368 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966). In Busch, When Law Is Fact, 24 FORDHAM L. REY. 
646, 657 (1956), the author suggests that when an appellate court discovers new ma-
terial on foreign law it must "remand the proceedings to the trial court for further 
proof with respect to those ••• authorities, thus permitting the parties to be heard 
on the subject before a final decision is reached." No reason is given why the parties 
cannot be heard in the appellate court. Undoubtedly, the brooding omnipresence of 
the fact theory and the long standing practice of using common-law methods of proof 
lie at the root of the quoted passage. See also Currie, On the Displacement of the 
Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 964, 984-85 (1958). 
302. 288 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
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and held that the judgment below need not be impeached unless the 
trial court's misapplication of foreign law resulted in perceptible in-
justice. This resolution of the question certainly is desirable from the 
perspective of giving the appellate courts sufficient freedom of action 
to avoid unnecessary reversals. The test is objectionable, however, be-
cause it seems to be little more than a paraphrase of the harmless-
error rule and because it interjects a somewhat elusive standard into 
the process of appellate review-a process already choked by an exces-
sive number of verbalisms-that may generate more uncertainty and 
controversy than the problem warrants.303 Moreover, the ]annenga 
approach makes remand mandatory whenever "prejudice" is shown, 
without regard to whether the prejudice can be rectified on appeal. 
It seems more desirable to permit the appellate tribunal to apply the 
proper foreign law whenever it can do so on the basis of the record 
on appeal and a supplementary presentation by counsel; this is a 
common practice when domestic law has been misapplied by the 
trial court.304 Remand then would be necessary only when an effec-
tive or fair application of foreign law is impossible without a new 
trial or when jury-trial considerations are paramount.aois Abandon-
ment of the fact theory of foreign law vitiates any justification for 
an absolute rule that alien law initially be determined by a trier of 
fact. Therefore, remand should be necessary only when the shift in 
the choice of foreign law is radical or when the magnitude of the 
presentations by the parties on the foreign law selected by the ap-
pellate tribunal would be too great an imposition on its energies. 
C. Consequences of Failing To Establish Foreign Law 
The federal courts have displayed as much diversity of opinion 
with regard to the consequences of a failure to establish the content 
of foreign law as have the state courts.306 This lack of judicial con-
303. See 14 STAN. L. REY. 162 (1961). 
304. E.g., Diemer v. Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d 206, 168 N.E.2d 654, 203 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1960). 
305. Under some circumstances due process considerations may come into play if 
the appellate court concludes that the trial court's choice of law was erroneous, decides 
to apply the law of a different country, and fails to provide the party prejudiced by 
the shift with an opportunity to present evidence on the new law or to contest the 
court's application of it. Cf. Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 (1917). 
306. See text accompanying notes 74-98 supra for a discussion of state practice. 
The problem of a failure of proof can confront a defendant as well as a plaintiff. 
For example, in Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kennedy, 199 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C. 
1961), rev'd on other grounds, 319 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 965 
(1964), a failure to establish a defense of impossibility under Hungarian law led to the 
granting of summary judgment against the defendant. The quantum of evidence 
needed to discharge the burden of proof on an issue of foreign law often depends 
on the character of the case. Thus, in Dulles v. Katamoto, 256 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 
1958), the court held that the government had not sustained what was characterized 
as a heavy burden of proof in a denaturalization proceeding. 
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sensus is exemplified by the different attitudes of the Second and 
Fourth Circuits in admiralty cases. In the Fourth Circuit, a failure 
to prove foreign law has led to the application of general American 
maritime law.307 In the Second Circuit the impact of Cuba R.R. v. 
Crosby308 is more evident; a failure to establish the existence of a 
cause of action under the applicable foreign law has resulted in a 
dismissal of the action.309 
Despite the elevated status of the Crosby case and the prevalence 
of the vested-rights philosophy during the nineteenth century and 
the first half of the twentieth century, most federal cases involving 
a failure to prove foreign law have not resulted in the direction of 
a judgment on the merits against the party who has the burden of 
establishing alien law. The harshness of Crosby has been avoided by 
employing the previously discussed exceptions to the proof require-
ment.310 Thus, federal courts have resorted to the rudimentary or 
fundamental principles concept in a number of cases to cure a failure 
of proof311 and in other cases forum law has been applied on the 
307. See, e.g., Heredia v. Davies, 12 F.2d 500, 501 (4th Cir. 1926); Todd Shipyards 
Corp. v. The City of Athens, 83 F. Supp. 67 (D. Md. 1949). 
308. 222 U.S. 473 (1912). The case is discussed at text accompanying notes 79-82 
supra. 
309. See Ozanic v. United States, 165 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1948); Banque de France v. 
Chase Nat'! Bank, 60 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1932); The Hanna Nielsen, 273 Fed. 171 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 653 (1921); Bakhshandeh v. American Cyanamid Co., 211 
F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); McQuade v. Compania de Vapores San Antonio, S.A., 
131 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See also Rosden v. Leuthold, 274 F.2d 747, 748 n.1 
(D.C. Cir. 1960) (dictum); Lauro v. United States, 162 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1947); Panama 
Elec. Co. v. Moyers, 259 Fed. 219 (5th Cir. 1919) (refusal to direct verdict against 
plaintiff for failing to prove Panama law held erroneous); Tsakonites v. Transpacific 
Carriers Corp., 246 F. Supp. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Gonzalez v. Hearst Consol. Publi-
cations, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). At one point, the Ninth Circuit ap-
peared to have cast its lot with the Second Circuit. In Philp v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945 
(9th Cir. 1958), 75 A.L.R.2d 523 (1961), an action for defamation governed by Peru-
vian law, no proof of foreign law was presented. Relying on Crosby, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the Washington District Court's dismissal. "Where one country's judicial 
system is based on the Common Law and the other's on the Civil Law, both systems 
having been modified by statutory changes, there is little to recommend the employ-
ment of a presumption that the law of one is the same as the law of the other." Id. 
at 948. But an imposing string of other Ninth Circuit cases, some of which, like Philp, 
originated in Washington, have applied the presumption of identity between forum 
and foreign law. See 1700 Ocean Ave. Corp. v. GBR Associates, 354 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 
1965); San Rafael Compania Naviera, S.A. v. American Smelting 8: Ref. Co., 327 F.2d 
581, 587 (9th Cir. 1964) (dictum); Medina v. Hartman, 260 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1958) 
(habeas corpus proceeding); Gerking v. Furness, Withy 8: Co., 251 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. 
Wash. 1961). See also Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Gorter, 254 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 
1958). 
l!IO. See text accompanying notes 138-50 supra. See generally Commissioner v. Hyde, 
82 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1936); Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE 
L.J. 1018, 1035 (1941). 
311. See Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1962); E. Gerli 8: Co. 
v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931); Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. 
Rivers, 211 Fed. 294 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 232 U.S. 727 (1914); Rosenthal v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 14 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
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theory that it was the only law before the court312 or in the belief 
that the parties agreed that forum law governed.313 In an apparent 
plurality, or perhaps even a majority, of cases involving a failure to 
prove alien law, federal courts have presumed that foreign law is 
identical with forum law and have required the party claiming a 
divergence between them to prove it.314 
Unfortunately, most of the federal opinions involving a failure 
of proof of foreign law lack any extensive or enlightening analysis 
of the factors leading to the particular disposition. The courts 
usually have not indicated whether they based their decisions on 
general federal principles or applied the law of the state in which 
the federal court was sitting. In several cases in which the latter 
course was clearly adopted, the court either expressed a belief 
that the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tomkins315 compelled the applica-
tion of the forum state's law316 or failed to delineate the considera-
tions that motivated its decision.311 
312. Barrielle v. Bet_tman, 199 Fed. 838 (S.D. Ohio 1912). 
313. El Hoss Eng'r &: Transp. Co. v. American Independent Oil Co., 183 F. Supp. 
394 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 289 F.2d 346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 837 (1961). There may be some due-process limitation on the direct application 
of forum law when there is an insufficient connection between the litigants and the 
forum. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See also Morgan, Choice of Law 
Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. REv. 153 (1944); CALIF. LAw REv. COMM'N, REPORTS 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES I-20 (1957). 
314. See, e.g., 1700 Ocean Ave. Corp. v. GBR Associates, 354 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 
1965); San Rafael Compania Naviera, S.A. v. American Smelting&: Ref. Co., 327 F.2d 
581, 587 (9th Cir. 1964) (dictum); Pedersen v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 95 (D. Guam 
1961); Molina v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 6 F.R.D. 385 (D. Neb. 1947); The Hanna 
Nielson, 25 F.2d 984 (W.D. Wash. 1928); The Fort Gaines, 18 F.2d 413 (D. Md. 1927). 
See also Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1966); Fowler v. 
Pennsylvania Tire Co., 326 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1964); Compania de Aquaceros, S.A. v. 
First Nat'l City Bank, 256 F. Supp. 658 (D.C.Z. 1966); Messina v. Mutual Benefit Health 
&: Acc. Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1964), af/'d, 350 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1965)1 cert. 
denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966); Gerking v. Furness, Withy &: Co., 251 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. 
Wash. 1961). In Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 
342 U.S. 913 (1952), the court presumed that since Japanese law had been in force in 
Okinawa prior to World War II and no change in jurisprudence had been shown, 
Japanese law was still in effect. 
315. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
316. E.g., Waggaman v. General Fin. Co., 116 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1940); Bostrom v. 
Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Tex. 1963), modified on other grounds, 
347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965). Federal courts in several diversity of citizenship cases 
have assumed that the Erie decision has modified the traditional federal-court prac-
tice of taking judicial notice of the law of all the states and have applied the pre-
sumptions employed by the forum-state's courts. See, e.g., Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. v. 
Fein, 342 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1965). See also Petersen v. Chicago, G.W. Ry., 138 F.2d 
304 (8th Cir. 1943). In a more significant number of cases, however, the federal courts 
continue to take judicial notice of the law-at least the Constitution and statutes-
of the several states. E.g., Schultz v. Tecumseh Prods., 310 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1962) 
(application of Erie expressly rejected); J. M. Blythe Motor Lines Corp. v. Blalock, 
310 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1962); Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 183 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 
1950); Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1941). See also note 425 infra. 
317. E.g., San Rafael Compania Naviera, S.A. v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 
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Neither Federal Rule 44.1 nor the accompanying Advisory Com-
mittee Note attempts to describe the effect of a failure to prove for-
eign law. Two considerations may have contributed to this silence. 
The first, a concern on the part of the draftsmen that an attempt to 
regulate this subject, which is a complex admixture of conflict of 
laws and burden of proof doctrines, would transgress the limits of 
the Supreme Court's rule-making power or would run afoul of the 
Erie doctrine.318 The second, a belief that a failure to prove foreign 
law under Rule 44.1 will be a rara avis because the Rule greatly 
increases a party's ability to establish foreign law and reinforces this 
capacity by giving the trial judge both extensive discretion to con-
sider foreign-law materials and power to engage in his own research. 
Inasmuch as the failure-of-proof problem will have new dimensions 
under Rule 44.1, which could not be discerned at the time the Rule 
was drafted, it probably was thought appropriate to leave the matter 
to judicial development. 
The consequences of a failure to prove foreign law should be 
viewed from two perspectives: as an exercise in conflict of laws, and 
as a problem of burden of proof. Separation of the two is useful 
solely for analytical purposes, because any attempt to divorce them 
is arbitrary. The conflicts approach necessitates an inquiry as to 
when a federal court is obliged to turn to the law of a foreign coun-
try as a source of decisional rules. Not all issues of foreign law raise 
conflicts problems. In many lawsuits foreign law is relevant only to 
a particular factual element or to the determination of a single 
issue319 and the rules governing the rights and liabilities of the par-
ties are found in domestic law. In these situations the application 
of foreign law to a particular facet of the case does not involve a 
choice of law, and conflicts theory does not offer any guidelines for 
dealing with a failure of foreign-law proof. 
Of course, it is the forum's conflicts principles that determine 
when foreign law is to be the source of decisional rules in particular 
cases. This article is not the place to recapitulate or assay the debate 
between the advocates of the vested-rights theory of conflict of laws 
and the proponents of the various new methodologies that seek out 
327 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1964) (dictum); Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th 
Cir. 1962); Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Gorter, 254 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1958); 
Molina v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 6 F.R.D. 385 (D. Neb. 1947). 
318. The rule-making power is discussed at text accompanying notes 429-519 infra; 
the effect of Erie on Rule 44.1 is dealt with at text accompanying notes 376-428 infra. 
319. See, e.g., Crashley v. Press Publishing Co., 179 N.Y. 27, 71 N.E. 258 (1904) 
(whether alleged libelous statement printed by the defendant was an imputation of 
a crime under Brazilian law). 
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a controversy's "center of gravity," weigh governmental interests, or 
use forum law absent a strong policy motivation to look elsewhere.320 
It is sufficient for the present discussion to point out that the pre-
Rule 44.1 practice regarding a failure to prove foreign law, which 
through Crosby, was appended to the vested-rights philosophy, left 
much to be desired. A pattern that permits a federal court to take ju-
dicial notice of the law of England, Mexico, or Spain as of a certain 
date because it happened to have been in force in a territory that has 
since become part of the United States, but requires a dismissal on 
the merits for a failure to establish the present-day equivalent of the 
same law, has a touch of factitiousness to it.321 A scheme of this type 
makes even less sense under Rule 44.1 because its primary applica-
tion would be in cases in which foreign law could not be ascertained 
despite the diligent efforts of both counsel and the trial judge. It 
simply is not fair to bar a party from recovering when neither his at-
torney nor the court is able to conjure up the content of the govern-
ing law. To speak of a failure of proof or to assume that the party 
has no rights under the controlling law in these circumstances is 
inappropriate. 
Turning to the burden of proof tangent, it is easy to state the 
traditional allocations. One of the by-products of the Crosby case 
and the vested-rights tradition is that the burden of proving foreign 
law generally has fallen on the party whose cause of action or defense 
320. The "new" conflicts methodologies are exemplified in cases such as Bernkrant 
v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1961); Clark v. Clark, 
222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 
240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), 95 A.L.R.2d 1 (1964); Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 
P.2d 543 (1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965). In ad-
miralty cases, the federal courts have used the "center of gravity" approach to deter-
mine the applicable law for some time. E.g., Jansson v. Swedish Am. Line, 185 F.2d 
212 (1st Cir. 1950); Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See 
also McClure v. United States Lines Co., 368 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). Some of the 
recent scholarly writing on the new approaches to conflict of laws include: CAVERS, 
THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS passim (1965); Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives 
in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, reprinted in CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYS ON 
THE CoNFUCT OF LAws 177 (1963); Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts 
Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARv. L. REV. 377 (1966); Symposium on New Trends 
in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 673 (1963) (especially the articles 
by Professors Cavers, Currie, Ehrenzweig, and Reese). Although the analyses and 
semantic formulations offered by the scholars differ widely, they seem to lead to sub-
stantially the same results in application. See Kay, Book Review, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 341 
(1966). 
321. The contrast is not entirely academic. In Loree v. Abner, 57 Fed. 159 (6th Cir. 
1893), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the Circuit Court in the District 
of Kentucky were called upon to apply the colonial law in force in Pennsylvania 170 
years earli~r. Moreover, the logic of the rule would require the pre-1867 law of Tsarist 
Russia to be judicially noticed by a federal court in Alaska, whereas a federal court 
in the Second Circuit would dismiss an action based on current or Tsarist Russian 
law in the absence of sufficient proof, 
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is based on it. In those jurisdictions employing the presumption of 
identity between local and foreign law, this burden has been shifted 
to the party asserting a lack of identity between the two.322 One un-
settled point is whether the presumption has the effect of shifting 
only the burden of production or affects the burden of persuasion 
as well. Although it probably is too early in the development of the 
new conflicts theories to predict with any certainty, it seems likely 
that if existing notions of burden of proof are retained in the con-
text of foreign law, both burdens will remain on the party whose case 
depends upon the contents of foreign law. 
When an irremedial failure of proof does occur under Rule 44.1, 
at the least the federal courts have the freedom to continue applying 
the variety of exceptions to the proof requirement that they have 
utilized in the past, assuming that the Erie considerations discussed 
below are not an impediment.323 Hopefully, the courts will be able to 
exercise substantially greater flexibility. If the trend away from the 
Crosby case and the strict territorial notion of conflict of laws con-
tinues, the crazy-quilt of exceptions and presumptions developed 
over the years can be replaced by a more cohesive and rational 
scheme. Even though these judicial doctrines have been extremely 
useful as safety valves for the pressures created by Crosby and have 
achieved desirable results in particular cases, they are interstitial in 
character and have acted as palliatives for a judicial unwillingness 
to accept the consequences of the vested-rights doctrine. If the courts 
have nurtured the existing inroads on the integrity of the vested-
rights system, they should be willing to exercise greater flexibility in 
dealing with failures in foreign-law proof than is currently prac-
ticed.324 
In an attempt to formulate a better approach to the problem, it 
might be helpful to examine a situation in which th~ conflicts rule, 
whether it be of the new or old genre, clearly points to the law of a 
particular foreign country. To provide a tangible background for 
the inquiry, posit a lawsuit similar to Walton: 325 an action involving 
322. Indeed, the word "presumption" in this context appears to be a euphemism 
for declaring a shift in the burden of producing evidence or in the burden of per-
suasion. See Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. 
L. REv. 195, 199-203, 205-08 (1953). 
323. See text accompanying notes 407-28 infra. The traditional exceptions to the 
proof requirement are discussed at text accompanying notes 138-50 supra. 
324. In Seguros Tepeyac, S.A. v • .Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168, 174 n.3 (5th Cir. 1965), 
the court commented: 
In the interest of arriving at a just adjudication, the trial judge should have 
discretion in determining whether the law of the forum, with or without the 
disguise of a presumption, should prevail. This discretion should be especially 
broad in a state with a civil law background. 
325. See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra. 
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a foreign tort in which the plaintiff is content to have his claim 
measured by forum law and demonstrates no desire to invoke for-
eign law, whereas the defendant perceives some advantage in apply-
ing the law of the place where the tort occurred and has given notice 
under Rule 44.1 that he intends to challenge the existence of a cause 
of action under the governing law. 
Despite the siren call of countless cases applying burden-of-proof 
notions to a failure of foreign-law proof, the rejection of the fact 
characterization of alien law by Federal Rule 44.1 makes it clear that 
under the new federal practice the failure-of-proof problem does not 
involve burdens of production and persuasion in any classical sense. 
Many of the considerations involved in assigning responsibility for 
proving the facts demonstrating the defendant's negligence or the 
plaintiff's contributory negligence are inapposite to the question 
who should establish the content of the foreign law. In the latter 
context, the text of Rule 44.1 requires the court and counsel for the 
parties to share the responsibility for ascertaining the relevant rules 
of law, as they do in cases governed by domestic law, thereby render-
ing the traditional objectives of burdens of proof irrelevant. This is 
emphasized by the passages in the new Rule giving the trial court 
authority to do its own research and directing that foreign-law de-
terminations be treated as rulings on questions of law.326 The most 
effective way of insuring that the joint obligation of court and coun-
sel is properly discharged is by giving the trial court discretion to 
allocate the workload entailed in establishing foreign law in light 
of such factors as convenience and economy; to insist upon the appli-
cation of traditional burdens of proof is as ill-advised as it is illogical. 
Even if one is hesitant about completely severing the umbilical 
cord to the past, a modicum of rationality can be provided within 
the confines of the existing burden-of-proof structure. Admittedly, 
there is something superficially attractive about the following set of 
alternative propositions: (1) a plaintiff who seeks relief on a cause 
of action that can be maintained in a federal court only if it can be 
asserted in the country in which the operative events occurred ( either 
because the forum does not recognize the plaintiff's cause of action 
or because the forum does recognize it, but the applicable conflicts 
principle requires the application of foreign law) should bear the 
burden of establishing the content of that law; or (2) forum law 
should be applied unless a party who seeks to gain some advantage by 
displacing it with foreign law assumes the burden of establishing 
326. The text of Rule 44.1 is set out in note 5 supra. 
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the latter. Allocation of the task of establishing foreign law in terms 
of an alleged symbiotic relationship between conflict of laws rules and 
burdens of proof hardly seems inevitable, however. The burden of es-
tablishing a cause of action or defense under the controlling foreign 
law normally should rest on the party who would bear that burden 
if the litigation were governed by forum law. Thus, if the identity 
presumption is followed and the defendant wishes to overcome it, 
he should not be required to do more than produce enough evidence 
to show that the presumption is unrealistic in the particular case; 
the plaintiff ought to have the ultimate task of persuading the court 
that a cause of action exists under foreign law. Phrased somewhat 
differently, the party who raises a foreign-law issue should bear the 
initial burden of production but not necessarily the ultimate burden 
of persuasion.827 This allocation is a rough equivalent of the view that 
a party who pleads the existence of a fact has the burden of present-
ing the first evidence with regard to it.328 The suggested approach is 
somewhat more difficult to employ if the court adopts the "new" con-
flict of laws approach and uses an interest analysis in selecting the 
governing law. Sound application of that technique requires the 
court to analyze the content of the various potentially controlling 
laws before one is chosen. Thus, neither party has a burden with 
regard to ascertaining the applicable law in any meaningful sense. 
Nonetheless, it still might be advantageous to divorce the process of 
showing the character of foreign law for purposes of determining 
whether it should govern the lawsuit from the question of who has 
the burden of establishing a right to relief under the law ultimately 
chosen. 
In the context of the hypothetical, the approach suggested in the 
327. There is a conflict among the commentators as to the effect of a presumption 
on these two burdens. Compare THAYER, A PREUMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 339 
(1898), and 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940), with Morgan &: Maguire, Look-
ing Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. R.Ev. 909, 913 (1938), and Reaugh, 
Presumptions and the Burden of Proof, 36 ILL. L. R.Ev. 703, 819 (1942). See also Kales, 
Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 HARV. L. R.Ev. 401 (1906). 
The suggestion in text finds support in Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Gorter, 
254 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1958), in which the appellee, an administratrix, sought damages 
for wrongful death stemming from the grounding of one of the appellant's airplanes 
in the tidal waters of the Pacific off the Dominion of Canada. The trial court pre-
sumed that the law of the place of injury was the same as Washington law and 
ignored the airline's motion after trial but prior to the entry of judgment to amend 
its answer to show that the Dominion of Canada had jurisdiction over the place of 
injury and that the applicable wrongful death act barred recovery. The Ninth Cir-
cuit, applying Washington law, stated that "the presumption of identity to Washing-
ton law of the law of another country disappears when evidence to the contrary is 
introduced." Id. at 653 n.3. 
328. See McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 306-07 (1954). See also 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 2489 (3d ed. 1940). 
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preceding paragraphs simply means that if the federal court con-
cluded that the dispute is governed by the law of the country in 
which the tort occurred, the burden of proving that country's law 
of negligence, contributory negligence, and any other significant 
legal principles would be assigned in accordance with the allocation 
normally made of those issues in domestic actions or, when the 
forum's conflicts principles require, in accordance with the burdens 
prescribed by the applicable foreign law. The same treatment would 
be appropriate when the issues of foreign law are collateral to the 
main dispute and there is no choice-of-law problem. 
Whatever treatment is accord.ed the burden problem, it must 
contain a degree of flexibility. In certain situations it may be proper 
to permit the trial court to exercise considerable discretion in assign-
ing the burden. For example, if the parties have unequal access to 
foreign-law materials, fairness and litigation economics may warrant 
a departure from the traditional approaches. Thus, if the hypotheti-
cal is embellished by adding such facts as an accident in Afghanistan 
between an American plaintiff who has had no contact with Afghani-
stan other than his presence there at the time of the accident and an 
American corporate defendant with continuous and extensive com-
mercial dealings in that country, it may be appropriate to ask the 
defendant to establish the content of Afghanistan law or at least to 
present whatever relevant legal materials are available to him, even 
though the burden normally would be on the plaintiff.820 A full or 
partial reassignment of the burden also would be justifiable if one 
of the litigants is an Afghan or if the party with superior access to 
information concerning Afghan law has assiduously avoided men-
tioning its relevance.830 A substantial number of additional variables, 
including the importance and character of the action, the level of 
the forum's interest in the dispute, the complexity of foreign law, 
and the difficulties of determining it, bear on the court's willingness 
to manipulate the burden. Although trial court discretion to re-
allocate the burden in order to minimize the number of cases in 
329. See Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign Countries, 3 AM. J. Cm,IP. L. 60, 
62, 66 (1954); Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 
1042-43 (1941). 
330. Although some of the commentators have expressed a lack of enthusiasm for 
assigning burdens of persuasion in terms of relative access to information, they do 
recognize that the burden-allocation process lacks a "key-principle" and generally 
retreat either to prior practice or to notions of "convenience, fairness and policy" to 
support their positions. See, e.g., McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 318 (1954); 9 WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE §§ 2486, 2488 (3d ed. 1940). The importance of the relative access to infor-
mation is supported by the use of presumptions for procedural convenience. See 
McCORllUCK, EVIDENCE § 309 (1954). See also Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REv. 
255 (1937). 
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which foreign law cannot be ascertained may be viewed as a degree 
of flexibility approximating anarchy, it is not completely heretical 
as far as burden-of-proof doctrine is concerned and it is in accord 
with the new Rule's objective of maximizing the ability to establish 
foreign law. 
The ultimate question, of course, is what is the appropriate 
denouement when the court has decided that foreign law controls 
and has allocated the burdens of production and persuasion, but 
the party with the latter burden has failed to discharge it? One ob-
vious answer is that the normal consequences of a failure to discharge 
a burden should accrue. When the foreign-law issue merely is inci-
dental or collateral to the controversy, this probably is sound. When 
foreign law is the source of the rules of decision, however, the justi-
fication for this approach is less apparent, especially if the forum's 
conflicts principles have any degree of elasticity. In any sensitive 
system for selecting the applicable law, an initial choice in favor of 
foreign rather than domestic law is tentative and to some degree 
presumes a capacity and willingness to ascertain the chosen law. 
Indeed, the court may have gravitated toward alien law because its 
content was thought fairer to the parties than domestic law or be-
cause the court believed that the nexus between the foreign country 
and the controversy was stronger than the tie between the forum and 
the dispute. If the party with the burden cannot (or occasionally 
even when he will not) establish foreign law, at least one of the 
premises upon which the court based its original decision to apply 
foreign law has proven to be inaccurate. Inasmuch as continued in-
sistence on foreign law may result in the plaintiff's dismissal despite 
the possibility that a valid cause of action actually exists under foreign 
law, the court may wish to reappraise its initial reference to foreign 
law and consider the application of forum law. For example, when 
one or both of the litigants is a citizen of the forum and the failure 
to establish foreign law is not deliberate but stems from its esoteric 
or underdeveloped character,331 there is little reason not to apply 
331. See VON MERREN&: TRAUTMANN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 99 (1965). 
Conversely, if neither party is a citizen of the forum state or if the federal court 
does not have any strong interest in the outcome of the litigation and does not find 
any rational basis for reallocating the burden or applying local law, it may choose 
to dismiss the action on the basis of forum non conveniens. The advantage of this 
escape valve is that it avoids an adjudication on the merits based on a failure to 
prove foreign law that will bar the losing party from seeking relief in another 
forum under more advantageous circumstances. Normally, however, the mere fact that 
proof of foreign law may be difficult is not a sufficient basis for granting a forum-non-
conveniens motion. See Horowitz v. Renault, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); 
cf. La Electronica, Inc. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 260 F. Supp. 915 (D.P.R. 1966). 
See also Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1966). 
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domestic law. The reasons for reassessing the decision to apply alien 
law become even more persuasive if, as suggested, the concept of 
burden of proof is considered inapposite to a failure to ascertain 
foreign law under Rule 44.1. 
D. The Implications of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 
I. Setting the Stage 
Probably no Supreme Court decision rendered during this cen-
tury has had as significant an impact on the distribution of judicial 
power between the federal government and the states as has Erie 
R.R. v. Tompkins.332 Viewed narrowly, the case merely rejected the 
prevalent pre-1938 notion that section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, the so-called Rules of Decision Act,333 requires a federal court 
in diversity litigation to apply the statutes and certain limited cate-
gories of local rules and customs, but not the common law, of the 
states.334 In doing so the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
332. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In view of the massive amount of literature on the Erie 
doctrine and the emphasis given it in current law-school curricula, it would be prof-
ligate to state the case's facts. Throughout this discussion case recitation will be 
minimized. 
333. 1 Stat. 92 (1789), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964). 
334. See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See also WRIGHT, FEDERAL 
COURTS § 54 (1963). The Erie doctrine is neither applicable to all diversity cases nor 
limited to diversity cases. Occasionally, its relevance will depend on the source or 
nature of the right being asserted and the litigation's impact on national policies 
rather than on the technical character of the federal court's subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., HART 8e WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 697-99 
(1953); Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARv. L. 
REv. 66 (1955); Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1013 (1953); 
Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the 
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957); Vestal, 
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection, 48 IowA L. REv. 248 (1963). Since this facet of 
Erie jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this article, the textual discussion proceeds 
with the relatively uncluttered diversity case as its model. 
Viewing Erie solely as an interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1652 (1964), Federal Rule 44.1 would not present an Erie problem if it could be 
brought under the aegis of the specific exemption in that act for matters that are the 
subject of federal statute. Arguably, a Federal Rule promulgated pursuant to the 
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964), either has the status of a United States 
statute or is a matter with a sufficient nexus to a federal statute to fall within the in-
tended coverage of the Rules of Decision Act. See Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Sub-
stantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REv. 467, 480 (1957). The Enabling Act is dis-
cussed in detail at text accompanying notes 475-519 infra. 
The precise status of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been a subject of 
considerable debate. The dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 
U.S. l (1941), rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 655 (1941), concurred in by three other Jus-
tices, contains a statement that the Rules cannot be equated with federal statutes. A 
majority of the Court appears to have taken a contrary view. See Note, Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1031 (1949); Note, State 
Jurisdictional Limitations Applied to Diversity Cases, 1957 WIS. L. REv. 339. See also 
Levin 8e Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in 
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Rules of Decision Act and simply invalidated the judicial construc-
tion given it during the reign of Swift v. Tyson.335 However, Mr. 
Justice Brandeis' opinion for the Court purports to rest the case 
partially on constitutional considerations. In the third part of his 
opinion, the Justice argued: 
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts 
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. 
And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legisla-
ture in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter 
of federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Con-
gress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law 
applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or 
"general," be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And 
no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon 
the federal courts.336 
The possibility that Mr. Justice Brandeis intended this passage as 
a flourish or make-weight to add force to his rationalization of the 
drastic changes worked by Erie caused the lower federal courts to 
take little notice of the case's constitutional basis for almost twenty 
years and led several writers to question the significance of that 
aspect of the Erie opinion.337 
Then in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.,338 decided in 1956, the 
constitutional foundation of Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in Erie 
was resurrected by the Supreme Court. The issue in Bernhardt was 
whether the federal Arbitration Act should be applied in a diversity 
case to a New York employment contract when the law of the forum 
state permits the revocation of an agreement to arbitrate at any time 
before an award is made. The Court interpreted the Arbitration Act 
narrowly to avoid a constitutional problem it described as follows: 
"Erie . . . indicated that Congress does not have the constitutional 
authority to make the law that is applicable to controversies in di-
versity of citizenship cases."339 According to the Court, the issue being 
Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1958); Note, 29 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 543; 545-
46 (1941). The quasi-statutory nature of the Rules seems to have been reinforced by 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See text accompanying notes 364-74 infra. 
335. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
336. 304 U.S. at 78. 
337. See, e.g., COOK, THE LOGICAL LEGAL BASIS OF nm CONFLICT OF LAws 138-43 
(1942); Broh-Kahn, Uniformity Run Riot-Extensions of the Erie Case, 31 KY. L.J. 99 
(1943); Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie 
v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 278-79 (1946); Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 
66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1013, 1024-35 (1953); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme 
Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 186, 188-204 (1957). See 
also Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940). 
338. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
339. Id. at 202. 
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avoided was "whether arbitration touched on substantive rights, 
which Erie . . . held were governed by local law, or was a mere 
form of procedure within the power of the federal courts or Congress 
to prescribe."340 
Although the Bernhardt opinion does not deal directly with the 
status of matters of procedure under Erie, the last portion of the 
second passage quoted above seems to leave federal procedure within 
Congress' competence.341 Given the language in Bernhardt, one 
might expect that the federal courts would have reached the conclu-
sion that the Rules Enabling Act,342 which is limited by its terms to 
practice and procedure, is a valid exercise of congressional power 
and is immune to an Erie challenge, and that any Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure falling within the legitimate scope of the act also is 
invulnerable to an attack under Erie.343 This conception of the in-
terrelationship between Erie and the Federal Rules apparently had 
support immediately following the Erie decision344 but the support 
atrophied when the Supreme Court transmuted the Erie philosophy 
in order to effectuate policies that had been expressed sotto voce in 
the original decision; as shall be seen below, however, this attitude 
may now be enjoying a renascence in a slightly modified form. 
340. Ibid. Although dictum, this language carries the implication that Erie disen-
abled Congress from enacting any legislation applicable in diversity litigation that 
"touched on substantive rights." See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 56, at 196-98 
(1963); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 427, 441 (1958); 
Whither, The Erie Doctrine and the Seventh Amendment: A Suggested Resolution 
of Their Conflict, 37 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 549, 550-54 (1959). 
341. Mr. Justice Reed remarked in his concurring opinion in Erie: "The line be-
tween procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one doubts federal power over 
procedure." 304 U.S. at 92. 
342. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1964). 
343. See Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. R.Ev. 940, 1046-49 (1961). 
An unstated premise in this analysis is that "substance" and "procedure" have similar 
meanings in both the Enabling Act and Erie contexts. For some time the propriety of 
this premise was considered extremely doubtful. See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. 
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946); Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play 
on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. R.Ev. 711, 715 (1950). Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 
(1965), may well have had the effect of bringing the two standards together, at least 
with regard to testing the validity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See text 
accompanying notes 364-74 infra. Nonetheless, the argument that the Erie concept of 
"substantive"-that which the Constitution declares untouchable by Congress-is nar-
rower than the Rules Enabling Act concept of "substantive"-that which Congress has 
declared untouchable by the Supreme Court and their rulemakers-cannot be con-
sigued to oblivion. 
344. In Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 
(1940), Judge Magruder commented: 
[I]t is not doubted that Congress has the power to prescribe the "procedure" for 
the federal courts, and this would certainly include a power to include within 
the domain of "procedure" subject-matter falling within the borderland between 
substance and procedure, and rationally capable of classification within either 
category. 
Id. at 756 n.4. See also Holtzoff, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie Rail-
Toad Co. v. Tompkins, 24 J. AM. Juo. Soc'Y 57 (1940). 
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Between 1938 and Bernhardt, the Supreme Court gave the Erie 
doctrine an everwidening scope. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric 
Mfg. Co.,845 the Court held that in diversity cases the federal judiciary 
was obliged to apply the conflict-of-laws principles of the forum state 
because "otherwise the accident of diversity of citizenship would 
constantly disturb equal administration of justice in co-ordinate state 
and federal courts sitting side by side."346 Thus, the elimination of 
shopping as between state and federal fora, a pernicious characteristic 
of the Swift v. Tyson era but hardly the leitmotiv of Mr. Justice 
Brandeis' opinion in Erie, became a rationale for tying the federal 
judiciary to state conflicts rules.347 The Klaxon case also made clear 
what was implicit in Erie: the words "substance" and "procedure" 
take on new meanings in the Erie environment, and categorizations 
evolved in other contexts are not necessarily apposite. 
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,348 the Supreme Court considered 
the propriety of a federal court granting equitable relief when a state 
court would have been foreclosed from awarding similar relief by 
the relevant state statute of limitations. The Court, speaking through 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, refused to apply the so-called equitable 
remedial rights doctrine and stated, in a passage that is indelibly 
inscribed on the minds of a generation of law students and Erieti-
c1ans: 
Here we are dealing with a right to recover derived not from the 
United States but from one of the States .... [T]he forms and mode 
of enforcing the right may at times, naturally enough, vary because 
the two judicial systems are not identic. But since a federal court 
adjudicating a State-created right solely because of the diversity of 
citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only another 
court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover 
is made unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the 
enforcement of the right as given by the State. 
And so the question is not whether a statute of liznitations is 
deemed a matter of "procedure" in some sense. The question is 
345. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
346. Id. at 496. 
347. See also Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); Griffin v. Mccoach, 
313 U.S. 498 (1941); Matanuska Valley Lines, Inc. v. Molitor, 365 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 
1966). For a criticism of the Klaxon result in terms of constitutional power, see Hill, 
The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 541, 543-68 (1958). Variant 
appraisals of Klaxon are found in CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 216-24 (1965); 
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 57 (1963); Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 
16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963); Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the Fed-
eral Courts, 28 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 732 (1963); Hart, The Relations Between State 
and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 489, 513-15 (1954). 
348. 326 U.S. 99 (1945), 44 MICH. L. REv. 477 (1945), 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 145 (1946), 
31 VA. L. REV. 948 (1945). 
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whether such a statute concerns merely the manner and the means 
by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced, 
or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the 
aspect that alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it signifi-
cantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard 
a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the 
same claim by the same parties in a State court? 
It is therefore immaterial whether statutes of limitation are 
characterized either as "substantive" or "procedural" in State court 
opinions in any use of those terms unrelated to the specific issue 
before us. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins was not an endeavor to 
formulate scientific legal terminology. It expressed a policy that 
touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial power between 
State and federal courts. In essence, the intent of that decision was 
to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising juris-
diction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, 
the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be sub-
stantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a 
litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court. The nub of the 
policy that underlies Erie . . . is that for the same transaction the 
accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead 
of in a State court a block away should not lead to a substantially 
different result.a49 
Thus emerged the outcome-determinative test-an attempt to pre-
vent a federal court in diversity litigation from reaching a decision 
at variance with the result that would obtain in a state court in a 
comparable case.350 
The Supreme Court decided two cases in 1949 involving "clashes" 
between the outcome-determinative test and the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse 
Co.,351 the plaintiff commenced a tort action pursuant to Federal 
Rule 3 by filing a complaint within the Kansas two-year limitations 
349. Id. at 108-09. Mr. Justice Rutledge, with whom Mr. Justice Murphy joined, 
dissented and warned of the "danger . . • of nullifying the power of Congress to 
control not only how the federal courts may act, but what they may do by way of 
affording remedies ...• " Id. at 116. See also Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 
514 (1953). 
350. See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), 35 CoRNELL L.Q. 420 
(1950), 44 ILL. L. REV. 533 (1949), 24 IND. L.J. 418 (1949), 28 TEXAS L. REv. 444 (1950); 
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947). Note that the outcome-determinative test is 
not necessarily constitutionally based but may be an attempt to determine Congress' 
intent in the Rules of Decision Act or, with regard to the test's application to the 
Federal Rules, in the Rules Enabling Act. Premonitions of the York result were 
sounded in Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 
(1940); Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. REv. 153, 158, 195 (1944); 
Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" After Erie Rail• 
road v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271, 278 (1939). 
351. 337 U.S. 530 (1949), 35 CORNELL L.Q. 420 (1950), 38 GEO. L.J. 115 (1949), 48 
MICH. L. REv. 531 (1950). 
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period but service on the defendant was not made until after that 
period had expired. Under Kansas law a statute of limitations was 
not tolled until the defendant was served. The Court concluded that 
the tolling provision was an integral part of the limitations statute 
and held the action barred in the federal courts because it was barred 
in the state courts. "Since that cause of action is created by local law, 
the measure of it is to be found only in local law .... Where local 
law qualifies or abridges it, the federal court must follow suit."352 
In the second case, Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,353 the 
Court applied a New Jersey statute obliging a plaintiff in a stock-
holder derivative action to post security for litigation expenses even 
though former Federal Rule 23(b), now Rule 23.1, did not contain 
a similar requirement. The Court reasoned that the New Jersey 
statute created an independent right of action for costs and expenses 
in favor of the defendant that was protected by the security provi-
sion, and that this substantive policy had to be effectuated by the 
New Jersey federal court. 
Although Ragan and Cohen do impinge upon the integrity of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, their impact probably is less drastic 
than some writers have indicated.354 The cases did superimpose state 
substantive law on the application of the Federal Rules but they did 
not invalidate Rule 3 or former Rule 23(b). In Ragan the action 
clearly was "commenced" within the meaning of Rule 3 for purposes 
of filing the action and measuring various time periods under the 
Federal Rules; the substantive rights created by Kansas law were 
rendered unenforceable in a federal court because they were not 
asserted within the time limits established by that state's law. In 
Cohen, New Jersey's policy of securing the defendant's ability to 
enforce the plaintiff's liability for the expenses of an unsuccessful 
derivative action was believed sufficiently strong to warrant its ap-
plication by the federal court in addition to the safeguards already 
provided for the defendant in Rule 23(b). When viewed as instances 
of the cumulation of state and federal law, rather than as a displace-
ment of the latter, Ragan simply means that Rule 3 does not deter-
mine the point at which certain state-created rights are extinguished 
and Cohen merely holds that compliance with Rule 23 does not 
352. Id. at 533. 
353. 337 U.S. 541 (1949), 35 CORNELL L.Q. 420 (1950), 48 MICH. L. REV. 706 (1950), 
35 VA. L. REv. 789 (1949). 
354. See HART &: WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 674-78 
(1953); Clark, Book Review, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 181 (1950). Other writers have been less 
pessimistic. E.g., Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 
19 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 64, 78-79 (1964). 
708 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:61!1 
automatically guarantee a federal forum when the state imposes 
additional impediments to access to its own courts in shareholder 
derivative suits.355 
However, neither Ragan nor Cohen considered the possibility 
that the Federal Rules and the inferences emanating from them em-
body significant federal policies that should not have been subordi-
nated to the policies reflected in the state statutes applied in those 
cases. Thus, for example, even if the statute involved in Cohen ex-
pressed New Jersey's desire to restrict shareholder derivative suits, 
might not former Federal Rule 23(b) represent a policy permitting 
comparatively easy access to the federal courts in such actions-a 
policy based upon a panoply of judicial administration factors dif-
ferent from the considerations that led the New Jersey legislature 
to constrict access to its own courts? Even if the New Jersey statute 
reflected that state's appraisal of the balance to be struck between 
corporations and their shareholders, should not the policy under-
lying Federal Rule 23(b) at least have been revealed and evaluated? 
In short, the holdings in Ragan and Cohen appear to be based on 
either (I) the unstated premise that the Supreme Court, despite the 
Rules Enabling Act, is impotent to promulgate a rule touching on 
matters of "substantive" law that will be operative in diversity litiga-
tion if it conflicts with state policy or (2) the unexpressed assumption 
that Federal Rules 3 and 23(b) do not reflect significant federal poli-
cies but merely articulate relatively banal procedural objectives. 
Untrammelled application of the outcome-determinative formu-
lation of York and its extension in Cohen and Ragan would require 
abandoning any hope of obtaining procedural uniformity among 
the national trial courts in diversity cases; almost any procedural 
rule may assume outcome-determinative dimensions in particular 
contexts.356 Similarly, nothing short of obsequious conformity to 
state practice could eliminate forum shopping; even the relative 
condition of court calendars and the different qualities of state and 
federal judges might influence a litigant's forum choice. Moreover, 
the fact that the Constitution does not bestow power on the Congress 
or the federal courts to enact substantive law for diversity cases does 
not mean that the Constitution requires unerring identity of out-
come between state and federal courts. That view ignores the exis-
355. Cf. Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nom. 
Carlin v. Iovino, 362 U.S. 949 (1960). 
356. See Clark, supra note 354, at 183; Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitu• 
tion, 53 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 427, 450-51 (1958). For a catalog of the Federal Rules that 
might be affected by an unremitting quest for identity of outcome, see Hill, supra at 
432-35. 
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tence of the Constitution's grant of diversity jurisdiction. By casting 
a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction in the role of a servile 
state tribunal, much of the desired protection theoretically afforded 
out-of-state litigants may be compromised. A strict outcome-determi-
native approach also ignores the value of preserving the equity 
powers traditionally exercised by federal courts and misses the im-
portance of insuring an impartial adjudication of federal rights, 
which often are involved in diversity cases. This failure to give 
weight to the independence of the federal judiciary and to the fre-
quent presence of important federal policies in diversity cases repre-
sents the weakest aspect of the York doctrine.357 
The most recent chapter in the Erie saga indicates that the trend 
established by York, Ragan, and Cohen has been reversed. It starts 
with Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-operative, Jnc.,358 decided 
two years after Bernhardt, in which the crucial question was whether 
the dispute was subject to the South Carolina Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, and therefore resolvable only through the state administra-
tive procedures, or could be heard in the federal courts. A jury verdict 
in the plaintiff's favor was reversed by the Fourth Circuit. The Su-
preme Court remanded the case to the trial court to permit the plain-
tiff to present evidence as to whether he was an employee of the defen-
dant, which would determine whether the plaintiff fell within the 
Workmen's Compensation Act; the plaintiff had been denied that 
opportunity in the lower court. The Court, holding that South 
Carolina's practice of having the court determine an issue of the 
act's coverage was not an integral or substantive part of the state's 
Workmen's Compensation Act but was "merely a form and mode of 
enforcing the immunity . . . and not . . . intended to be bound 
up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties,"359 
directed the District Court to leave the question to the jury. Apropos 
of the York rule, the Court observed that if "outcome" were the only 
factor, the federal court might well be required to follow state prac-
tice. 
But there are affirmative countervailing considerations at work 
here. The federal system is an independent system for administering 
357. It has been suggested that the test should be predictability prior to the time 
the forum is chosen. See Blume &: George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 937, 953, 956 (1951). See also Horowitz, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins-A Test 
To Determine Those Rules of State Law to Which Its Doctrine Applies, 23 So. CAL. 
L. REv. 204, 214-15 (1950). Although this approach might cure the forum-shopping 
aspect of Erie, it may not always meet the problem of avoiding results in the federal 
courts that differ from those reached in the state courts. 
358. 356 U.S. 525 (1958), 72 HARv. L. REV. 147 (1958), 43 MINN. L. R.Ev. 580 (1959). 
359. Id. at 536. 
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justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction. An essential 
characteristic of that system is the manner in which ... it distributes 
trial functions between judge and jury and, under the influence-
if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the deci-
sions of disputed questions of fact to the jury .... The policy of 
uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obligations ... 
cannot in every case exact compliance with a state rule-not bound 
up with rights and obligations-which disrupts the federal system of 
allocating functions between judge and jury .... Thus the inquiry 
here is whether the federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed 
fact questions should yield to the state rule in the interest of further-
ing the objective that the litigation should not come out one way in 
the federal court and another way in the state court.300 
The Court's decision seems to have been influenced by its belief that 
it was unlikely that the outcome of the case would be different if 
heard by a federal jury rather than by a state judge.861 
At first glance, Byrd seems limited by its peculiar facts. Even 
though the Court did not base its decision on the seventh amend-
ment, the "brooding omnipresence" of the constitutional status of 
the jury-trial right offers a basis for containing the application of the 
case's expansive language.362 Moreover, no "likelihood of a different 
result" was shown in Byrd, which may mean that substituting a jury 
for a court determination does not raise a York problem. Despite 
these reasons for a conservative reading of Byrd, several courts of 
appeals have used the case to bypass Erie and preserve the integrity 
of the Federal Rules.363 These courts have taken the position that 
360. Id. at 537-38. See also Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963); Shenandoah Life 
Ins. Co. v. Hawes, 256 F. Supp. 366 (E.D.N.C. 1966). A pre-Byrd decision of like tenor 
is Pogue v. Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1957). 
361. "We do not think the likelihood of a different result is so strong as to require 
the federal practice of jury determination of disputed factual issues to yield to the state 
rule in the interest of uniformity of outcome.'' 356 U.S. at 540. In Bernhardt the Court 
had said that "the change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a 
radical difference in ultimate results.'' 350 U.S. at 203. Note, however, that the dif-
ference in "ultimate result" in Byrd is not predictable as it was in the York case. 
362. 356 U.S. at 537 n.10. The commentators have expressed widely divergent views 
on the importance of Byrd. See Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 
HARV. L. REv. 275, 292-301 (1962); Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 
49 VA. L. R.Ev. 1082, 1098-99 (1963); Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye 
View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 Tut. L. R.Ev. 443 (1962); Weintraub, 
The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Law Rules, 39 IND. L.J. 228, 235-37 (1964); 
Whicher, The Erie Doctrine and the Seventh Amendment: A Suggested Resolution 
of Their Conflict, 37 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 549, 554-63 (1959). 
363. In Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nom. Carlin 
v. Iovino, 362 U.S. 949 (1960), the Second Circuit permitted substitution of an out-
of-state administrator as plaintiff under Federal Rule 25(a)(l), although New York 
law would not have permitted substitution and the action could not have been main-
tained in a state court. Judge Friendly rejected the application of York on two 
grounds: first, whereas York involved a defined state policy embodied in a statute, 
he could find no such policy prohibiting revivor against a foreign administrator; 
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Byrd requires any relevant federal policies that will be encroached 
upon by the application of state law to be balanced against the 
desiderata of achieving identity of result and respecting state sub-
stantive policies. In addition, a number of decisions in which par-
ticular Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been upheld support 
the proposition that the Rules express federal attitudes on the 
second, in York there was no federal legislation or clear federal policy covering the 
point in issue. Byrd was cited for the proposition that considerations other than mere 
"outcome" were relevant. Said the court: 
Our holding is only that in this limited area Congress may use its power to 
"provide for service of process anywhere in the United States" in such a manner 
that in all suits properly in the Federal courts by or against United States citizens, 
including diversity suits, substitution of their personal representatives may be 
had on their decease. This is an area which the positive inference from Article 
III and the "necessary and proper" clause outweighs the negative inference from 
the limited grant of legislative power in Article I, § 8, and the Tenth Amend-
ment that must have afforded the basis for the constitutional precept of Erie. 
Id. at 48. 
Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 {5th Cir. 1960), held that a prior incon-
sistent statement of an officer of the defendant corporation was admissible in the 
federal courts under Rule 43{a), although a Florida statute seemed to exclude it. 
Again, Byrd was construed to indicate that: 
[ A ]11 does not necessarily fall in the path of uniformity of result. So to deter-
mination of whether the application of the state rule would likely affect the 
outcome in a significant way must now be added the further one. Are there 
countervailing considerations reflecting substantial federal polices which outweigh 
in final balance the aim of like result? ••. 
Not the least of these countervailing considerations is the indispensable neces-
sity that a tribunal, if it is to be an independent court administering law, must 
have the capacity to regulate the manner by which cases are to be tried and facts 
are to be presented in the search for the truth of the cause .•.• A United States 
District Court clothed with power by Congress pursuant to the Constitution is 
not a mere adjunct to a state's judicial machinery. In entertaining diversity cases 
it is responding to a constitutional demand made effective by congressional action 
and ..• has a constitutional duty to hear and adjudicate .••. 
• • • An important countervailing policy consideration in the Blue Ridge sense 
therefore is the historic purpose of the Federal Rules and the forces which led 
Congress to pass the Rules Enabling Act. 
Id. at 406-08. As in Iovino, the Fifth Circuit in Monarch engaged in an analysis of 
the underlying premises of the Florida rule of exclusion. Finding no policy that 
would justify exclusion of the evidence in a federal court, it was held admissible. 
The Monarch decision was referred to by the Fifth Circuit in Dallas County v. 
Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 {5th Cir. 1961), as standing for the propo-
sition that the admissibility of evidence "is procedural, not substantive." The Dallas 
County case reaffirmed the proposition and held that the admissibility of a fifty-eight 
year old newspaper clipping was within the discretion of the federal court. The same 
result is implicit in Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681 {2d Cir. 
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962), although the Erie issue is discussed only in the 
dissenting opinion by Judge Moore. The majority opinion in Hope approvingly cites 
the Monarch discussion of Rule 43(a) and the problems posed by Erie. See also 
McDonald v. United Airlines, Inc., 365 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1966). For a further discus-
sion of various circuit court decisions, see WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 59 (1963). 
Se\'cral post-Byrd circuit court cases applied the outcome-determination test of 
York, however. E.g., Hardwick v. Smith, 286 F.2d 81 (10th Cir. 1961); Summers v. 
Wallace Hosp., 276 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1960); Aponte v. American Sur. Co., 276 F.2d 
678 (1st Cir. 1960). An excellent Chautauqua on Byrd was conducted by Judges Clark 
and Friendly in Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), and 
Jafte.x Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960). 
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administration of justice in the district courts and that they reflect 
a congressional desire for a uniform, national procedural system 
applicable in all civil actions regardless of the basis of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Thus, Byrd has produced a series of ad hoc analyses of 
the policies underlying various Federal Rules and a series of evalua-
tions of whether those policies are sufficiently important to outweigh 
contrary state practices. This process imposes a difficult burden upon 
the courts, often results in abstract distinctions, and requires deci-
sions that on many occasions are made without knowing whether the 
ruling will have any practical impact on the case. Nonetheless, the 
Byrd approach seems preferable to the complete absence of concern 
for federal interests that pervaded the York, Ragan, and Cohen 
regime. 
In 1965, the Supreme Court again had occasion to consider the 
impact of the Erie-York-Byrd complex on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This time the vehicle was Hanna v. Plumer.364 At issue 
was whether a plaintiff in a Massachusetts diversity action, brought 
against an executor for personal injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff 
in South Carolina by the defendant's testatrix, could commence the 
lawsuit by substituted service under Federal Rule 4(d)(l) or was 
obliged to comply with a Massachusetts statute365 requiring service 
"by delivery in hand" within one year after an executor posts bond 
for the performance of his duties. Both the district court and the 
First Circuit, concluding that the propriety of service of process 
should be tested with reference to the Massachusetts statute, granted 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment because timely in-
hand service had not been made on the executor. The Supreme 
Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, con-
cluded that Rule 4(d)(l) "neither exceeded the congressional man-
date embodied in the Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed consti-
tutional bounds, and that the Rule is therefore the standard against 
which the District Court should have measured the adequacy of 
the service."366 
The Court disposed of the argument that the "outcome-deter-
364. 380 U.S. 460 (1965), 54 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 1382, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 551, 1966 DUKE 
L.J. 142, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 345, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 413 (1966). 
365. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 197, § 9 (1955). 
366. 380 U.S. at 464. In retrospect, Hanna appears to have been foreshadowed by 
National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), which also involved the 
validity of serving on an agent under Rule 4(d)(l). In upholding service, the Court 
impliedly rejected Mr. Justice Black's argument in dissent that the agency was invalid 
under the forum state's law and that the foreign defendants had been deprived of 
their right to be sued in their home state, a right the Justice felt was guaranteed 
them by Erie. 
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minative" test required application of the Massachusetts statute as 
follows: 
The difference between the conclusion that the Massachusetts 
rule is applicable, and the conclusion that it is not, is of course at 
this point "outcome-determinative" in the sense that if we hold the 
state rule to apply, respondent prevails, whereas if we hold that 
Rule 4(d)(l) governs, the litigation will continue. But in this sense 
every procedural variation is "outcome-determinative." For example, 
having brought suit in a federal court, a plaintiff cannot then insist 
on the right to file subsequent pleadings in accord with the time 
limits applicable in the state courts, even though enforcement of the 
federal time-table will, if he continues to insist that he must meet 
only the state time limit, result in determination of the controversy 
against him .... Though choice of the federal or state rule will at 
this point have a marked effect upon the outcome of the litigation, 
the difference between the two rules would be of scant, if any, 
relevance to the choice of a forum. Petitioner, in choosing her forum, 
was not presented with a situation where application of the state 
rule would wholly bar recovery; rather, adherence to the state rule 
would have resulted only in altering the way in which process was 
served. Moreover, it is difficult to argue that permitting service of 
defendant's wife to take the place of inhand service of defendant 
himself alters the mode of enforcement of state-created rights in a 
fashion sufficiently "substantial" to raise the sort of equal protection 
problems to which the Erie opinion alluded.a61 
In a later portion of his opinion, the Chief Justice concluded that 
Erie considerations do not determine the validity or applicability of 
a Federal Rule. He argued that "the Erie rule has never been in-
voked to void a Federal Rule";368 Cohen, Ragan, and similar cases 
were distinguished as instances in which the Federal Rule did not 
cover the point in dispute. According to the Chief Justice, a clash 
between a Federal Rule and local law--clearly present in Hanna-
is resolved by applying the Federal Rule unless it can be demon-
strated that "the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred 
in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses 
neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restric-
tions."369 Although Byrd was not cited in the Court's discussion of 
the Federal Rules, its philosophy seems implicit in the notion that 
the Federal Rules are to be given effect despite contrary state law 
367. 380 U.S. at 468-69. In redefining tbe Erie and "outcome-determination" poli-
cies, tbe Court emphasized tbe elimination of forum shopping and tbe "inequitable 
administration of tbe laws." The Chief Justice's opinion clearly manifests a lessened 
preoccupation witb uniformity of outcome. See McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie 
Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REv. 884, 888-901 (1965). 
368. 380 U.S. at 470. 
369. Id. at 471. 
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because of the federal policy inherent in "the constitutional provi-
sion for a federal court system" and the exercise of "congressional 
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those 
courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, 
though falling within the uncertain area between substance and 
procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either."370 
But has the pendulum swung too far? In a concurring opinion-
there were no dissents-Mr. Justice Harlan suggested that it has and 
chastised the Court for straying too far from the basic precepts of 
Erie. He believed that the Chief Justice's opinion unduly sanctified 
the Federal Rules because if "a reasonable man [and those charged 
with the responsibility for formulating the rules "are presumably 
reasonable men"] could characterize any duly adopted federal rule 
as 'procedural,' the Court ... would have it apply no matter how 
seriously it frustrated a State's substantive regulation of the primary 
conduct and affairs of its citizens."371 
Hanna seems to require that a federal court confronted with a 
challenge to a Federal Rule decide initially whether the Rule ac-
tually conflicts with state law or whether it is narrower in scope and 
permits the superimposition of state law, as in Ragan and Cohen.372 
If a conflict does exist,373 the court must then determine whether the 
Federal Rule falls within the ambit of articles I and III of the Con-
stitution and the delegation in the Rules Enabling Act.374 Appar-
ently abandoned (especially if Mr. Justice Harlan's appraisal of the 
majority opinion is accurate) is the notion derived from Byrd by 
several courts and commentators that competing state and federal 
practices must be balanced and that state practice can be permitted 
370. Id. at 472. The Court also remarked that "neither York nor the cases following 
it ever suggested that the rule there laid down for coping with situations where no 
Federal Rule applies is co-extensive with the limitations on Congress to which Erie 
has adverted." Ibid. 
371. Id. at 476. Mr. Justice Harlan believed the question to be whether "choice of 
a rule would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct 
which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation." Id. at 475. 
372. See Kuchenig v. California Co., 350 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 
U.S. 985 (1966). 
373. See Sylvestri v. Warner &: Swasey Co., 244 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), in 
which Judge Wyatt expresses the view that Ragan would not be followed after Hanna. 
That conclusion is not inevitable. Indeed, two circuits have concluded that FED. R. 
CIV. P. 3 does not purport to deal with the question of when an action is commenced 
for purposes of measuring the relevant limitations period. Groninger v. Davison, 364 
F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1966); Sylvester v. Messler, 351 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1965). The same 
approach can be taken toward Cohen. See also Pinewood Gin Co. v. Carolina Power 8: 
Light Co., 41 F.R.D. 221 (D.S.C. 1966) (Rule 17(a) applied under Ranna despite con-
trary South Carolina practice). 
374. See text accompanying notes 429-519 infra for a discussion of the Rules Ena• 
bling Act. 
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to prevail only when it is "bound up with the definition of the rights 
and obligations of the parties."375 
2. Rule 44.1 and the Erie Doctrine 
Given the tortuous evolution of the Erie doctrine and the new 
analytic framework provided by Hanna, what is the status of Federal 
Rule 44.1 in diversity cases? Approaching the Rule anatomically, 876 
the provision in the first sentence requiring that the court and adverse 
parties be given "reasonable written notice" of an intent to rely on 
foreign law appears immune from challenge. Procedures for giving 
notice and pleading are among the most traditional "practice" sub-
jects. If they are held outcome determinative, the goal of uniform ap-
plication of the Federal Rules in diversity litigation is unobtainable. 
Even during the heyday of Erie and York the courts preserved the 
integrity of the pleading provisions in the Federal Rules,877 and a 
contrary conclusion with regard to Rule 44.1 hardly seems conceiv-
able. The notice-giving or quasi-pleading character of the first sen-
tence of the new Rule falls under the aegis of the Erie-York era plead-
ing cases and unquestionably is the beneficiary of the expanded pro-
tection accorded the Federal Rules by Hanna.878 
To the extent that the second sentence of Rule 44.1 merely serves 
to render the exclusionary evidence rules inapplicable and to ex-
pand the court's permitted scope of examination on a question of 
foreign law, it is a rule of admissibility in the style of Rule 43(a). 
375. 356 U.S. a~ 536. See text accompanying notes 358-63 supra; Hill, State Proce-
dural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 66, 97 (1955). In its 
concluding paragraph, the Court does not completely shut the door on either the bal-
ancing approach or outcome determination by stating: 
[A] court, in measuring a Federal Rule against the standards contained in the 
Enabling Act and the Constitution, need not wholly blind itself to the degree to 
which the Rule makes the character and result of the federal litigation stray 
from the course it would follow in state courts ••.. 
380 U.S. at 473. Moreover, one aspect of determining whether a Federal Rule applies 
in a particular situation is an inquiry into the policies underlying the Rule, which 
may necessitate a weighing of the relevant federal, and any competing state, interests. 
Neither the interest-balancing technique nor the many other emanations from the 
Byrd decision seem to have been atrophied by Hanna outside the realm of matters 
directly covered by the Federal Rules. See, e.g., Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 
365 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1966); McDonald v. United Airlines, Inc., 365 F.2d 593 (10th 
Cir. 1966); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965); Bolick v. 
Prudential Ins. Co., 249 F. Supp. 735 (D.S.C. 1966). 
376. The text of Federal Rule 44.1 is set out in note 5 supra. 
377. See, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). See also Follenfant v. Rogers, 
359 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1966); Garcia v. Bernabe, 289 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1961). 
378. Prior to the advent of FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1, at least two cases held that federal 
pleading rules governed the manner of pleading foreign law in the federal courts 
regardless of a divergent state practice. Telesphore Couture v. Watkins, 162 F. Supp. 
727, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); Empresa Agricola Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 
57 F. Supp. 649, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). 
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Even before Byrd and Hanna, the lower federal courts held that 
Erie, with certain exceptions not presently relevant, did not affect 
matters of proof or admissibility and believed themselves free, inter 
alia, to determine the proper scope of cross-examination379 and to 
consider evidence that would have been excluded by a state court.380 
Moreover, resort to federal rather than state practice will not be 
outcome determinative when the new Rule is consistent with the 
local practice regarding the receipt of foreign-law materials, as is the 
case in an ever-increasing number of states. Even in a state in which 
the cumbersome common-law methods of proving foreign law con-
tinue in vogue or a judicial-notice statute is in force, the possibility 
of a case turning on a differential between the materials that can be 
received and examined by state and federal judges is as remote and 
incalculable as was the likelihood of an outcome differential in the 
Byrd case. The mere fact that a different caliber of proof is needed to 
379. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950). 
380. Peoples Gas Co. v. Fitzgerald, 188 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 1951); Franzen v. 
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 51 F. Supp. 578 (D.N.J. 1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 837 (3d 
Cir. 1944). See Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 
429, 435-39 (1957); Comment, Federal Rule 4:J(a): The Scope of Admissibility of Evi-
dence and the Implications of the Erie Doctrine, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 1049 (1962). But 
see Sibley, Delimitations of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 29 KY. L.J. 172, 174-75 
(1941). For a post-Byrd pre-Hanna decision to the same effect, see Monarch Ins. Co. v. 
Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960). See also Rain v. Pavkov, 357 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 
1966). Questions relating to the burden of proof have fallen prey to Erie. See Dick v. 
New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 
(1943); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939); Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 
754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940). But cf. text accompanying notes 407-28 
infra. 
The same fate probably is in store for at least some of the privileges, although 
the Supreme Court never has passed on the question. See, e.g., Krizak v. ·w. C. Brooks 
& Sons, Inc., 320 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1963); Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 
1955); Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953). See also Fraser v. United 
States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1944). A fundamental dispute exists among the com-
mentators as to the impact of Erie on questions of privilege in the federal courts. 
For the views of those who believe that the federal courts ·are not bound to apply 
state privileges, see, e.g., 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE tJ 43.07, at 1333 (2d ed. 1951); 
Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, IO VAND. L. REY. 467, 483 
(1957); Pugh, Rule 4:J(a) and the Communication Privilege Under State Law: An 
Analysis of Confusion, 7 VAND. L. REv. 556, 568 (1954). For the contrary view, see, e.g., 
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 93 (1963); Degnan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence 
in Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D. 341, 347 (1960); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and 
Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 102 (1956); Wein-
steiQ, Recognition in the United States of the Privilege of Another Jurisdiction, 56 
CoLUM. L. REv. 535 (1956); Comment, Evidence Rules in the Federal Courts: A Time 
for a Change, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 451, 463-65 (1960); Note, The Admissibility of Evi-
dence Under Federal Rule 4:J(a), 48 VA. L. REv. 939, 943 (1962). The parol-evidence 
rule, res ipsa loquitur, the statute of frauds, and various presumptions have been 
categorized with privileges and burdens of proof. See Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 
192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952); Patterson-Ballagh Corp. 
v. Byron Jackson Co., 145 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1944); Hotel Dempsey Co. v. Tell, 128 
F.~d 673 (5th Cir. 1942). 
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establish foreign law in a state court than is needed in a federal court 
is not a variance of sufficient magnitude to raise an Erie problem; 
indeed it seems indistinguishable from divergences between state 
and federal practices as to required pleading detail or the availability 
of pretrial discovery. The Erie doctrine, especially as reformulated 
in Hanna, cannot be invoked whenever different state and federal 
procedural rules reflecting the same broad objectives do not lead to 
identical results in particular contexts.381 Finally, since it is unlikely 
that a party ever will realistically expect the mode of proving foreign 
law in a federal court to produce a different outcome than would 
result under the forum state's proof-of-foreign-law procedures, the 
availability of the liberal practice under the second sentence of Rule 
44.1 will have "scant, if any relevance to the choice of a forum."382 
Thus, the mode of proof aspects of the second sentence of Rule 44.1 
seem immune from debilitation by the Erie-York outcome-determi-
nation approach and seem even more secure given the Byrd-Hanna 
assertions of federal power to regulate the penumbra! area between 
substance and procedure. 
Moving on to the last sentence of Rule 44.1, both its statement 
that a determination of a foreign-law issue is to be treated as a ruling 
of law and a federal-court practice of having such issues judicially 
determined rather than jury tried seem to be unimpeachable by 
Erie or York. It is difficult to perceive how the precepts of these cases 
are violated by according the process of ascertaining foreign-law all 
the indicia of a ruling on a question of law or by permitting a United 
States court of appeals to use a review standard different from the one 
employed by the forum state's appellate courts. It is highly unlikely 
-probably to the point of being speculative-that a case's ultimate 
result will change because the scope of review in the federal courts 
is narrower or broader than that available in the state courts.883 The 
remote possibility that a variance of this type will be outcome deter-
minative or will encourage forum shopping renders any Erie or York 
challenge to the final sentence of Rule 44.1 relatively impotent. 
Even if Erie and York were thought relevant to the matters cov-
ered by the last sentence of Rule 44.1, its explicit text, as reinforced 
by the Advisory Committee's Note, expresses a federal policy in favor 
of treating foreign-law issues in a certain manner. Assuming the 
Rule is a valid exercise of the Supreme Court's rulemaking power 
381. Cf. Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 412 (5th Cir. 1960). 
382. 380 U.S. at 469. 
383. See generally Note, Proof of the Law of Foreign Countries: Appellate Review 
and Subsequent Litigation, 72 HARv. L. REv. 318, 323-24 (1958). 
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under the Rules Enabling Act,as4 Hanna requires it to be given 
effect in diversity litigation even when the forum state's practice is 
markedly different. The problem becomes somewhat more complex 
if federal appellate courts decide to exercise the same flexibility that 
Rule 44.1 now gives to federal trial courts with regard to ex parte 
research and begin to consider foreign-law materials presented to 
the court for the first time on appeal.3s5 In that eventuality, the argu-
ments advanced for immunizing the trial courts from an Erie chal-
lenge for comparable conduct under the second sentence of Rule 
44.1 can be advanced to defend the practice of the appellate courts.386 
Admittedly, the absence of an express statement of federal appellate 
policy in the Rule would attenuate any argument premised on 
Hanna. Nonetheless, a court's freedom to consider any relevant legal 
materials and to engage in independent research are incidents of 
the review given a trial court's domestic-law findings and the review 
given foreign-law findings should be similarly viewed in light of the 
new Rule's statement that a determination of foreign law is to be 
treated as a "ruling on a question of law." It is extremely doubtful 
that a litigant could convince the Second Circuit that Erie requires 
it to review the conclusions on New York law that were reached in 
a diversity action by the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York in the same way that a New York appellate court would 
review comparable conclusions by a New York trial court. The same 
should be true when sister-state or foreign law is involved. 
The possibility that judicial rather than jury determination of 
foreign law will create an Erie-York problem is minimal since issues 
of foreign law are outside the jury's domain in almost every state.3s7 
Moreover, it is unlikely that, in the few states that permit some form 
of jury involvement on foreign-law issues, state jury decisions would 
vary from federal judicial determinations on the same issues with 
any frequency or in any predictable way.ass Although Bernhardt did 
indicate that altering the character of the adjudicatory tribunal 
might lead to "a radical difference in ultimate result,"389 that case 
is distinguishable from the question of leaving foreign-law issues to 
the judge. Judicial adjudication rather than arbitration of a dispute 
under an employment contract, the choice involved in Bernhardt, is 
384. The bases for this conclusion are found at text accompanying notes 515-19 
infra. 
385. See text accompanying notes 299-300 supra. 
386. See text accompanying notes 379-83 supra. 
387. See text accompanying notes 291-92 supra. 
388. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Kielhom, 98 F. Supp. 288 ('V.D. Mich. 1951). 
389. 350 U.S. at 203. 
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more likely to produce a difference in outcome than federal judicial 
determination as opposed to state jury trial on an issue of foreign law 
because the difference in the character of the two tribunals is of 
greater magnitude in the former case than it is in the latter. 
Actually, the situation presented by Byrd is more closely related 
to the potential Erie impedimenta to judicial determination of 
foreign law under Rule 44.1 than is Bernhardt. A federal practice 
calling for the denial of jury trial on a particular issue is as much a 
part of "the federal system of allocating functions between judge and 
jury"390 as is a practice requiring that an issue be submitted to the 
jury.301 This proposition had some acceptance in the federal courts 
even before Byrd. In Diederich v. American News Co.,392 the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed a directed verdict on the issue of assumption of the 
risk despite a passage in the Oklahoma constitution requiring that 
the issue be given to the jury. The court stated that a federal trial 
court's obligation to discharge judicial functions and its puissance 
to determine certain questions as a matter of law were essential ele-
ments of the seventh amendment.393 Inasmuch as the Supreme Court 
did not rest its decision in Byrd on the Constitution, it is possible 
to conclude that a federal practice of judicial determination of for-
eign-law issues supervenes a contrary state practice without reaching 
the question whether trial by court instead of by jury is a constitu-
tional right. 
There are several additional Erie questions lurking at the periph-
ery of the Rule that warrant discussion. First, does the total effect of 
Rule 44.1 create Erie implications not revealed by a dissection of the 
Rule's text? Second, is the new Rule contrary to the Klaxon impera-
tive that in diversity actions a federal court is bound to apply the 
conflicts rules of the forum state?394 Finally, does Erie disenable a 
390. 356 U.S. at 538. 
391. For example, in Kirby Lumber Corp. v. White, 288 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1961), 
the court said that "the quantity and quality of proof necessary to make out a case 
for submission to a jury in a federal court are determined by the Seventh Amend-
ment •.• , the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the decisions of the Courts of 
the United States .•.• " Id. at 573. 
392. 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1942). See also Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 
91 (1931). 
393. See also McDonald v. United Airlines, Inc., 365 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1966); 
Pogue v. Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1957); Bowie v. Sorrell, 
209 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1953); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 62 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943); Shenandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Hawes, 256 F. Supp. 
366 (E.D.N.C. 1966); Hollingsworth v. General Petroleum Co., 26 F. Supp. 917 (D. 
Ore. 1939); cf. Reynolds v. Pegler, 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 
(1955). 
394. Klaxon requires a federal court to apply the forum state's conflicts principles 
in diversity litigation in the interstate situation. Quaere whether the Supreme Court 
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federal court from developing a series of flexible rules for allocating 
the task of proving foreign law and for fixing the consequences of a 
failure to discharge that obligation? 
One of the basic objectives of Federal Rule 44.1 is to maximize 
the ability of counsel and the court to prove the content of foreign 
law. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that there will be instances 
in which a federal court will do its own research or accept foreign-
law materials that would be excluded by the forum state's less sen-
sitive procedures for proving foreign law. The result of this dis-
crepancy will be occasions on which a federal court would be able to 
ascertain foreign law and adjudicate the case on the merits but a state 
court would have to declare a failure of proof and direct the entry of 
judgment against the party relying on foreign law. Thus, it may not 
be accurate to say that Federal Rule 44.1 merely deals with the 
mechanics of raising, proving, and determining issues of foreign law 
and neither intrudes upon the forum's substantive law or public 
policy nor upsets the equilibrium between the administration of jus-
tice in the federal and state courts.395 Although a federal judge's abil-
ity to decide a higher percentage of foreign-law issues than his state 
counterpart seems too weak a foundation to support an Erie argument, 
undoubtedly there are circumstances in which it will be outcome 
determinative or a factor in the plaintiff's choice of forum. In a juris-
diction adhering to the Crosby philosophy,396 for example, the differ-
ence to a plaintiff whose right of action is based on foreign law will 
be the difference between winning and losing. 
At first glance, the dialectic in favor of federal court freedom of 
action under Rule 44.1 does not seem to be enhanced by the Hanna 
reconstruction of what constitutes outcome determination. Unlike 
a divergence between state and federal practice with regard to serv-
ing process, which, as Mr. Chief Justice Warren pointed out, does 
not cause a difference in outcome as long as the plaintiff adheres to 
the procedural rules of the chosen forum, a divergence between the 
respective practices regarding proof of foreign law may lead to a 
totally different outcome even if the litigant does comply with the 
practice of the forum. Arguably, therefore, the ability to establish 
foreign law in a federal court and the inability to do so in a state 
would, or should, extend Klaxon to the international situation, especially in the con-
text of a case in which the forum state has little or no interest in the outcome of 
the litigation. Klaxon is described briefly at text accompanying notes 345-47 supra. 
395. See Baltimore &: O.R.R. v. Reaux, 59 F. Supp. 969 (N.D. Ohio 1945); Peterson 
v. Chicago, G.W. Ry., 3 F.R.D. 346, 348 (D. Neb.), afj'd, 138 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1943). 
See also Wade v. Lynn, 181 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ohio 1960). But cf. Krasnow v. National 
Airlines, Inc., 228 F.2d 326, 327 n.3 (2d Cir. 1955) (dictum). 
396. Crosby is discussed at text accompanying notes 78-82 supra. 
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court may well, in the words of the Hanna opinion, have "relevance 
to the choice of a forum" and "raise the sort of equal protection prob-
lems to which the Erie opinion alluded."397 
One reply to this attack on Rule 44.1 can be extrapolated from 
the fact that the broad federal discovery practice poses the same 
type of variance between state and federal procedure as does Rule 
44.1 but has not fallen prey to Erie challenges.398 Additional succor 
may be derived from the idealistic notion that, since every state does 
provide a mechanism for establishing foreign law, all a litigant need 
do is work with it diligently, avoid becoming depressed by the spectre 
of the Crosby and Walton cases, and truth will out. Thus viewed, 
the only difference between state and federal practice is the relative 
ease with which foreign law can be established. It also might be 
argued that a lawyer would need the prescience of a Nostradamus to 
choose a forum on the basis of a difference in outcome resulting from 
disparate foreign-law practices, which again reduces the divergence 
between state and federal practice to one of methodology. Although 
these assertions are idyllic circumlocutions of the outcome-determina-
tive quagmire and offer some solace to those who would preserve the 
virtue of the Federal Rules against the rapacious qualities of the 
Erie doctrine, they do not completely vitiate the concern that Rule 
44.1 may violate, at least the spirit of, the important limitations on 
federal power articulated in Erie and York. 
Further analysis of Hanna, assuming the case is not viewed as 
sufficiently distinguishable from the problem under discussion to 
render it irrelevant, does offer a satisfactory thesis for protecting 
Rule 44.1 from Erie and the outcome-determination test. In Hanna, 
the Supreme Court made it clear that violation of one or both of 
the so-called "twin aims" of Erie-discouraging forum shopping and 
preventing the inequitable administration of the law399-does not 
necessarily emasculate a Federal Rule in diversity litigation. As pre-
viously noted,400 the Court in Hanna takes the position that a Rule is 
valid unless shown to transgress the terms of the Enabling Act or 
some constitutional restriction.401 For reasons detailed below,402 the 
first avenue of attack on a Federal Rule left open by Hanna-a chal-
!197. !180 U.S. at 469. The Hanna notion of "inequitable administration of the 
laws" is discussed in Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 6!1-64 (4th Cir. 1965). 
!198. See Hill v. Greer, !10 F.R.D. 64 (D.N.J. 1961); Commercial Solvents Corp. v. 
Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. !159 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Developments in the 
Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940, 1046-49 (1961). But cf. Reeves v. Pennsylvania 
R.R., 8 F.R.D. 616 (D. Del. 1949). . 
!199. !180 U.S. at 468. 
400. See text accompanying notes !168-75 supra. 
401, !180 U.S. at 471. 
402. See text accompanying notes 429-519 infra. 
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lenge based on the Rules Enabling Act-is not likely to be a fruitful 
endeavor with respect to Rule 44.1. The second possible point of 
vulnerability-encompassed by the reference to "constitutional 
restrictions"-is somewhat difficult to isolate. The structure of the 
Court's opinion indicates that these words may apply to Mr. Justice 
Brandeis' discussion in Erie of the impropriety of promulgating 
federal rules of decision regarding matters that do not fall within 
one of the specific constitutional grants of power to the national 
government.403 If this is the case, the reference to "constitutional 
restrictions" does not affect Rule 44.1, which comes under the aegis 
of the provision for a federal court system in article III of the Con-
stitution, as reinforced by the necessary and proper clause.404 How-
ever, the words may refer to the type of equal-protection problem 
that also troubled Mr. Justice Brandeis in Erie. This construction 
would support the argument that even though a Federal Rule is a 
legitimate exercise of federal power, it may be invalid if its applica-
tion leads to the unequal administration of the law. The possibility 
that a Federal Rule might be invalid in diversity litigation because 
it causes a federal case to "stray from the course it would follow in 
state courts" is faced squarely in Hanna as follows: 
To hold that a Federal Rule ... must cease to function whenever 
. it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to 
disembowel either the Constitution's grant of power over federal 
procedure or Congress' attempt to exercise that power in the 
Enabling Act.405 
This passage precludes the revitalization of the outcome-determina-
tion test under the guise of the equal-protection doctrine, at least as 
to any matter covered by a Federal Rule. Moreover, the concept of 
equal protection has not been applied to prohibit variations in prac-
tice or to prevent the forum from using its own "procedure" even 
though a different outcome might result. 
The Klaxon problem is easily resolved. Although the draftsmen 
of Rule 44.1 might have been inclined to deal with the choice-of-law 
problem and the consequences flowing from a failure to prove foreign 
law had Hanna antedated their efforts, the Rule as promulgated pre-
supposes that the governing foreign law is determined in accordance 
with state conflict of laws principles. Reliance on the forum state's 
choice-of-law rules will minimize the possibility of a clash between 
the Rule and the forum state's substantive law. Abrasion between the 
403. See text accompanying notes 332-37 supra. 
404. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8. 
405. 380 U.S. at 473-74. 
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two is especially unlikely when the forum's policy is to utilize its 
own law absent a strong reason to apply foreign law. Even when the 
local conflicts rules direct the application of the law of a foreign 
country, tension between the Rule and state law is improbable ex-
cept when the Rule enables foreign law to be ascertained and state 
practice does not. Inasmuch as the forum state's interest is minuscule 
when a foreign cause of action is being litigated and the forum's 
substantive policies are not in issue, any thesis calling for the invoca-
tion of state procedures for ascertaining foreign law as an incident 
or intrinsic element of the forum's choice-of-law system is weak.406 
Two much more difficult analytical problems are whether a fed-
eral court is obligated to treat a failure to establish foreign law as a 
state court would and whether a federal tribunal is required to use 
state standards to quantify the evidence when ascertaining if a failure 
of proof has taken place. These inquiries, which turn out to have 
labyrinthine qualities, are intertwined with a further conundrum: 
What freedom does Erie leave a federal court in diversity cases to 
depart from state practice and manipulate the burden of proving 
the content of foreign law? 
The case for complete federal control over the consequences of a 
failure of proof is premised on the assumption that Rule 44.1 is 
intended to equate the process of determining foreign law with the 
treatment of questions of domestic law. The result of this approach 
together with the involvement of the trial judge is to dissipate the 
adversarial character of the procedure and, as suggested earlier,407 
to render the burdens of production and persuasion used in connec-
tion with factual issues inapposite to the proof of foreign law. Thus, 
both the state burdens relating to the proof of foreign law and the 
attendant set of consequences for failing to meet those burdens, 
which were formulated on the basis of the fact characterization of 
alien law, are irrelevant to the federal procedure for ascertaining 
foreign law. As a result, Erie considerations are not germane to the 
distribution of the various tasks involved in determining foreign 
406. This approach, of course, lends support to the argument for federal conflicts 
rules in interstate and international cases, in which the interest of the forum state 
presumably is de minimis; it also would permit the development of a federal practice 
on the consequences that flow from a failure to establish the applicable foreign law. 
See generally Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 541 
(1958). The view that international and interstate conflicts problems should be treated 
differently has been expressed by at least two leading scholars. CAVERS, THE CHOICE· 
OF-LAW PROCESS 117-19 (1965); EHRENZWEIG, CONFUCT OF I...Aws § 6 (1962); Ehrenzweig, 
Interstate and International Conflicts Law: A Plea for Segregation, 41 MINN. L. REv. 
717 (1957). The interrelationship between Klaxon and the separation of international 
and interstate conflicts is not dealt with in the cited materials. 
407. See text accompanying notes 325-31 supra. 
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law in the federal courts under Rule 44.1. This theme will be re-
newed shortly.408 
Even if the traditional fact burdens of proof are considered rele-
vant, federal court independence in the realm of foreign law can 
still be premised on the argument that Erie does not require a federal 
court to apply state burdens on foreign-law issues or state standards 
for deciding when there has been a failure of proof and the conse-
quences of such a failure. The effect of Erie on burdens of proof has 
been before the Supreme Court on three occasions. On the first, Cities 
Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap,409 the question was whether the Texas 
federal courts were obliged to follow a Texas rule placing the burden 
of proving a bona fide purchase on the party challenging the legal 
title to property and asserting a superior equity. The Supreme Court, 
reversing both lower courts, held yes. According to Mr. Justice 
McReynolds, the state rule "relates to a substantial right upon which 
the holder of recorded legal title to Texas land may confidently 
rely."410 The second case presented a situation closer to the problem 
being discussed. In Palmer v. Hoffman411 the Supreme Court held 
that Federal Rule 8(c) "covers only the manner of pleading. The 
question of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a 
question of local law which federal courts in diversity of citizenship 
cases ... must apply."412 The third case, Dick v. New York Life Insur-
ance Co.,413 involved the application of a North Dakota practice that 
under certain factual circumstances an insured's death is presumed to 
be accidental and not suicide. No Erie issue was involved since both 
parties assumed North Dakota law governed. However, the Court, 
through Mr. Chief Justice Warren, did comment: "Under the Erie 
rule, presumptions (and their effects) and burden of proof are 'sub-
stantive' and hence respondent was required to shoulder the burden 
during the instant trial."414 
A burden of proof is outcome determinative within the meaning 
of York when no proof is adduced or the proof presented is in equi-
librium; in either situation, the case will tum on the allocation of 
the burden. It is questionable whether the importance of the burden 
in these exceptional cases warranted the broad pronouncements by 
the Court in Dunlap, Palmer, and Dick. Burdens certainly are not 
408. See text accompanying notes 416-28 infra. 
409. 308 U.S. 208 (1939). See also Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill. 1938). 
410. 308 U.S. at 212. 
411. 318 U.S. 109 (1943). 
412. Id. at 117. 
413. 359 U.S. 437 (1959). 
414. Id. at 446. 
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outcome determinative in the run of the mine case or when they 
only identify the party who must come fonvard with proof on a 
particular issue. Nonetheless, reflecting on the matter in 1967, the 
presence of three Supreme Court decisions and a substantial body of 
scholarly opinion to the same effect415 make it unprofitable to argue 
that the impact of Erie on burdens of pro~£ should be limited to 
cases in which it is highly probable that the burden allocation will 
be outcome determinative. Indeed, the uncertainty generated by 
such a standard might well make its adoption unwise as a policy 
matter. 
Perhaps a somewhat narrower exception to the application of 
state burdens of proof in diversity cases can be articulated. The 
burden issues in Dunlap, Palmer, and Dick can be readily distin-
guished from the burden questions likely to arise under Rule 44.1. 
In each of the Supreme Court cases, both the burden and the sub-
stantive rules on which the burden operated were formulated by 
the same jurisdiction.416 Since the process of molding a substantive 
right takes account of the identity of the litigant who will be called 
upon to establish various elements of the right or the defenses to 
its assertion, it is entirely proper for a federal court to honor the 
forum state's allocation of the relevant burdens. Although applica-
tion of the forum's burdens makes eminent sense when the forum 
also created the substantive right to which the burden attaches, it 
makes less sense to require a federal court to impose the forum 
state's burdens of proof on a cause of action or defense created by 
the law of another jurisdiction and it is even less justifiable when the 
forum's burden simply identifies the party who must establish the 
law of the other jurisdiction. In the latter context the burden, even 
though it is technically part of the forum's choice-of-law system, is 
not bound up with the foreign substantive right. By definition, the 
415. See Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REv. 275, 283, 
298-99 (1962); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Fed-
eral Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101, 117 (1956). See also Ladd, Uniform Evidence 
Rules in the Federal Courts, 49 VA. L. REv. 692 (1963). The study that preceded the 
formation of an Advisory Committee to draft rules of evidence for the federal courts 
concluded that the subject of burdens of proof was beyond the rule-making power. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, A PREUMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBIUTY OF DEVELOP-
ING UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR. THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 39-40 (1962). 
416. In Dunlap and Dick the law of the forum state governed both the cause of 
action and the burden of proof. In Palmer the federal trial court in New York was 
directed to follow New York's conflicts rule, which required the court to apply the 
Massachusetts burden on contributory negligence to two Massachusetts statutory 
causes. Two Massachusetts common-law causes also were involved but the court did 
not resolve the burden question with regard to them because a proper exception had 
not been taken below. 
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burden of proving the existence and content of foreign law, as op-
posed to the burden of proving a right to recover under that law, 
is not inextricably interwoven with substantive rights and duties 
created by the forum's law or, for that matter, with rights and duties 
created by the foreign country's law. It is simply the forum's mecha-
nism for assigning responsibility for establishing the legal frame-
work in a particular class of lawsuits. Only after this has been accom-
plished are the traditional functions of burdens of proo~ called into 
play to determine if the elements of the previously ascertained sub-
stantive law have been proven. 
It therefore seems unwise to extend Dunlap, Palmer, and Dick 
and require a federal court to pay obeisance to a state burden deal-
ing with the proof of foreign law in all circumstances. At the least, 
resort to state law should depend upon the results of an inquiry as 
to whether the forum's burden reflects a legitimate state policy of 
sufficient importance to be honored by a federal court at the expense 
of countervailing federal procedural norms. In jurisdictions adher-
ing to the vested-rights approach to conflicts, the burden is a con-
comitant of the view that the plaintiff cannot succeed unless he 
establishes a valid cause under the law of the territory in which his 
cause of action accrued. Quite logically this burden is placed on the 
party with the affirmative and fulfills at least one traditional func-
tion ascribed to burdens-insuring that one party is obligated to 
come forward with evidence;417 note, however, that the placement 
of the burden seems to be a matter of trial administration and has 
no necessary nexus with the substantive elements of the plaintiff's 
cause. 
In jurisdictions that presume an identity between local and 
foreign law, the justification for imposing the burden on the party 
asserting a difference between the two is not immediately apparent. 
It is unlikely that the forum is attempting to favor one class of liti-
gants-citizens, for example-over other classes. The adventitious 
way in which parties become aligned in litigation, as exemplified 
by the Walton case,418 would make such a goal difficult, if not im-
possible, to achieve. But even assuming that the forum state's goal, 
or one of them, is to favor a particular group at the expense of 
another, a federal court is not obligated to promote this discrim-
ination absent some substantial and rational justification for it. 
Since the identity presumption is based on an assumption, ap-
417. See Note, State Trial Procedure and the Federal Courts: Evidence, Juries, 
and Directed Verdicts under the Erie Doctrine, 66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1516, 1518-19 (1953). 
418. See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra. 
February 1967] Federal Rule 44.1 and Foreign Law 727 
parently unsupported by any empiric data, that local and foreign 
law are identical, the explanation for the burden allocation may be 
the forum's desire to minimize the expenditure of judicial time and 
effort in ascertaining and applying foreign law. If so, Erie does not 
oblige federal judges to expend their time and energy the way state 
judges consume theirs. Going one step further, even if we assume 
that the state's policy of frugality with regard to devoting resources 
to foreign-law issues includes a desire to conserve the energies and 
assets of litigants, neither the Erie principle nor its derivative pos-
tulates require a contest in the federal courts to cost a party the 
same sum and take the same time as would a corresponding proceed-
. ing in the local courts. To generalize, in any situation in which a 
state's burden of establishing the content of foreign law simply 
reflects administrative considerations, the state does not have a legit-
imate interest in how the burden of ascertaining foreign law is 
allocated in the federal courts. Nor is the efficacy of this conclusion 
altered when one of the litigants is a citizen of the forum state. 
The impropriety of encumbering the national courts with the 
forum state's notions of how to expend judicial and party resources 
is manifest whenever there is a competing federal interest. If Byrd 
and Hanna preach anything, it is that federal policies, particularly 
those germane to the functioning of the federal judicial system, 
should not be cavalierly shunted aside in favor of state practices 
simply to pursue the grail of result identity. If a significant federal 
policy is discernible, whether its substance is captured in a federal 
statute or court rule or is merely an unarticulated or inherent char-
acteristic of a judicial system, it should be given effect despite a 
contrary state rule; certainly this is true when the federal policy is 
pitted against a fragile state interest of the type apparently at the 
root of state-created burdens of proof on foreign-law issues. 
A number of policies concerning the treatment to be given 
foreign-law issues in the federal courts are embodied in the text of 
Federal Rule 44.1. First, the Rule reflects the belief that litigants 
should be able to raise foreign-law issues with a minimum of formal-
ity and without "unfair surprise." Second, it purports to establish 
an optimum environment in which everything relevant to a foreign-
law issue can be brought to the court's attention. Third, it gives 
federal trial judges the freedom to do independent research, thereby 
indicating that the accurate determination of foreign law is a suffi-
ciently important and desirable goal to warrant the expenditure of 
federal judicial resources. Fourth, it insures plenary appellate 
review by dealing with determinations of foreign and domestic law 
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in the same fashion, thus reaffirming the judgment that the accurate 
resolution of foreign-law issues is considered a worthy utilization of 
a federal judge's time and energy. 
The cumulative effect of these points is that Rule 44.1 expresses 
a philosophy that federal courts should ascertain foreign law accu-
rately whenever possible. Consequently, the use of state burdens of 
proof and presumptions that do not insure the best possible presen-
tation of foreign-law materials is antithetical to the federal approach 
to the determination of alien law. Accordingly, it is desirable for 
federal judges to exercise the type of discretion previously sug-
gested419 in assigning functions concerning the proof of foreign law 
in order to secure optimum advantage from the flexibility provided 
by Rule 44.1. Liberating federal judges from the constraints of 
burdens of proof that are part of foreign-law practices differing 
markedly from Rule 44.1 will maximize their ability to utilize the 
subtle pressures associated with proof burdens and help to insure 
as effective a foreign-law presentation as the parties can muster. 
Much the same reasoning dictates that the federal courts should be 
free to treat a failure of proof of foreign-law in the discretionary 
manner suggested earlier420 and should not be tied to what often 
are Draconian state rules. 
Admittedly, the panoply of federal policies distilled from Federal 
Rule 44.1 do not have the magisterial dignity of the judge-jury 
relationship involved in Byrd. Nonetheless, the Rule was recom-
mended by a federal commission, was adopted by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to a federal statute, and does represent a directive from the 
nation's highest court-augmented by whatever congressional im-
primatur can be attributed to the latter's silent acquiescence in the 
Rule's promulgation-that federal trial judges treat the determina-
tion of foreign law in a certain manner. Of equal importance is the 
fact that the existing potpourri of state techniques does not appear 
to articulate any significant counterbalancing policies.421 Moreover, 
the argument that the mantle of Hanna is not broad enough to cover 
the burden-of-proof aspect of determining foreign law because Rule 
419. See text accompanying notes 320-31 supra. 
420. Ibid. 
421. A broad interpretation of Byrd that seems to be in harmony with the views 
expressed in the text appears in Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 
HARV. L. REv. 275, 292-301 (1962). It may be more difficult to characterize a state's 
interest as de minimis when the foreign law relates to a collateral issue than when 
it governs the rules of decision for the entire case. When a case is controlled by forum 
law and foreign law must be established to prove a given factual element, the state's 
burden on the issue may be of considerable importance to the enforcement of the 
substantive right. 
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44.1 fails to deal specifically with the problem is not persuasive. 
Hanna should not be limited to those matters expressly dealt with 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; its philosophy applies to 
numerous aspects of federal practice that are found in the interstices 
and beyond the language of the Federal Rules. Even if Hanna 
technically does not apply in the present context, nothing in that 
case suggests that the interest-balancing technique of Byrd has been 
displaced on matters outside the ambit of Hanna or that Byrd does 
not provide an adequate framework for a federal approach to the 
problem of a failure to prove foreign law.422 
Many of the contentions and conclusions offered in the preced-
ing pages are reinforced by an analysis of the problem in terms of 
several situations in which a collision between state and federal prac-
tice is conceivable. Friction is most likely to occur when the party 
in a federal diversity action who is required under the law of the 
forum state to establish foreign law fails to do so, but the court, 
exercising its prerogatives under Rule 44.1, is able to ascertain the 
applicable law on its own. Even though the party has not discharged 
his burden, there probably has not been a "failure of proof" of the 
type that normally brings the state's sanctions into play. Thus, the 
federal court should proceed to apply foreign law and adjudicate the 
case, either on the theory that there is no conflict with state law 
inasmuch as foreign law has been revealed or on the premise that 
Federal Rule 44.1 controls. 
But suppose that neither the parties nor the court are able to 
unearth enough information to ascertain foreign law despite dili-
gent efforts to do so. Must the federal judge impose the state conse-
quences of a failure of proof? To the extent that the state practice 
regarding failure of proof is based on the notion that foreign law is 
a fact and that one of the parties has the responsibility for establish-
ing that fact, the state rule is inapplicable in a federal court. Federal 
practice is governed by a Rule that treats foreign law as an issue of 
law and purports to socialize the process of ascertaining foreign 
law; Rule 44.1 does not pivot on the concept of party responsibility. 
Since it is within the competence of the national government to 
promulgate a rule recasting the traditional characterization and 
treatment of any element of procedure, the federal courts are not 
obliged to follow a state practice formulated to operate in an en-
vironment completely different from that encountered in the federal 
courts. Thus, whenever a state's attitudes regarding the burden of 
proving foreign law and the consequences of failing to discharge 
422. See note 375 supra. 
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that burden are based on assumptions and conditions markedly 
different from those prevailing in the federal courts, they need not 
be honored despite a possibility that a difference in outcome will 
result.423 
A more difficult case is presented when the forum state has a 
provision identical to Federal Rule 44.1 or Article IV of the Uni-
form Interstate and International Procedure Act and its courts have 
concluded that a plaintiff whose cause of action is predicated on 
foreign law must lose if neither the parties nor the court are able to 
ascertain foreign law. A strong argument can be made that the Erie-
York doctrine, as embellished by Klaxon, requires a federal court to 
impose the same consequences on the plaintiff as would have befallen 
him had he litigated in a state court. A contrary result is plausible 
only if the federal court is willing to assume that the goals of Rule 
44.l are not identical to those of a comparable state enactment and 
that the federal courts' right to control their own trial procedure 
can be best effectuated by allowing them to reach their own conclu-
sions as to the consequences of a failure of proof. A decision to this 
effect should be reached only after a careful analysis of the premises 
for the state's dismissal of an action for failure of proof and an ap-
praisal of the role played by Rule 44. l and its state equivalent. If 
the federal courts use Rule 44. l to develop their own allocation of 
functions relating to the proof of foreign law, it would be desirable 
to permit the federal practice to prevail as against a contrary state 
practice even though the effect might be outcome determinative, 
especially if there is no strong policy basis for the state practice. This 
result is amply supported by the theoretical foundation provided by 
the Byrd and Hanna decisions. 
Keeping the burden of proof on foreign-law issues outside the 
Erie arena also finds support in the attitude of many federal courts 
toward judicial notice and a variety of foreign-law presumptions. 
The post-Erie decisions have been virtually unanimous in sanction-
ing a federal court's continued application of the practice of taking 
judicial notice of the law of all the s~ates without pleading or proof,424 
423. Much of the Supreme Court's discussion of outcome determination in Hanna 
seems to support this conclusion. The same thinking is implicit in the use of Federal 
Rule impleader in D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1958), 
despite the absence of impleader in Rhode Island practice and even though it enabled 
the federal court to adjudicate a case that could not have been determined by the 
Rhode Island state courts within the applicable state limitations period. 
424. In Erie itself, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the application of 
Pennsylvania law, although at that time New York, the forum state, did not judicially 
notice the law of sister states. See Goodrich, Mr. Tompkins Restates the Law, 27 
A.B.A.J. 547 (1941). 
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regardless of the forum state's rule on the subject.425 In a number of 
instances counsel's invocation of the Erie doctrine has been expressly 
rejected.426 In another group of cases, federal courts have not followed 
state presumptions as to the content of sister-state law or as to the 
identity of sister-state law and the law of the forum state.427 Although 
special policy considerations underlie a federal court's taking judicial 
notice of state law,428 the strong analogy between that practice and 
the suggested practice of permitting a federal court to ignore a 
state's burden-of-proof rules and sanctions for an inability to prove 
the law of a foreign country cannot be ignored. 
425. See Schultz v. Tecumseh Prods., Inc., 310 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1962); J. M. Blythe 
Motor Lines Corp. v. Blalock, 310 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1962); Reeves v. Schulmcier, 303 
F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962); Jannenga v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 288 F.2d 169 (D.C. 
Cir. 1961); Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958); 
Wm. J. Lemp Brewing Co. v. Ems Brewing Co., 164 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. 
denied, 333 U.S. 863 (1948); Alcaro v. Jean Jordeau, Inc., 138 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1943) 
(Goodrich, J., concurring); Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 643 n.6 (2d 
Cir. 1943), rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 322 U.S. 709 (1944); Newman v. Clayton 
F. Summy Co., 133 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1942); Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 
1941); Tarbert v. Ingraham Co., 190 F. Supp. 402 (D. Conn. 1960); Mullaly v. Carlisle 
Chem. Works, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 588 (D.N.J. 1959). See also 2B BARRON & HoLTZOFF, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 963 (Wright ed. 1961); IA MOORE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE ,r,r 0.316[2], [4], [5] (2d ed. 1961); 5 id. ,I 43.09; Comment, Judicial Notice of 
Foreign Law, 38 WASH. L. REV. 802, 817 (1963). But see Keeffe, Landis & Shaad, Sense 
and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REv. 664, 686-88 (1950). A contrary 
view was expressed in Waggaman v. General Fin. Co., 116 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1940), 
but this case appears to have been overruled by later decisions in the Third Circuit. 
In the Second Circuit, at least three cases have relied on state practice, thereby over-
looking the traditional federal practice and other authority in the Circuit. Gediman v. 
Anheuser Busch, Inc., 299 F.2d 537, 544 n.6 (2d Cir. 1962); Anderson v. National 
Producing Co., 253 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 906 (1958); Affiliated 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Courter Amusement Co., 32 F. Supp. 11 (E.D.N.Y. 1940). See also 
Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. v. Fein, 342 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1965). On occasion, judicial 
notice is taken without reliance on the established federal practice. For example, in 
Eliscu v. Fiber, 157 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1946), the Third Circuit authorized judicial 
notice of New York law but only referred to the New Jersey enactment of the Uni-
form Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act. The complete absence of any discussion of 
the proper basis for taking judicial notice in a federal court indicates that the court 
may not have adverted to the question. See also 14 STAN. L. REv. 162, 166 (1961). 
Moreover, in a later case the Third Circuit affirmed per curiam a district court deci-
sion stating that judicial notice of the law of the states is a question of federal law. 
Hassenplug v. Victor Lynn Lines, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Pa.), afj'd per curiam, 163 
F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1947). 
426. E.g., Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Reaux, 59 F. Supp. 969 (N.D. Ohio 1945); Petersen 
v. Chicago, G.W. Ry., 3 F.R.D. 346 (D. Neb.), affd, 138 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1943). See 
also Wade v. Lynn, 181 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ohio 1960). 
427. In Tarbert v. Ingraham Co., 190 F. Supp. 402, 406 (D. Conn. 1960), the court 
remarked that "such presumptions are not 'substantive' in the sense of shifting evi-
dentiary burdens; they are more in the nature of judicial notice taking by the court." 
The court then proceeded to reject application of the state presumptions on the 
ground that their use would be inconsistent with the Federal Rules and would ad-
versely affect the functioning of the pretrial process in the federal courts. But see 
Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. v. Fein, 342 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1965). 
428. See text accompanying notes 149-51 supra. 
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E. The Rule-Making Power and Foreign Law 
To conclude this discussion of Federal Rule 44.1 it is appropriate, 
especially in view of the doubts raised as to the Rule's integrity in 
diversity of citizenship cases, 429 to investigate the possibility that the 
new Rule exceeds the power delegated to the United States Supreme 
Court by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act to prescribe rules of 
practice and procedure for the district courts.430 If the Rule is vul-
nerable at all, its weakness lies in the second and third sentences. 
The first sentence deals with traditional practice and procedure 
subjects-pleading and notice giving-that are well within the lan-
guage of the Enabling Act even if that statute is narrowly construed. 
However, the second sentence affects matters of evidence and the 
mode of proof in the federal courts; the third sentence pertains to 
the relationship between the trial and appellate courts and, by im-
plication, to the interaction between federal trial and appellate 
courts and federal juries. Since these are matters of considerable sig-
nificance, a closer analysis of the Rule's status under the Enabling 
Act seems justified. 
l. An Historical Prologue 
Historical examination of civil procedure in the federal courts 
begins with section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Rules of 
Decision Act, which originally provided that, absent a supervening 
federal regulation, "the laws of the several states ... shall be regarded 
as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the 
United States .... "431 The text of the statute as enacted-it has 
since been modified-precluded its application to equity proceed-
ings. Other sections of the Judiciary Act that dealt with procedure 
include section 17 (b ), 432 which gave the courts rule-making power for 
"conducting business" in an orderly way, and section 30,438 which 
provided that the "mode of proof" in civil actions be by oral testi-
mony and that witnesses be examined in open court.434 
The Rules of Decision Act was augmented by the Process Act of 
429. See text accompanying notes 376-428 supra. 
430. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). Similar delegations have been enacted for admiralty 
causes, 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1964), criminal cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1964), and bankruptcy 
matters, 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1964). 
431. 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). 
432. 1 Stat 73, 83 (1789). 
433. 1 Stat 73, 88 (1789). 
434. Section 30 of the Act initially applied to equity and admiralty cases as well 
as common-law cases, but subsequently was restricted to actions at common law. 
REV. STAT. § 861 (1875). 
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1792,435 which directed that "the forms and modes of proceedings" 
in common-law actions conform to those in the state in which the 
federal court was sitting; the lower federal courts were given "discre-
tion" to depart from state practice, and the Supreme Court pre-
sumably could do the same under the grant of rule-making power in 
section 17 (b) of the earlier act. One of the effects of the 1792 act 
was that federal courts in the original states had to conform to local 
practice as it existed in September, 1789. Federal courts in states 
admitted to the Union after that date generally were instructed by 
statute to follow state procedures as of later, but equally arbitrary, 
dates;436 in the case of states joining the Union between 1842 and 
1872, the conformity principle was incorporated directly into the 
enactments granting statehood or was extended by judicial construc-
tion of those statutes.437 
The Supreme Court's rule-making power was strengthened in 
1842 by a statute giving it 
full power and authority . . . to prescribe, and regulate, and alter, 
... the forms and modes of framing and filing libels, bills, answers, 
and other proceedings and pleadings, in suits at common law or in 
admiralty and in equity . . . and also the forms and modes of 
taking and obtaining evidence, and of obtaining discovery, and 
generally the forms and modes of proceeding to obtain relief, . . . 
and generally to regulate the whole practice of the said courts, so as 
to prevent delays, and to promote brevity and succinctness in all 
pleadings and proceedings therein .... 438 
Despite this expansive delegation, rules regulating the practice on 
the law side of the federal courts were not promulgated for almost 
another century. Further legislative development also was sparse. 
Between 1842 and 1872 Congress saw fit to enact only three rela-
tively narrow statutes dealing with the competency of witnesses in 
federal civil actions.439 
435. 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1789). 
436. See, e.g., 4 Stat. 278 (1828); 5 Stat. 499 (1842). These statutes were a reaction 
to the Supreme Court's decision in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (IO Wheat.) 1 (1825), 
in which Chief Justice Marshall applied the Process Act of 1792 to an execution on 
a judgment despite a post-1789 Kentucky statute on the subject. See also HART 8: 
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 582-84 (1953); Warren, Fed-
eral Process and State Legislation, 16 VA. L. R.Ev. 421, 436 (1930). 
437. See, e.g., 5 Stat. 742-89 (1842), construed in United States v. Council of Keokuk, 
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 514 (1867); 12 Stat. 128 (1861), construed in Smith v. Cockrill, 73 U.S. 
(6 Wall.) 756 (1867). ; 
438. 5 Stat. 516, 518 (1842). 
439. The first provided that the laws of the state in which the federal court was 
sitting were to be the rules of decision as to the competency of witnesses. 12 Stat. 
588 (1862). The second prohibited the exclusion of a witness because of his color or 
because he was a party to or interested in the litigation. 13 Stat. 351 (1864). See also 
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The inadequacy of the static conformity created by the various 
Process Acts and unrelieved by the 1842 rule-making delegation be-
came intolerable in the third quarter of the nineteenth century 
when the states began to promulgate new procedural codes pat-
terned after New York's Field Code of 1848.440 Because the federal 
courts adhered to state practice as it existed on fixed dates prior to 
the advent of these codes, the notion that the procedure in a given 
federal court was identical to that employed by the courts in the 
state in which it was sitting was a chimera.441 
In response to this degenerating situation, Congress, in 1872, 
enacted the Conformity Act, section 5 of which provided: 
That the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in 
other than equity and admiralty causes ... shall conform, as near as 
may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceed-
ing existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the 
State within which such circuit or district courts are held, any rule 
of court to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, however, That 
nothing herein contained shall alter the rules of evidence under the 
laws of the United States, and as practiced in the courts thereof.442 
In addition to the rejection of static conformity, the Act is note-
worthy because it does not reaffirm the 1842 delegation of rule-
making power to the Supreme Court. Other than the existence of 
a firm congressional desire for procedural uniformity between state 
and federal courts within each state, there is no apparent explana-
tion for this omission. 
The proviso at the end of the section is another curiosity. Under 
section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the federal courts, including 
the Supreme Court, applied state rules of evidence in the absence of 
a federal statute.443 The Process Act of 1792 and the enactments 
supplementing it generally were not relied on as sources of rules of 
evidence. Inasmuch as the Conformity Act did not vitiate the prac-
tice under the Rules of Decision Act, the pre-1872 practice would 
have continued in the proviso's absence. Its inclusion, therefore, sup-
ports the argument that rules of evidence were viewed as matters of 
13 Stat. 374 (1864) (District of Columbia). The third limited the testimony of a sur• 
vivor in actions involving a dead man's representative. 13 Stat. 533 (1865). The three 
acts were later combined. REv. STAT. § 858 (1875). 
440. See CLARK, ConE PLEADING § 8 (2d ed. 1947). 
441. See generally Warren, Federal Process and State Legislation, 16 VA. L. REv. 
546, 557-70 (1930). 
442. 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872). 
443. See, e.g., Ryan v. Bindley, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 66 (1863); Vance v. Campbell, 66 
U.S. (1 Black) 427 (1861); Sims v. Hundley, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 1 (1848); McNeil v. 
Holbrook, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 84 (1838), 
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federal concern in 1872 and that Gongress intended federal-court 
uniformity rather than conformity to state practice in this area, 
although, as pointed out below, 444 this does not appear to be the 
judicial interpretation uniformly given the Conformity Act. In any 
event, the proviso was eliminated in 1878,445 which argµably gives 
rise to a diametrically opposite inference.446 
The early federal decisions intimating that evidence in the fed-
eral courts was governed by state law under the Rules of Decision 
Act were buttressed by similar language in opinions written after 
the Conformity Act was passed and the proviso in section 5 re-
moved. 447 In later decisions, however, it was concluded that the 
Conformity Act governed evidence.448 An additional deviation from 
the pre-Conformity Act doctrine took place when several circuits, 
presumably influenced by Swift v. Tyson,449 concluded that only state 
statutory rules of evidence were binding on the federal courts and 
applied "general" federal law absent a statute; other circuits, how-
ever, continued to adhere to the prior practice and used state rules 
of evidence, whether statutorily or judicially enunciated.450 The un-
444. See text accompanying notes 447-51 infra. 
445. REY. STAT. § 914 (1875). Federal evidence statutes prevailed over state practice 
in Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1885) (Mode of Proof Act); Potter v. National Bank, 
102 U.S. 163 (1880) (Competency of Witnesses Act). 
446. In Bryant v. Leyland, 6 Fed. 125, 127 (C.C.D. Mass. 1881), the court com-
mented on the removal of the proviso as follows: "The reason for omitting it may 
be assumed to be that the rules of evidence are no part of the practice, or forms or 
modes of proceeding, as they certainly are not in general, though the mode of 
obtaining evidence is." 
447. See Nashua Sav. Bank v. Anglo-American Land, Mortgage 8e Agency Co., 189 
U.S. 221 (1903); Bucher v. Cheshire R.R., 125 U.S. 555, 582 (1888); Connecticut Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 112 U.S. 250 (1884). See also Pure Oil Pipe Line Co. 
v. Ross, 51 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1931). 
448. See, e.g., De Soto Motor Corp. v. Stewart, 62 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1932); Keur v. 
Weiss, 37 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1930). 
449. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
450. Compare Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Luray Supply Co., 6 F.2d 218 (4th Cir. 
1925) (complete conformity), with Camden &: S. Ry. v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900) 
(statutory conformity), and Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Mcclish, 115 Fed. 268 (6th Cir. 
1902) (statutory conformity). See also DOBIE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 160 (1928). Some 
courts applied "general" law across the board. See, e.g., Bates v. Preble, 151 U.S. 149 
(1894); Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 
U.S. 656 (1935); Hawthorne v. Eckerson, 77 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1935). See also JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COM!lffITEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 
A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM 
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 4-6 (1962); Callahan &: 
Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 622, 
627-30 (1936); Leach, State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 43 HARV. L. REV. 
554, 569-77 (1930); Note, The Admissibility of Evidence in Federal Courts Under Rule 
43(a), 46 CoLUM. L. REv. 267 (1946). An apparent conflict on the subject existed within 
the Eighth Circuit, compare Chicago &: N.W. Ry. v. Kendall, 167 Fed. 62 (8th Cir. 
1909), with van Crome v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 11 F.2d 350 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 
U.S. 664 (1926), although in the latter case the court cited one statute but apparently 
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certainty as to the source of evidence rules for the federal courts in 
actions at law was symptomatic of numerous difficulties encountered 
under the Conformity Act.451 Because the act only required con-
formity "as near as may be," it was doomed from the outset to a 
variegated interpretation by the lower federal courts. 
Practice in equity initially was governed by the Process Act of 
1789,452 which provided that "the forms and modes of proceedings 
in causes of equity ... shall be according to the course of the civil 
law."453 Three years later Congress enacted the following statement 
as part of the Process Act of 1792: 
That the forms of writs, executions and other process, except their 
style and the forms and modes of proceeding in suits . . . in . . . 
equity ... [shall be] according to the principles, rules and usages 
which belong to courts of equity . . . , subject however to such 
alterations and additions as the said courts respectively shall in their 
discretion deem expedient, or to such regulations as the Supreme 
Court of the United States shall think proper from time to time by 
rule to prescribe. . . . 454 
The conformity principle presumably was not extended to equity 
because several states did not develop any substantial equity juris-
prudence until long after the Revolution.455 The Process Act of 1792 
remained the primary directive regarding federal equity procedure 
until the fusion of law and equity in 1938.456 
intended to apply the other. At least one decision seemed to indicate that the matter 
was one of judicial discretion. Royal Ins. Co. v. Eastham, 71 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 293 U.S. 557 (1934). See also Donm, FEDERAL PROCEDURE §§ 139, 160 (1928). 
451. See generally HART &: WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND TIIE FEDERAL 
SYsrEM 584-86 (1953); Clark &: Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 
387, 401-11 (1935). 
452. l Stat. 93, 94 (1789). 
453. Although the Rules of Decision Act applied only to actions at common law, 
equity courts generally looked to the law of the states for rules of substantive law. 
See, e.g., Meade v. Beale, 16 Fed. Cas. 1283 (No. 9371) (C.C.D. Md. 1850). This was 
not the situation, however, with remedies and matters of practice, which generally 
were considered to be matters of federal uniformity. See Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 
101 (1915); Neves v. Scott, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 268 (1851); Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. 
(6 Pet.) 648 (1838). See also Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REv. 
1013, 1024-31 (1953); Note, The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine: Past and Present, 
67 HARV. L. REv. 836 (1954). As a result of the fusion of law and equity and the 
traditional application of state substantive law in equity, the Rules of Decision Act 
was made applicable to equitable actions in 1948. See Revisor's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 
(1964). 
454. l Stat. 275, 276 (1792). 
455. See Fisher, The Administration of Equity Through Common-Law Forms in 
Pennsylvania, l L.Q. REv. 455 (1885), reprinted in 2 SELEcr EssAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LEGAL HISTORY 810 (1908); Woodruff, Chancery in Massachusetts, 5 L.Q. REv. 370 (1889). 
456. The only other noteworthy enactments relating to equity were a restatement 
of the Supreme Court's rule-making power, 5 Stat. 516, 518 (1842), its consolidation 
into the Mode of Proof Act in 1878, Rev. Stat. § 862 (1878), and the three Compe-
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The first equity rules were promulgated in 1822.457 They did not 
refer directly to rules of evidence or to the proof of foreign law but 
they did provide for the taking of testimony by commission,458 gaye 
the circuit courts power to promulgate further rules and regula-
tions, 450 and stated that in all matters not covered by the rules "the 
practice of circuit court shall be regulated by the practice of the 
high court of chancery in England."460 The rules of 1822 were sup-
planted in 1842 by more detailed provisions,461 which included rules 
for the taking of testimony and explicit provisions on examination, 
cross-examination, and admissibility.462 The courts were empowered 
to appoint masters to regulate proceedings, including matters of evi-
dence,463 and the reference to practice in the High Court of Chan-
cery was retained.464 The Supreme Court's final equity rule-mctking 
effort took place in 1912 when it promulgated a set of extre~ely 
comprehensive rules.465 Rule 46 detailed the manner in which evi-
dence was to be presented, objected to, and its admissibility reviewe~ 
on appeal,466 the 1842 provisions for pretrial discovery and court-
appointed masters were expanded, a number of rules dealing with 
matters of evidence were added, 467 and the reference to English 
chancery practice was deleted (probably because of the unification 
of the English courts in 1873).468 Little equity rule-making activity 
occurred between 1912 and 1938.469 
The nature and source of the evidence rules to be applied in the 
tency of Witnesses Acts, which were combined in 1878, Rev. Stat. § 858 (1878). See 
note 439 supra. The Mode of Proof Act specifically gave the Supreme Court power 
to prescribe rules for "the mode of proof in causes of equity." 
457. See RULES OF PRACTICE FOR THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF THE UNITED STATES, 20 
U.S. (7 Wheat.) xvii (1822). 
458. Equity R. 24-26, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) xvii, xix-xx (1822). 
459. Equity R. 32, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) xxi (1822). 
460. Equity R. 33, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) xxi (1822). 
461. See Rules of Practice in Suits in Equity in the Circuit Courts of the United 
States, 42 U.S. (I 7 Pet.) xii (1842). 
462. Equity R. 67-70, 42 U.S. (17 Pet.) xii, lxxii-lxxiii (1842). See also Equity R. 80-
81, 42 U.S. (17 Pet.) xii, lxxv (1842). 
463. Equity R. 77, 42 U.S. (17 Pet.) lxxv (1842). 
464. See Equity R. 90, 42 U.S. (17 Pet.) lxxvi (1842). 
465. See Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 
627 (1912). Between 1842 and 1912 the rules were modified sporadically but by and 
large the changes were of a trivial nature. 
466. See also Equity R. 47-49, 51, 64, 226 U.S. 627, 661-63, 668 (1912). 
467. See, e.g., Equity R. 62, 64-65, 226 U.S. 667-68 (1912). 
468. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 &: 37 Viet., c. 66. See Bowen, 
Progress in the Administration of Justice During the Victorian Period, in 1 SELECT 
EssAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 516-57 (1907); Sunderland, The English 
Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 HARv. L. REv. 725 (1926). 
469. See generally Lane, Twenty Years Under the Federal Equity Rules, 46 HARV. 
L. REv. 638 (1933); Talley, The New and the Old Federal Equity Rules Compared, 18 
VA. L. REV. 663 (1913). 
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federal equity courts under the 1822, 1842, and 1912 Rules raised 
questions that were never satisfactorily resolved, in part because of 
the dearth of federal equity decisions on points of evidence.470 Au-
thority existed for the proposition that the rules of evidence in equity 
were the same as those applied at law, the only difference being that 
an objection to evidence was noted on the record for purposes of 
appeal. 471 This view was supported by one reading of the ambiguous 
statement in Rule 46 of the 1912 Rules to the effect that "the court 
shall pass upon the admissibility of all evidence offered as in actions 
in law." A second hypothesis was that the English rules of 1842 were 
the source of evidence rules in federal equity courts,472 a proposi-
tion supported by the reference to English chancery practice in the 
1822 and 1842 Rules. Furthermore, the text of the Process Act of 
1792 and the inapplicability of the conformity principle in equity 
could be interpreted as indicating that Congress desired uniformity 
in the federal equity courts-a goal most easily accomplished by the 
incorporation of English practice.473 A third approach was based 
upon the premise that federal equity practice was not encumbered by 
any rules of evidence, especially those dealing with admissibility; 
the theory was that there is no reason to exclude any potentially 
relevant material absent a jury.474 This view has the attraction, as 
does the second, of being consistent with the notion that the federal 
equity courts were an independent legal system, unfettered by the 
conformity principle and free to develop a unitary national practice. 
In the end, no single theory achieved ascendancy over the others. 
2. The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934475 empowers the Supreme Court 
to prescribe general rules governing "the forms of process, writs, 
470. The lack of judicial opinions on the subject results from the fact that im-
properly admitted and improperly excluded evidence, which was required to he set 
forth in the record, usually was ignored on appeal or considered by the court with-
out comment, and rarely served as a basis for reversal. See I ,vmMORE, EVIDENCE § 6, 
at 172-73 (3d ed. 1940). For a statistical analysis indicating the unimportance of 
questions of admissibility in federal equity cases, see Callahan &: Ferguson, Et1ide11ce 
and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 622, 625 (1936). 
471. See, e.g., Harmer v. Gwynne, 11 Fed. Cas. 551 (No. 6,075) (C.C.D. Ohio 1851); 
l BATES, FEDERAL EQUITY PROCEDURE § 388 (1901); GRESLEY, LAW OF EVIDENCE IN THE 
COURTS OF EQUITY 2-6 (2d ed. 1848); Green, The Admissibility of Evidence Under the 
Federal Rules, 55 HARV. L. REv. 197, 201-02 (1941). 
472. See I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 6, at 172 (3d ed. 1940) (opinion of Russell Wiles, 
Esq.). 
473. Cf. United States v. American Lumber Co., 85 Fed. 827, 829 (9th Cir. 1898). 
474. See Carson v. American Smelting &: Ref. Co., 25 F.2d 116, 119 (W.D. Wash. 
1928); Callahan &: Ferguson, supra note 470, at 625; cf. Manhat v. United States, 220 
F.2d 143 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 966 (1955). 
475. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). The language of the 
act was revamped in 1948 to take account of the merger of law and equity. 
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pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil 
actions at law" in the United States District Courts and the courts 
of the District of Columbia. The rules cannot "abridge, enlarge, or 
modify" the substantive rights of any litigant. Section 2 of the 
original act gave the Court authority to merge law and equity 
"provided ... that in such union of rules the right of trial by jury 
as at common law and declared by the seventh amendment to the 
Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."476 
At first glance, the Enabling Act merely reinstates the Supreme 
Court's rule-making power, which had existed with respect to the 
law courts before the Conformity Act and had been in force in 
equity after the Process Act of 1792, and grants the power to fuse 
law and equity. The efforts entailed in securing the enactment of the 
act and the conditions that motivated those efforts, however, belie 
the simple language of the statute. The Enabling Act was the culmi-
nation of more than twenty years of concerted pressure by the bar 
to eliminate the uncertainties of federal practice under the Con-
formity Act and the Equity Rules of 1912.477 Its failure to trumpet 
any grandiose legislative purpose merely reflects the indecision of 
the act's draftsmen and sponsors as to whether uniformity of practice 
among the state and federal courts in the same jurisdiction was more 
desirable than uniformity among the federal courts throughout the 
country. This ambivalence ultimately was resolved and a plan 
emerged to adopt uniform rules for the federal district courts that 
also would serve as a model for procedural reform in the states.478 
There always has been a consensus among the commentators that 
the Rules Enabling Act delegates sufficient authority to the Supreme 
Court to permit the promulgation of rules of evidence for the fed-
eral courts479 (and for the moment Rule 44.1 is being subsumed 
476. The first legislative step toward fusion was the Law and Equity Act of 1915, 
38 Stat. 956, which made equitable defenses available at law and permitted the trans-
fer of cases brought on the wrong side of the court. 
477. See Clark &: Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387 (1935); 
Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 32 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1116 (1934); Taft, Three Needed Steps of Progress, 8 A.B.A.J. 
34 (1922). 
478. Debate over the primary goal of the reform movement continued until the 
statute actually was passed. Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 
75th Cong., 3d Sess., serial 17, 1-26 (1938). See generally Sunderland, supra note 477. 
The decision to unify law and equity and to appoint an Advisory Committee was not 
made until mid-1935. See generally IA MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r,i 0.501(2), 0.511 
(2d ed. 1966). 
479. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE ON Rur.ES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBIUTY 
OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM RUI.ES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 29-
36 (1962); Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARv. L. REv. 275, 277-87 
(1962): Degnan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D. 341 
(1960); Estes, The Need for Uniform Rules of Evidence in the Federal Courts, ~4 
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under the rules of evidence). This also appears to have been the con-
clusion of the Advisory Committee that drafted the original Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.480 The Committee did not incorporate 
rules of evidence in its draft primarily because its members con-
sidered the task beyond their energies and one better left to 
another group or to gradual judicial development. In addition, it 
was felt that the delay resulting from an attempt to formulate evi-
dence rules might have jeopardized the expeditious adoption of the 
other rules. Thus, Rule 43(a) was inserted as a temporary expe-
dient.481 Actually, several other Rules touch upon matters of evi-
dence, including Rule 44, which governs the admissibility of official 
documents, and Rules 26-37, 4l(b), 43(b)(c)(d)(e), 45, 46, 50, 59(a), 
60, 61, 68, and 80.482 None of these Rules has been challenged suc-
cessfully as being beyond the scope of the Enabling Act. 
Obviously, however, the Enabling Act is not infinitely elastic. 
The jugular issue in determining the validity of a Federal Rule 
under the act's rule-making delegation is whether the rule relates 
F.R.D. 331 (1960); Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 
429 (1958); Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REv. 
467; 484 (1957); Riedl, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power 
Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 601 (1940); Sullivan, Evidence Rules in the 
Federal Courts: A Time for a Change, 38 TEXAS L REv. 451 (1960); Sunderland, 
Character and Extent of the Rule Making Power Granted U.S. Supreme Court and 
Methods of Effective Exercise, 21 A.B.A.J. 404, 406-07 (1935); Sweeney, Federal or 
State Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 27 ILL. L. REV. 394, 398 (1932). But see 
Wickes, The New Rule-Making Power of the United States Supreme Court, 13 TEXAS 
L. R.Ev. 1, 23-25 (1934); Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting 
Procedure, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 459, 462-64 (1937). The early Supreme Court decisions in 
Doe ex dem. Patterson v. Winn, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 233 (1831), and Mills v. Bank of the 
United States, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 431 (1826) (dictum), in which evidence rules promul-
gated by lower federal courts were invalidated, are not relevant because of the absence 
of any congressional delegation of rule-making power to those courts. 
480. See AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 186 
(1938) (Cleveland meetings). That the Advisory Committee realized it was dealing 
with matters of evidence is made abundantly clear by the following passage from its 
note to Rule 43(a): 
The second and third sentences on admissibility of evidence and Subdivision (b) 
on contradiction and cross-examination modify U.S.C., Title 28, § 725 (Laws of 
states as rules of decision) in so far as that statute has been construed to prescribe 
conformity to °state rules of evidence. • . • The last sentence modifies to the 
extent indicated U.S.C., Title 28, § 631 (Competency of witnesses governed by 
state laws). 
ADVISORY COMl\HTrEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, NOTES TO THE RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 37 (1938). Thus, the Congress was on notice prior to its approval of the 
Federal Rules that the Advisory Committee had construed the Enabling Act as ex-
tending to matters of evidence. An excellent analysis of the circumstances surrounding 
the enactment of the Enabling Act and the adoption of the Federal Rules is found 
in Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275, 278-82 (1962). 
481. See Clark, Foreword to Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 10 
RUTGERS L. REV. 479 (1956). 
482. See generally JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, op. cit. supra note 
479, at 12-14; 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 6c (3d ed. 1940). 
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to "practice and procedure" or affects "substantive rights." The legis-
lative history is inconclusive as to how these words apply to rules of 
evidence. A version of the statute submitted to Congress many years 
before the Enabling Act's ultimate enactment specifically provided 
for "taking and obtaining evidence"483 but the absence of this passage 
in the final enactment is of de minimis probative force. The Revisor's 
Note to the Rules Enabling Act for admiralty484 states that a reference 
to "modes of proof," which historically encompassed rules of evi-
dence, was deleted because it was believed covered by the words 
"practice and procedure." A transmutation of this reasoning to the 
Civil Rules context supports the conclusion that evidence is within 
the compass of the Rules Enabling Act. 
Nonetheless, the history of federal procedure prior to the En-
abling Act does not foreclose the argument that rules of evidence 
were "rules of decision" under section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, rather than matters of "practice, pleadings, and forms and 
modes of proceedings" within the meaning of the Process, Mode of 
Proof, and Conformity Acts. The thrust of this thesis is that rules of 
evidence deal with "substantive rights" and are outside the delega-
tion in the Rules Enabling Act. Recall that pre-Conformity Act de-
cisions relied upon the Rules of Decision Act to bind federal courts 
to state rules of evidence absent a federal statute, and that a number 
of federal courts reached the same conclusion even after the Confor-
mity Act was enacted.485 Furthermore, a sharp distinction occasionally 
was drawn in the post-Conformity Act cases between practice and 
rules of evidence. In Chicago & Northwestern Ry. v. Kendall,486 it 
was held that a federal court's power to compel a plaintiff to submit 
to a physical examination was a matter of practice and not of evi-
dence. The Eighth Circuit, citing the Supreme Court's decision in 
Wayman v. Southard,481 went on to state that the Rules of Decision 
Act did not apply to the process and practice of the federal courts. 
In Wayman the Supreme Court had remarked that "the thirty-fourth 
section ... has no application to the practice of the court, or to the 
conduct of its officer, in the service of an execution."488 Unfortu-
483. See S. REP. No. 892, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1917). Judicial rule-making in the 
realm of evidence on the state level is discussed in Clapp, Privilege Against Self-
lncrimination, IO RUTGERS L. REv. 541, 562-73 (1956); Kaplan &: Greene, The Legis-
lature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 
65 HARV. L. REv. 234 (1951); Levin &: Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial 
Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. I (1958). 
484. 28 u.s.c. § 2073 t<J964). 
485. See text accompanying notes 443-51 supra. 
486. 167 Fed. 62, 65 (8th Cir. 1909). 
487. 23 U.S. (IO Wheat.) l (1825). 
488. Id. at 6. 
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nately, the passage's punctuation renders it ambiguous. One com-
mentator has argued that Wayman supports the proposition that the 
Rules of Decision Act did not require conformity to state practice.489 
This view is bolstered by language in United States v. Eckford,490 
which appears to be a lineal descendent of the statement in the 
Wayman syllabus that section 34 "does not apply to the process and 
practice of the [federal] courts. It is a mere legislative recognition of 
the principles of universal jurisprudence as to the operation of the 
lex .... "491 It is doubtful, however, that the Court's opinion in 
Wayman actually supports the passage in the syllabus. In addition 
to Kendall, at least one other post-Conformity Act case held that 
although methods for obtaining evidence were matters of practice 
and procedure, rules of evidence were not.492 
Given this historical background the following syllogism can be 
constructed: if matters of evidence were governed by the Rules of 
Decision Act, and if the Rules of Decision Act did not extend to 
matters of practice and procedure, then evidence is not a matter of 
practice and procedure. Although the judicial opinions on the status 
of evidence prior to the Enabling Act do not use the terms "sub-
stance" and "procedure," the allocation of matters between the Rules 
of Decision and Conformity Acts may reflect a primordial substance-
procedure dichotomy for ascertaining the source of governing law 
in the federal courts.493 If the syllogism is correct and evidence is 
within the ambit of the Rules of Decision Act,494 the failure to modify 
that statute at the time the Enabling Act was passed coupled with 
the similarity of the language in both the Enabling and Conformity 
Acts lends additional textual support for characterizing evidence as 
"substantive" and beyond the scope of the Enabling Act's delegation. 
This hypothesis clearly is quite tenuous, however. In contrast to 
the views expressed in cases such as Kendall, several Supreme 
Court495 and lower federal court496 decisions contain dic.!a to the 
489. Wickes, The New Rule-Making Power of the United States Supreme Court, 
13 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 24 (1934). 
490. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 484 (1867). 
491. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 2; cf. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 6b, at 195 (3d ed. 1940). 
492. Bryant v. Leyland, 6 Fed. 125 (C.C.D. Mass. 1881); cf. Easton v. Hodges, 8 
Fed. Cas. 271 (No. 4258) (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1877), rev'd on other grounds, 106 U.S. 408 
(1882). See also McKeon v. Central Stamping Co., 264 Fed. 385 (3d Cir. 1920); McBride 
v. Neal, 214 Fed. 966 (:'th Cir. 1914); DOBIE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 139 (1928). 
493. See Blume 8: George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 MICH. L. REv. 
937, 938 (1951). 
494. The limited legislative history of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
sheds no light on the intended significance or compass of its reference to state law. 
See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. 
L. R.Ev. 49, 81-88 (1923). 
495. See Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 385 (1897); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 
221, 231 (1882). 
496. See De Soto Motor Corp. v. Stewart, 62 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1932); Keur v. 
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effect that the Conformity Act and not the Rules of Decision Act 
governed evidence rules. It also seems reasonably clear that whether 
a court relied on one statute rather than the other depended upon 
considerations other than a perception of the demarcation between 
"substance" and "procedure."497 Judicial resort to the Rules of Deci-
sion Act on points of evidence before the enactment of the Con-
formity Act is understandable, since utilization of the static con-
formity of the Process Acts would have compelled the federal courts 
to follow state practices as of wholly arbitrary dates. In McNeil v. 
Holbrook, 498 for example, had the Supreme Court relied on the 
Process Act of 1792, rather than on the Rules of Decision Act, an 
extremely relevant Georgia statute enacted in 1810 (twenty-eight 
years before the case reached the Supreme Court) probably would 
not have been applied. Inasmuch as numerous pre-1872 opinions 
referred to the Rules of Decision Act on matters of evidence, it is 
not surprising that these pronouncements continued after 1872, 
especially since it usually was of no moment which act served as a 
source of law for evidence rules. 
Finally, even if evidence matters were controlled by the Rules 
of Decision Act, that alone is an insufficient basis for concluding that 
rules of evidence are "substantive" under the Rules Enabling Act of 
1934. Although a substance-procedure analysis was applied to several 
legal problems before the Enabling Act,499 it was not used with 
reference to evidence or, for that matter, to determine the source of 
law governing actions in the federal courts. Utilization of the di-
chotomy to ascertain the governing law in the federal courts is 
largely a post-1934 phenomenon stemming from the Enabling Act's 
wording and the amplification of the attention given the substance-
procedure syndrome following the decisions in Erie and York.500 
Indeed, there is no evidence that the Advisory Committee appointed 
to draft the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure considered the 
line between the Rules of Decision Act and the Conformity Act of 
consequence in determining the boundaries of its mandate under the 
Enabling Act. 
The foregoing analysis makes it difficult to conclude that rules of 
Weiss, 37 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1930); Battaglia v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. 
Ill. 1935). 
497. See 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 43.02[2] (2d ed. 1966). 
498. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 84 (1838). 
499. See R.Esl'ATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 585, 595-98 (1934). 
500. The writers who have alluded to the possibility of evidence falling within 
the Rules of Decision Act rather than the Conformity Act have taken the position 
that this allocation would not preclude the conclusion that evidence is a branch of 
procedure. 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 43.02[2] (2d ed. 1966); Sunderland, Character 
and Extent of the Rule-Making Power Granted U.S. Supreme Court and Methods of 
Effective Exercise, 21 A.B.A.J. 404, 407 (1935). 
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evidence are substantive and beyond the scope of the Enabling Act. 
Construing the statute to exclude evidence is inconsistent with the 
Enabling Act's purpose of providing a foundation for an effective 
revision of federal practice. Furthermore, the thesis for classifying 
evidence as substantive is unidirectional. It focuses entirely on the 
history of practice on the law side of the federal courts and overlooks 
the fact that neither the Rules of Decision nor the Conformity Act 
applied to equity, which after 1822 was governed by rules promul-
gated by the Supreme Court pursuant to a grant of authority similar 
to the Enabling Act. It also is doubtful that Congress concerned itself 
with what the precise contours of "practice and procedure" in the 
federal courts should be when it enacted the Enabling Act, or that it 
intended to constrict the Supreme Court's rule-making power in ac-
cordance with any classification scheme supposedly in existence be-
fore 1934. Congress appears to have been much more desirous of 
wiping the slate clean and eliminating the statutory goulash created 
by the Rules of Decision Act, the Process Acts, the Conformity Act, 
the Competency of Witnesses Act, and the Mode of Proof Act. 601 
The Supreme Court has examined the scope of the Enabling 
Act on only a few occasions since the adoption of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.602 In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,603 the plaintiff 
refused to comply with an order under Rule 35 to submit to a 
physical examination, contending that although Rule 35 and the 
mechanism for its enforcement in Rule 37 were rules of procedure, 
they were beyond the Enabling Act's delegation to the Supreme 
Court because they affected well-recognized "important" or "sub-
stantial" rights. The Court rejected this contention in a five-to-four 
decision, stating: 
The asserted right . . . is no more important than many others 
enjoyed by litigants ... before the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure altered and abolished old rights or privileges and created 
new ones in connection with the conduct of litigation. . . . If we 
were to adopt the suggested criterion of the importance of the 
alleged right we should invite endless litigation and confusion worse 
confounded. The test must be whether a rule really regulates pro-
cedure-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recog-
nized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and 
redress for disregard or infraction of them. 504 
501. See S. REP. 1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1926). 
502. The Supreme Court failed to approve a proposed rule on the registration of 
judgments, which appeared as Rule 77 of the Advisory Committee's 1937 draft. Con-
ceivably, the Court felt that this rule affected substantive rights. See 2 MooRE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE 1 1.04[2] (2d ed. 1966). 
503. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
504. Id. at 14. The question before the Court in Sibbach was raised again in 
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The dissenting opinion, written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, did not 
dispute the conclusion that matters involving the "economic and fair 
conduct of litigation" are within the Enabling Act; instead, it argued 
that Rule 35 impairs the historic immunity of the person. 
In Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,505 a unanimous 
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the provision in Rule 4(£) 
permitting a federal court's process to run throughout the state in 
which it sits. The Court acknowledged that the Rule affected the cor-
porate petitioner because it might not have been subjected to suit 
outside a particular district in a multi-district state under prior 
practice, but concluded that the Rule related only to the manner and 
means of enforcing the respondent's claim and did "not operate to 
abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of decision by which ... [the 
district court] will adjudicate its rights."506 
Most recently, in Hanna v. Plumer,507 which already has been 
considered in detail,508 Mr. Chief Justice Warren indicated that a 
Federal Rule can be invalidated "only if the Advisory Committee, 
this Court and Congress erred in their prima fade judgment that the 
Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act 
nor constitutional restrictions."509 The Chief Justice's opinion un-
fortunately offers few insights into what "transgresses ... the terms 
of the ... Act." A sentence at the close of the opinion that may apply 
only to the Erie aspect of the case but nonetheless does demonstrate 
the elevated status given the Rules, states: "To hold that a Federal 
Rule ... must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of en-
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964), with similar results and without any 
dissent on the question of the Rule's validity. 
505. 326 U.S. 438 (1946). 
506. Id. at 446. In Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub 
nom. Carlin v. Iovino, 362 U.S. 949 (1960), the Second Circuit made it clear that the 
substance-procedure analysis employed in diversity litigation under Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins before Hanna v. Plumer does not apply to the process of defining the 
scope of the Rules Enabling Act. In Iovino the court upheld Rule 25(a)(l) against the 
contention that the substitution of parties permitted by the Rule would not be 
permitted under state practice. The court stated: 
[I]t would unduly restrict the grant of authority made by Congress to hold that 
a rule contravenes the Enabling Act as abridging, enlarging or modifying sub-
stantive rights merely because a provision admittedly procedural in nature either 
furthers or prevents the enforcement of such rights. 
Id. at 46. The opposite conclusion regarding the same Rule had been reached in the 
pre-Byrd decision in Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956). See also Bendix 
Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1952); Hart v. Knox County, 171 F.2d 
45 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
But cf. Provident Tradesmens Bank &: Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 365 
F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966), 80 HARv. L. R.Ev. 678 (1967); 65 MICH, L. REV. No. 5 (to be pub-
lished March, 1967). 
507. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
508. See text accompanying notes 364-75 supra. 
509. 380 U.S. at 471. 
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forcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the Con-
stitution's grant of power over federal procedure or Congress' attempt 
to exercise that power in the Enabling Act."510 Despite the lack of 
elaboration in Hanna, that case clearly gives extremely wide latitude 
to those who formulate the rules for the federal courts. 
The history of practice and procedure in the federal courts and 
the criteria derived from the cases construing the Rules Enabling 
Act leave little doubt that the vast majority of evidentiary matters 
relate to practice and procedure or to "the manner and means of 
enforcing" rights, and therefore are within Congress' delegation to 
the Supreme Court. Principles of admissibility and competency 
historically have evolved judicially, either gradually by the deci-
sional process or pursuant to rule-making delegations from legisla-
tive bodies.511 Certain quasi-evidentiary subjects, such as privileges 
and burdens of proof, have been thought to require special treat-
ment512 because they frequently represent a conscious attempt to 
balance one litigant's ability to enforce a right against another liti-
gant's ability to defend against the assertion of that right. Further-
more, privileges and burdens of proof frequently have a legislative 
genesis, as is especially true when they are associated with a statutory 
cause of action, 513 or embody important policies as to the handling 
of certain information and confidential relationships by the courts. 
In these sensitive areas, Congress may not have intended the Enabling 
Act to give the Supreme Court power to overturn state or federal 
legislative judgments. With these exceptions, the Supreme Court's 
present effort to develop federal evidence rules appears to be a proper 
exercise of their rule-making power.514 
3. Rule 44.1 and the Enabling Act 
In light of the foregoing, it seems reasonable to conclude that if 
Federal Rule 44.1 is viewed as a rule of evidence, it is well within 
the ambit of the Rules Enabling Act. Certainly the second sentence 
510. Id. at 473-74. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan took exception to 
what he believed to be the Court's "arguably procedural, ergo constitutional test.'' 
Id. at 476. 
511. See Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429 
(1957). 
512. See, e.g., Louisell &: Crippens, Evidentiary Privileges, 40 MINN. L. REv. 413 
(1956); Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. R.Ev. 
467, 483-84 (1957). 
513. See Degnan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D. 
341, 346-48 (1959). 
514. See 1961 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF nu: 
UNITED STATES 31; Maris, Federal Procedural Rule-Making: The Program of the Judi-
cial Conference, 47 A.B.A.J. 772 (1961). 
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of the Rule falls in this category, given the strong analogy between 
it and the general admissibility provision in Rule 43(a). Even if the 
second sentence is not subsumed under the rules of evidence but is 
classified as a sharp departure from the historic treatment accorded 
foreign-law issues by the federal courts, it does not violate the 
Enabling Act. The rejection of one practice and the substitution of 
another conceived to be better suited to current conditions is a 
permissible form of rule-making as long as substantive rights are not 
affected, and such rights do not seem to be affected by this portion of 
the Rule. A litigant does not have a substantive right to prove foreign 
law or to have his opponent do so in a certain mode any more than a 
litigant has a vested right to have contributory negligence pleaded in 
a stylized manner by a particular party or to have a "cause of action," 
rather than a "claim for relief," set forth in his adversary's plead-
ings. 515 Thus, the fact that the Rule permits the court to consider 
foreign-law material that may be inadmissible under traditional 
evidence notions or to engage in its own research excursions does 
not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right" of the litigants. 
The new Rule's final sentence also seems invulnerable. It does 
not exceed the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules govern-
ing the procedure "of the district courts," even though its content 
tangentially affects the conduct of the appellate courts by shaping the 
scope of review to be given a trial court's determination of foreign 
law. The last sentence's characterization of a foreign-law determina-
tion as a ruling on a question of law is directed primarily at the 
district courts. Its purpose is to define the methodology to be em-
ployed by the trial judge in handling foreign-law issues in such con-
texts as motions for summary judgment, new trial, and judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. Moreover, the last sentence of the new 
Rule has no more impact on the appellate process than does the 
provision in Rule 54(b) for final judgment on less than all the 
claims in an action and the passage in Rule 73 dealing with 
appeals to the courts of appeals, both of which have survived 
Rules Enabling Act challenges.516 To the extent that the last sen-
tence in Rule 44.1 affects the scope of review given a trial court's 
determination of foreign law, it is indistinguishable from the "clearly 
erroneous" standard in Rule 52(a). Admittedly, the new Rule may 
alter the pre-1966 scope of review in several circuits but the amplifi-
cation of the appellate court's obligations vis-a-vis issues of foreign 
515. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
516. See Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1952) (Rule 54(b)); 
Hart v. Knox County, 171 F.2d 45 (6th Cir. 1948) (Rule 73). 
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law cannot be said to "modify the substantive rights of any litigant" 
in a way that differs from numerous other procedural changes effected 
by the Federal Rules, including the expansion of discovery, the 
territorial reach of the district court's process, and the role of the 
trial judge on post-trial motions.1517 
Finally, using Rule 44.1 as a fulcrum for developing a federal 
standard with respect to allocating proof functions among the parties 
or dealing with a failure to prove foreign law or for justifying judi-
cial resolution of foreign-law issues without jury involvement will 
not generate Enabling Act difficulties. By analogy to Cohen and 
Ragan, and their ex post facto rationalization in Hanna,1518 these 
practices are not covered by Rule 44.1 and their validity will not be 
tested under the rule-making power. Instead, they raise issues as to 
the proper scope of federal power under the Constitution to regu-
late matters pertaining to the functioning of the national courts and 
therefore should be tested by the same factors that were explored in 
the discussion of the Erie doctrine and the interest balancing analysis 
of Byrd.1519 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The rigid insistence by American courts upon the formal plead-
ing and proof of foreign law during the nineteenth and early part 
of the twentieth centuries was the by-product of the common-law 
fetish of characterizing issues of foreign law as questions of fact. This 
classification, which originally was employed by the English courts 
for purposes that in retrospect appear to have little relevance to 
existing conditions, permeated the entire process of proving alien 
law and obfuscated the functional similarity between domestic and 
foreign-law issues. The fact theory became so pervasive in the United 
States that even the enactment of statutes designed to relieve courts 
517. Since Rule 44.1 does not deal explicitly with the question whether foreign 
law should be determined by a judge or jury, it does not run afoul of the express 
preservation of trial by jury in the Enabling Act. A federal-court practice of judicial 
determination of foreign-law issues would not abridge the seventh amendment's jury-
trial guarantee. See text accompanying notes 231-92 supra. 
518. See text accompanying notes 368-70 supra. 
519. Cf. Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 858, 862 (5th Cir. 1966) 
("the unit of time type of argnment is not proscribed by federal statute or by the 
federal rules"; "the propriety of the argument is a federal question"; "it is a matter 
of federal trial procedure"; citing Byra). There are several intimations in National 
Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), that federal law can be used to 
fill the interstices of the Federal Rules. Presumably, the Byrd analysis will be super-
imposed on questions of this type. The Erie doctrine, its modification by Byrd, and 
the relevance of the two cases to Rule 44.1 are discussed at text accompanying notes 
332-428 supra. 
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and litigants of much of the burden of pleading and proof failed 
to liberate the judicial mind from established patterns of doctrine 
and nomenclature. Not surprisingly, the federal courts fell heir to 
much of the dogma and it was not until the promulgation of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that any attempt was made to chip 
away the encrustation that had formed on judicial habits in this area. 
The adoption of Federal Rule 44.1 in 1966 has presented the 
federal courts with a blueprint for handling foreign-law issues that 
extricates them from the formalism and inefficiency of the fact 
approach. The new Rule offers parties and trial judges a highly 
malleable scheme for raising, proving, and determining foreign law 
that is compatible with the clarion for the "just, speedy, and inex-
pensive" administration of justice sounded in Federal Rule I. If 
the conceptual underpinnings and modus operandi of the Rule are 
given effect by the federal judiciary, the pleading and proof of foreign 
law will be modernized and brought into the mainstream of Federal 
Rule practice. Given the increased incidence of foreign-law issues in 
federal litigation during the past quarter century, it is imperative 
that this be done in order to secure the full benefits of the new Rule. 
Rule 44.1 does not deal explicitly with many of the problems that 
are bound to arise in the future-some of these will be the timing of 
the notice required by the Rule's first sentence, the allocation of 
proof functions, the relative roles of the trial judge and the jury, the 
consequences of failing to prove foreign law, and the precise scope 
of appellate review. The expectation is that the various lacunae 
in the Rule will be closed by the courts in ways consistent with the 
norms established in analogous areas of federal procedure to the 
extent that the peculiarities of proving foreign law permit. This 
burden of innovative cross-fertilization and integration of the Rule 
has appropriately been left to the federal bench. 
In the event that Rule 44.1 is challenged under the Erie doctrine 
or the Rules Enabling Act, due account should be taken of the federal 
policies, both expressed and implicit, embodied in the Rule, the 
extensive effort that has been expended in the last decade in every 
quadrant of the federal government and by the bar to upgrade the 
United States' international judicial co-operation practices, and the 
fact that the new Rule is a working element of a comprehensive civil 
procedure system. Distortion of the practice under Rule 44.1 may 
have an adverse affect on other parts of the adjudicatory process and 
on the federal government's overall schema for promoting interna-
tional judicial assistance. In short, faithful and creative employ-
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ment of the new procedure for determining foreign law are highly 
desirable policy objectives. Since the Supreme Court decisions in 
Byrd and Hanna, doctrinal bases for achieving these objectives and 
for preventing the emasculation of Rule 44.1 are available. 
